Why Does Privacy Paradox Exist?

In this exploratory study, the main aim was to find, ‘why do people disclose information when they are concerned about their privacy?’. The reasons that provide a plausible explanation to the privacy paradox have been conjectural. From the analysis of the eighteen in-depth interviews using grounded theory, themes were then conceptualized. We found rational and irrational explanations in terms of cognitive biases and heuristics that explain the privacy paradox among mobile users. We figured out some reasons in this context of mobile computing which were not emphasized earlier in the privacy paradox literature such as Peanut Effect, Fear of Missing Out- FoMo, Learned Helplessness, and Neophiliac Personality. These results add to the privacy paradox discourse and provide implications for smartphone users for making privacy-related decisions more consciously rather than inconsiderately disclosing information. Also, the results would help marketers and policymakers design nudges and choice architectures that consider privacy decision-making hurdles.

The impacts of cognitive biases and heuristics on Covid-19 preventive behaviors

The covid-19 pandemic disease became part of the study of many scientific disciplines recently since its impact area is large and it threatened millions of lives. One of the important disciplines is public policy since the characteristics may easily influence the spread of covid-19. It is assumed that an individual’s irrational tendencies can increase this spread since they are highly correlated with the most important actions of prevention of the spread such as isolation, wearing a mask, and washing hands. Moreover, public policies can be effective in such a pandemic period if they take into consideration of individual’s irrational tendencies. Hence, in this study the psychological background of why individuals do not follow the regulations that can decrease the spread of covid-19 will be presented: cognitive biases and heuristics.

Initial evidence for biased decision-making despite human-centered AI explanations

In explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) research, explainability is widely regarded as crucial for user trust in artificial intelligence (AI). However, empirical investigations of this assumption are still lacking. There are several proposals as to how explainability might be achieved and it is an ongoing debate what ramifications explanations actually have on humans. In our work-in-progress we explored two posthoc explanation approaches presented in natural language as a means for explainable AI. We examined the effects of human-centered explanations on trust behavior in a financial decision-making experiment (N = 387), captured by weight of advice (WOA). Results showed that AI explanations lead to higher trust behavior if participants were advised to decrease an initial price estimate. However, explanations had no effect if the AI recommended to increase the initial price estimate. We argue that these differences in trust behavior may be caused by cognitive biases and heuristics that people retain in their decision-making processes involving AI. So far, XAI has primarily focused on biased data and prejudice due to incorrect assumptions in the machine learning process. The implications of potential biases and heuristics that humans exhibit when being presented an explanation by AI have received little attention in the current XAI debate. Both researchers and practitioners need to be aware of such human biases and heuristics in order to develop truly human-centered AI.

How Egocentric Biases Maintain Social Anxiety: A Literature Review

Biases and heuristics are mental shortcuts that help guide our daily decision making and cognitive processing but can often lead us astray when they account for inaccurate or misinterpreted information. In this review I aim to understand how the spotlight effect (Gilovich et al., 2000), the overestimation of how attentive others are to our actions, and the illusion of transparency (Gilovich et al., 1998), the overestimation of how easily others can discern our internal state, maintain social anxiety by disrupting the anchoring component these shortcuts rely on. Through a detailed analysis of major research conducted by Brown and Stopa (2007) and Haikal and Hong (2010), I was able to synthesize the empirical findings, discuss clinical implications, and propose future directions for research.

The Psychological Foundations of Management in Family Firms: Emotions, Memories, and Experiences

Exploring the psychological foundations of management in family firms is necessary to understand why they formulate and implement strategies differently from nonfamily firms, and why and how family firm behavior varies across different family firms. Picone et al. (2021. The psychological foundations of management in family firms: Values, biases, and heuristics. Family Business Review, 34(1), 12-32) have proposed a conceptual framework for the psychological foundations of management in family business, examining how the values, biases, and heuristics of family firm members affect strategic decision-making and family firm outcomes. Drawing on this framework, we examine emotions, memories, and experiences in family firms, disentangling “what we know” from “what we should know”, and offering some relevant questions to advance the field.

Decision-Making in Psychological Assessment

This chapter describes a number of factors that may influence a clinician’s judgment and conclusions while conducting an assessment, and it discusses others that make interpretation of the results less than straightforward. It begins by discussing the effects of the prevalence, or base rate, of the disorder on the diagnostic accuracy of the findings. Even in the presence of seemingly unequivocal results pointing to a given diagnosis, the findings may lead to a false-positive conclusion if the prevalence is low and to a false-negative one if the prevalence is high. The chapter shows how using Bayes’ theorem can tell us the likelihood of a wrong diagnosis. It next discusses incremental validity—whether adding another test to the battery increases diagnostic accuracy. If the new test is correlated with ones already administered, then the amount of new information it provides is limited and may increase unwarranted confidence in the final diagnosis. Third, the chapter discusses various biases and heuristics that may affect diagnostic decision-making, such as anchoring, diagnostic momentum, premature closure, and the influence of patient and assessor characteristics. It concludes by presenting a number of steps that should be taken to minimize the effects of these biases.

Identifying and addressing nonrational processes in REB ethical decision-making

Ethical decision-making is inherent to the research ethics committee (REC) deliberation process. While ethical codes, regulations, and research standards are indispensable in guiding this process, decision-making is nonetheless susceptible to nonrational factors that can undermined the quality, consistency, and perceived fairness REC decisions. In this paper I identify biases and heuristics (i.e., nonrational factors) that are known to influence the reasoning processes among the general population and various professions alike. I suggest that such factors will inevitably arise within the REC review process. To help mitigate this potential, I propose an interventive questioning process that can be used by RECs to identify and minimize the influence of the nonrational factors most likely to impact REC judgment and decision-making.

The Psychological Foundations of Management in Family Firms: Values, Biases, and Heuristics

Considering the heterogeneity of family firm behaviors as reflecting the values, biases, and heuristics of individuals, we discuss the implications of the psychological foundations of management in family firms. We develop a conceptual framework for investigating how the values, biases, and heuristics of family and nonfamily members affect strategic decision-making and the outcomes of family firms. To advance the field, we put forward some relevant questions and offer a future research agenda at the intersection of the psychological foundations of management and family business.

The Cognitive Psychology of Rules of Interpretation in International Law

While Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) prescribe the rules of interpretation for international treaty law as “disciplining rules,” the rules of interpretation themselves are understudied from a cognitive psychology perspective. This is problematic because, as Jerome Frank observed, “judges are incurably human,” like everybody else. I submit that behavioral approaches could provide insights into how biases and heuristics affect the way judges and other interpreters use the VCLT rules.