Human Rationality Challenges Universal Logic

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian R. Gaines
2006 ◽  
pp. 4-21
Author(s):  
A. Belyanin

The paper describes the contributions of T. Schelling and R. J. Aumann, the Nobel Prize laureates of 2005 in economics, to modern economics and social sciences. Their key contributions were in the field of the game theory - a major tool to study human interactions and rational behavior in a wide variety of contexts, from applied industrial organization to labor economics, public policy, international relations and political science. Works by Aumann and Schelling were pathbreaking in this respect, and have paved the way to many modern developments that enhance our understanding of human rationality.


Author(s):  
Istvan Kecskes

This chapter argues that a speaker’s utterance is not just recipient design. While fitting words into actual situational contexts, speakers are driven not only by the intent that the hearer recognize what is meant as intended by the speaker, but also by individual salience, which affects production subconsciously. The interplay of these social (recipient design) and individual factors (salience) shapes a speaker’s utterance. Recipient design is the result of being cooperative, which, according to Grice,is a part of human rationality. This chapter claims, however, that individual egocentrism that results in individual salience is part of human rationality just as much as cooperation is. It is claimed and demonstrated through examples that recipient design usually requires an inductive process that is carefully planned, while salience effect generally appears in the form of a deductive process that may contain repairs and adjustments.


City ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 298-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Schindler ◽  
Simon Marvin
Keyword(s):  

Urban Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Cardoso ◽  
Evert Meijers ◽  
Maarten van Ham ◽  
Martijn Burger ◽  
Duco de Vos

Despite the many uncertainties of life in cities, promises of economic prosperity, social mobility and happiness have fuelled the imagination of generations of urban migrants in search of a better life. Access to jobs, housing and amenities, and fewer restrictions of personal choices are some of the perceived advantages of cities, characterised here as ‘urban promises’. But while discourses celebrating the triumph of cities became increasingly common, urban rewards are not available everywhere and for everyone. Alongside opportunity, cities offer inequality, conflict and poor living conditions. Their narrative of promise has been persistent across different times and places, but the outcomes and experiences of urban life compare poorly with the overoptimistic expectations of many newcomers. And yet, millions still come and stay regardless of odds, raising the question why we have such positive and persistent expectations about cities. To examine this question, this paper considers the process of urban migration from the perspective of decision-making under uncertainty. It discusses how decisions and evaluations are based on imperfect information and offers a novel contribution by examining how the cognitive biases and heuristics which restrict human rationality shape our responses to urban promises. This approach may allow a better understanding of how people make decisions regarding urban migration, how they perceive their urban experiences and evaluate their life stories. We consider the prospects and limitations of the behavioural approach and discuss how biases favouring narratives of bright urban futures can be exploited by ‘triumphalist’ accounts of cities which neglect their embedded injustices.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Falk Lieder ◽  
Tom Griffiths

Many contemporary accounts of human reasoning assume that the mind is equipped with multiple heuristics that could be deployed to perform a given task. This raises the question how the mind determines when to use which heuristic. To answer this question, we developed a rational model of strategy selection, based on the theory of rational metareasoning developed in the artificial intelligence literature. According to our model people learn to efficiently choose the strategy with the best cost-benefit tradeoff by learning a predictive model of each strategy’s performance. We found that our model can provide a unifying explanation for classic findings from domains ranging from decision-making to problem-solving and arithmetic by capturing the variability of people’s strategy choices, their dependence on task and context, and their development over time. Systematic model comparisons supported our theory, and four new experiments confirmed its distinctive predictions. Our findings suggest that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of fallible heuristics. This perspective reconciles the two poles of the debate about human rationality by integrating heuristics and biases with learning and rationality.


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