Differences between Korean Null Arguments and Korean Overt Pronouns

The ultimate goal is this paper is to provide five pieces of evidence that Korean null pronouns are not semantically and syntactically equivalent to Korean overt pronouns. First, when Korean overt pronouns and Korean null pronouns have the only NP as their antecedent, the truth condition becomes different. Second, when Korean overt pronouns and Korean null pronouns take the even NP as their antecedent, the truth condition becomes different. Third, the Korean overt pronoun ku ‘he’ is associated with its antecedent by coreference, whereas Korean null pronouns are associated with their antecedent by binding. Fourth, Korean overt pronouns yield a strict reading, whereas Korean null arguments induces the strict/sloppy ambiguity. This in turn suggests that Korean null pronouns yield looser interpretations than Korean overt pronouns. Additionally, it is worth noting that Korean overt pronouns induce a definite reading, whereas Korean null pronouns yield indefinite and definite readings. Fifth, Korean overt pronouns and Korean null pronouns are not alike in that the former is sensitive to phi-features (gender, number, and person), whereas the latter is not. This paper argues that Korean null pronouns are not syntactically the equivalent of Korean overt pronouns.

Symmetry as a Guide to Post-truth Times: A Response to Lynch

William Lynch has provided an informed and probing critique of my embrace of the post-truth condition, which he understands correctly as an extension of the normative project of social epistemology. This article roughly tracks the order of Lynch’s paper, beginning with the vexed role of the ‘normative’ in Science and Technology Studies, which originally triggered my version of social epistemology 35 years ago and has been guided by the field’s ‘symmetry principle’. Here the pejorative use of ‘populism’ to mean democracy is highlighted as a failure of symmetry. Finally, after rejecting Lynch’s appeal to a hybrid Marxian–Darwinism, Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes are contrasted en route to what I have called ‘quantum epistemology’.

Fitting and Fudging: On the Folly of Trying to Define Post-truth

I propose that the ‘post-truth condition’, i.e., the vulnerability of our institutions for establishing and negotiating what is true and worth knowing, is not primarily a pathology, a susceptibility to external manipulation or coercion, as tends to be stressed in the literature, but has first and foremost to do with the unraveling of certain epistemic assumptions. In analogy with T.S. Eliot’s modernist notion that the attempt to capture and concretize an experience or a state of mind requires ‘objective correlatives’ which it conveys, I argue that the trope of post-truth to express the embattled status of expertise can be understood in terms of failed symbolization. In the second section, I spell out what this means in terms of Donald Davidson’s discussion of the problem of defining truth. In the last section, I propose a ‘poetics of political theory’ for understanding the post-truth condition.

Democracy Naturalized: In Search of the Individual in the Post-truth Condition

This article takes a ‘naturalistic’ look at the historically changing nature of the individual and its implications for the terms on which democracy might be realized, starting from classical Athens, moving through early debates in evolutionary theory, to contemporary moral and political thought. Generally speaking, liberal democracy sees individuality as the mark of an evolutionarily mature species, whereas socialist democracy sees it as the mark of an evolutionary immature species. Overall, the individual has been ‘de-naturalized’ over time, resulting in the indeterminate figure who thrives in the post-truth condition.

The Meaning and Functions of qSdk and yʕny as Discourse Markers in Saudi Arabic

The current study aims at investigating two discourse markers that are used in Saudi Arabic, “qSdk and yʕny”, against Schourup’s characteristics of discourse markers which are connectivity, optionality, and non-truth conditionality. Additionally, this study investigates the pragmatic uses and procedural meanings of those discourse markers using Blakemore’s procedural meaning and relevance theory as a framework. By examining two discourse markers that received less attention in other studies, the current study builds on previous literature in this field. Regarding methodology, the current study is a corpus-based study in which two corpora containing texts written in Saudi Arabic are used to extract data and evidence. The study concludes that “qSdk and yʕny” behave as discourse markers by being optional, connecting two segments together, and having no influence on the truth condition of the sentence in which they are used. The discourse marker “qSdk” serves three procedural meanings: asking for clarification, correction and making irony whereas “yʕny” serves the procedural meanings of clarification and asking for clarification. Furthermore, the use of these discourse markers makes the sentence more relevant to listeners as they need less cognitive effect to derive the pragmatic meaning of the sentence.

Acts that Kill and Acts that Do Not

In response to recent debates on the need to abandon the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) to facilitate vital-organ transplantation, I claim that, through a detailed philosophical analysis of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the DDR, some acts that seem to violate DDR in fact do not, thus DDR can be upheld. The paper consists of two parts. First, standard apparatuses of the philosophy of language, such as sense, referent, truth condition, and definite description are employed to show that there exists an internally consistent and coherent interpretation of UDDA which resolves the Reduction Problem and the Ambiguity Problem that allegedly threaten the UDDA framework, and as a corollary, the practice of Donation after the Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) does not violate DDR. Second, an interpretation of the DDR, termed ‘No Hastening Death Rule’ (NHDR), is formulated so that, given that autonomy and non-maleficence principles are observed, the waiting time for organ procurement can be further shortened without DDR being violated.

