scholarly journals Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 193 (7) ◽  
pp. 2097-2127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Galeazzi ◽  
Emiliano Lorini
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Type Spaces ◽  
Multi Agent

INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Alternative Set

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

scholarly journals Superrational types

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 847-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando A Tohmé ◽  
Ignacio D Viglizzo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Usual Assumption ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Type Spaces

AbstractWe present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes.

scholarly journals User-Centric Radio Access Technology Selection: A Survey of Game Theory Models and Multi-Agent Learning Algorithms

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Caso ◽  
Ozgu Alay ◽  
Guido Carlo Ferrante ◽  
Luca De Nardis ◽  
Maria-Gabriella Di Benedetto ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Learning Algorithms ◽  
Technology Selection ◽  
Access Technology ◽  
Radio Access Technology ◽  
Radio Access ◽  
Agent Learning ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
User Centric ◽  
Radio Access Technology Selection

scholarly journals Model Checking Temporal Epistemic Logic under Bounded Recall

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (05) ◽  
pp. 7071-7078
Author(s):  
Francesco Belardinelli ◽  
Alessio Lomuscio ◽  
Emily Yu
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Upper Bounds ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Model Checker ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Bounded Recall

We study the problem of verifying multi-agent systems under the assumption of bounded recall. We introduce the logic CTLKBR, a bounded-recall variant of the temporal-epistemic logic CTLK. We define and study the model checking problem against CTLK specifications under incomplete information and bounded recall and present complexity upper bounds. We present an extension of the BDD-based model checker MCMAS implementing model checking under bounded recall semantics and discuss the experimental results obtained.

scholarly journals GAME THEORY BASED MULTI CRITERIA DECISION MAKING PROBLEM UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A CASE STUDY ON INDIAN TEA INDUSTRY

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Animesh DEBNATH ◽  
Abhirup BANDYOPADHYAY ◽  
Jagannath ROY ◽  
Samarjit KAR
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Market Volatility ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Multi Criteria Decision Making ◽  
Tea Industry ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Indian Tea

The long-term evolution of multi agent multi criteria decision making (MCDM) and to obtain sustainable decision a novel methodology is proposed based on evolutionary game theory. In this paper multi agent MCDM is represented as an evolutionary game and the evolutionary strategies are defined as sustainable decisions. Here we consider the problem of decision making in Indian Tea Industry. The agents in this game are essentially Indian Tea Estate owner and Indian Tea board. The replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game are studied to obtain evolutionary strategies which could be defined as sustainable strategies. The multi agent MCDM in Indian Tea Industry is considered under different socio-political and Corporate Social Responsibility scenario and groups of Indian Tea Industry. Again, the impacts of imprecision and market volatility on the outcome of some strategies (decisions) are studied. In this paper the imprecision on the impact of the strategies are modelled as fuzzy numbers whereas the market volatility is taken into account as white noise. Hence the MCDM problem for Indian Tea Industry is modelled as a hybrid evolutionary game. The probabilities of strategies are obtained by solving hybrid evolutionary game and could be represented as a Dempster-Shafer belief structure. The simulation results facilitate the Decision Makers to choose the strategies (decisions) under different type of uncertainty.

scholarly journals Possession as Linear Knowledge

10.29007/ntkm ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Pfenning
Keyword(s):  
Distributed System ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Linear Logic ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Cut Elimination ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Ongoing Effort ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Localized Knowledge

Epistemic logic analyzes reasoning governing localized knowledge, and is thus fundamental to multi- agent systems. Linear logic treats hypotheses as consumable resources, allowing us to model evolution of state. Combining principles from these two separate traditions into a single coherent logic allows us to represent localized consumable resources and their flow in a distributed system. The slogan “possession is linear knowledge” summarizes the underlying idea. We walk through the design of a linear epistemic logic and discuss its basic metatheoretic properties such as cut elimination. We illustrate its expressive power with several examples drawn from an ongoing effort to design and implement a linear epistemic logic programming language for multi-agent distributed systems.

Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Famous Theorem ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Natural Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Rationality

This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.

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