scholarly journals Radical interpretation and decision theory

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anandi Hattiangadi ◽  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Representation Theorems ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Empirical Information ◽  
Radical Interpreter

AbstractThis paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation. The interpretationist defends the physicalist thesis that the intentional truths supervene on the physical truths by arguing that it is possible for a radical interpreter, who knows all of the physical truths, to work out the intentional truths about what an arbitrary agent believes, desires, and means without recourse to any further empirical information. One of the most compelling arguments for the possibility of radical interpretation, associated most closely with David Lewis and Donald Davidson, gives a central role to decision theoretic representation theorems, which demonstrate that if an agent’s preferences satisfy certain constraints, it is possible to deduce probability and utility functions that represent her beliefs and desires. We argue that an interpretationist who wants to rely on existing representation theorems in defence of the possibility of radical interpretation faces a trilemma, each horn of which is incompatible with the possibility of radical interpretation.

scholarly journals Verdade, interpretação e objetividade em Donald Davidson

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
José Maria Arruda
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
Philosophical Hermeneutic ◽  
Principle Of Charity ◽  
Radical Interpreter ◽  
Philosophical Importance

Donald Davidson foi um dos filósofos mais influentes da tradição analítica da segunda metade do século. A unidade de sua obra é constituída pelo papel central que reflexão sobre como podemos interpretar os proferimentos de um outro falante desempenha para a compreensão da natureza do significado. Davidson adota o ponto de vista metodológico de um intérprete que não pode pressupor nada sobre o significado das palavras de um falante e que não possui nenhum conhecimento detalhado de suas atitudes proposicionais. Neste artigo, eu apresento inicialmente a estrutura e os pressupostos da filosofia da linguagem de Davidson; passo depois a uma discussão sobre a importância do princípio de caridade para seu projeto interpretativo e, por fim, procuro apontar as diferenças do projeto de Davidson com a hermenêutica filosófica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Interpretação radical. Princípio de caridade. Hermenêutica. ABSTRACT Donald Davidson was one of the most influential philosophers in the analytic tradition in the last half of the twenthy century. The unity of his work lies in the central role that the reflection on how we are able to interpret the speech of another plays in undestanding the nature of meaning. Davidson adopts the standpoint of the interpreter of the speech of another whose evidence does not, at the outset, pressupose anything about what the speaker’s words mean or any datailed knowledge of his propositional attitudes. This is the position of the radical interpreter. In this paper, I begin with an account of the assumptions and structure of Davidson’s philosophy of language; after this I discuss the philosophical importance of the principle of charity for the theory of radical interpretation and, at the end, I compare Davidson’s interpretative project to the philosophical hermeneutic. KEY WORDS – Radical interpretation. Principle of charity. Hermeneutics.

A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART A

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANNES LEITGEB
Keyword(s):  
Probability Measure ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Truth Condition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Representation Theorems ◽  
Probabilistic Semantics ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Probabilistic Nature

This is part A of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its probabilistic nature, we show that the semantics and the resulting system of logic may be regarded as a naturalistically vindicated variant of David Lewis’ truth-conditional semantics and logic of counterfactuals. At the same time, the semantics overlaps in various ways with the non-truth-conditional suppositional theory for conditionals that derives from Ernest Adams’ work. We argue that counterfactuals have two kinds of pragmatic meanings and come attached with two types of degrees of acceptability or belief, one being suppositional, the other one being truth based as determined by our probabilistic semantics; these degrees could not always coincide due to a new triviality result for counterfactuals, and they should not be identified in the light of their different interpretation and pragmatic purpose. However, for plain assertability the difference between them does not matter. Hence, if the suppositional theory of counterfactuals is formulated with sufficient care, our truth-conditional theory of counterfactuals is consistent with it. The results of our investigation are used to assess a claim considered by Hawthorne and Hájek, that is, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals are false.

Subjectivism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lyle Zynda
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Subjective Probability ◽  
Dutch Book ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Confirmation Theory ◽  
Representation Theorems ◽  
Preference Theory ◽  
Betting Behavior ◽  
Old Evidence ◽  
Problem Of Old Evidence

This essay discusses subjective probability—its foundations, justification, and relation to other subjects, such as decision theory and confirmation theory. Various forms of subjectivism (the belief in subjective probability) are described, and distinguished from non-subjectivist approaches. Two broad approaches to justifying the laws of probability on subjectivist grounds are then discussed: (a) pragmatic approaches, based on betting behavior, with associated Dutch book arguments, or (more broadly) pragmatic approaches based on decision and preference theory, with its representation theorems; and (b) non-pragmatic (epistemic) approaches, with arguments based on calibration and gradational accuracy. These various arguments are assessed, and their scope and limitations spelled out in detail. Finally, the relation of subjective probability to the confirmation of scientific theories is discussed, focusing on the problem of old evidence, and its various proposed solutions.

scholarly journals Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. G. Meacham ◽  
Jonathan Weisberg
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Representation Theorems

scholarly journals Assessing and Studying Utility Functions in Psychometric Decision Theory

1983 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bastiaan J. Vrijhof ◽  
Gideon J. Mollenbergh ◽  
Wulfert P. van den Brink
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Utility Functions

Lewis, David Kellogg (1941–2001)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter van Inwagen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Rational Decision

David Lewis has made extremely important and influential contributions to many topics in metaphysics, philosophical logic, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of probability, rational decision theory, and ethics and social philosophy. His work on counterfactuals and the philosophy of modality has been especially influential.

Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 263-314
Author(s):  
Adam Pautz
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Phenomenal Intentionality

In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. I will agree with friends of phenomenal intentionality that reductive externalists neglect the role of our internally determined conscious experiences in grounding intentionality, but I will fault them for not adequately explaining intentionality. They cannot just say “conscious experience explains it” and leave it at that. However, I will sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. In particular, by appealing to Lewisian ideas, we can explain how Karl’s conscious experiences help to ground the contents of his other mental states.

David Hume, David Lewis, and decision theory

Mind ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 106 (423) ◽  
pp. 411-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
David Lewis

A Decision Theory Model for Course Placement

1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim J. van der Linden
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Probability Distributions ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Nonincreasing Function ◽  
Course Placement ◽  
Linear Utility ◽  
Theory Point ◽  
Specific Shape

The problem of how to place students in a sequence of hierarchically related courses is addressed from a decision theory point of view. Based on a minimal set of assumptions, it is shown that optimal mastery rules for the courses are always monotone and a nonincreasing function of the scores on the placement test. On the other hand, placement rules are not generally monotone but have a form depending on the specific shape of the probability distributions and utility functions in force. The results are further explored for a class of linear utility functions.

Radical Interpretation and Reference Magnetism

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
J. Robert G. Williams
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

This chapter is one of three that draws out the consequences of Radical Interpretation for how concepts represent the world. A claim associated with David Lewis is that metaphysically fundamental properties are ‘reference magnets’—that if usage is equipoised between two candidate referents, the one that is ‘closer to the metaphysical fundamentals’ is the one that gets to be the referent. This chapter examines how such a thesis might arise as a prediction of Radical Interpretation. It looks to epistemology of inference to the best explanation to make a connection between concepts used in explanations and naturalness. The connection to concepts used in induction is discussed.

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