Facing Epistemic Authorities

Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. This chapter argues that these two Enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also further the spread of conspiracy theories and undermine trust in experts. As a result, we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter

Communicating Corrected Risk Assessments and Uncertainty About COVID-19 in the Post-truth Era

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a challenge for science communication in terms of addressing the question of uncertainty and how it translates into risk. This task has been aggravated by the complexity of the pandemic and the current post-truth environment. The article suggests that there is a need to analyze the practices of correcting risk information that is uncertain, but not necessarily false, made by online news media about COVID-19. This is a point of analysis where the uncertainty and risk linked to science, the pandemic, and the post-truth condition meet. The qualitative discursive analysis yielded three important results: (1) uncertainty can be fought by increasing uncertainty; (2) a multiplication of facts or reasons may not be the most prominent strategy in practices of correction; and (3) the use of hyperlinks with additional information can increase uncertainty and risk.

¿Antropoceno o Capitaloceno? Más allá de los términos

En este artículo abordamos dos enfoques sobre la catástrofe ambiental: el Antropoceno y el Capitaloceno. Primero, establecemos una relación entre la sobreexplotación de la naturaleza y la concepción moderna de sujeto des-incorporado que concibe la naturaleza como recurso. En seguida, señalamos la utilidad del término Antropoceno para enfatizar cómo la actividad humana es responsable por el cambio climático y el calentamiento global. En tercer lugar, señalamos las limitaciones del término, en tanto no distingue entre diferentes contextos socio-económicos y culturales y su relación con la naturaleza. En la cuarta parte exponemos las principales tesis del Capitaloceno, según el cual un argumento sobre la responsabilidad humana del calentamiento global retira la responsabilidad de estos procesos a formas muy específicas de explotación, producción, consumo y deshecho, a saber, las del capitalismo. Palabras Clave Antropoceno y Capitaloceno, sujeto moderno, catástrofe ambiental, límites planetarios, producción y explotación. Referencias Bernal, John D. (1986), La ciencia en la historia, México, Ed. Nueva Imagen/UNAM. Bernal Pérez, Javier Rolando (2016), Propuesta de un marco axiológico para la evaluación de un desarrollo tecnológico. El proyecto del tren de alta velocidad México-Querétaro, Tesis presentada para obtener el título de doctor por la Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña. Boulding, Kenneth E. (1966), “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth”, en H. Jarrett (ed.), Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy, Baltimore, Resources for the Future/Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-14. Crutzen, Paul J. (2002), “Geology of Mankind”, Revista Nature, Vol. 415. Descartes, René (2011), en Descartes, Madrid, Ed. Gredos. Ehrlich, Paul, John Holdren (1971), “Impacto of population growth”, Science, New Series, Vol. 171, No. 3977, pp. 1212-1217. Fuller, Steve (2018), “What can philosophy teach us about the Post-Truth condition”, en Peters, et al (eds.), Post-Truth, Fake News: viral modernity and higher education, Singapur, Ed. Springer. Haraway, Donna (2016), Staying with the trouble. Making kin in the Chthulucene, EUA, Duke University Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (2002), Lecciones sobre la historia de la filosofía, vol. III, México, Ed. FCE. Heidegger, Martin (2001), “La época de la imagen del mundo”, en Caminos de Bosque, España, Alianza Editorial. Manzo, Silvia (2001), “Algo nuevo bajo el sol : el método inductivo y la historia del conocimiento en la gran restauración de Francis Bacon”, Revista latinoamericana de filosofía, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 227-254. Marx, Karl (1988), “Prólogo a ‘Contribución a la Crítica de la Economía Política’”, en Contribución a la Crítica de la Economía Política, México D. F., Ediciones Quinto Sol. Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, Randers, J., W. Behrens III (1972), The Limits to Growth, Nueva York, Universe Books. Moore, Jason (2017-1), “The Capitalocene: Part I: on the natura and origins of our acological crisis”, The Journal of Peasant Studies. Moore, Jason (2017-2), “The Capitalocene: Part II: accumulation by appropriation an the centrality of unpaid work/energy””, The Journal of Peasant Studies. Parakkal, Varkey (2018), “From Malthus to Thanos : The Problem with ‘Thinning the Herd’”, Ramjas Reading Room. Recuperado de https://ramjasreadingroom.wordpress.com/2018/11/22/from-malthus-to-thanos-the-problem-with-thinning-the-herd/ el 30 de septiembre de 2020. Radowitz, Jon Von (2017), “Stephen Hawking says we must colonise other planets to ensure human survival”, Independent. Recuperado de https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-colonise-other-planets-ensure-human-survival-a7746016.html el 28 de spetiembre de 2020. Raworth, Kate (2012), A safe and just space for humanity: can we live within the doughnut?, Oxfam Discussion Papers. Röckstrom, Johan, et al (2009), “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity”, Ecology and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2. Sandel, Michael (1998), Liberalism and the limits of justice, EUA, Cambridge University Press. Stephen, Will, Jacques Grinevald, Paul Crutzen y John McNeil (2011), “The Anthropocene: conceptual and historical perspectives”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Vol. 369, No. 1938. Taylor, Charles (2001), Sources of teh Self. The making of the modern identity, EUA, Harvard University Press. Vallaeys, François (1996), “Las deconstrucciones del sujeto cartesiano”, Areté, Revista de Filosofía, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 309-318. WWF (2018), Living Planet Report - 2018: Aiming Higher, Grooten, M. and Almond, R.E.A.(Eds), WWF, Gland, Switzerland.