Best practices and better laws: Corporate governance codes in the member states of the European Union

ERA Forum ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-351
Author(s):  
Björn Fasterling
Author(s):  
Theodor Baums

Although corporate governance codes have spread across the European Union and beyond, and are regularly revised and adapted to changing national and international expectations of investors and other stakeholders, some important questions have not yet been unanimously answered. Two of these ongoing debates are addressed in this chapter. First, where should the line be drawn between statutory provisions and corporate governance codes as an instrument of self-regulation? Second, what is the rationale behind the idea of independent directors? In particular, how should independence be understood in relation to board members: independent of the incumbent management and company or independent of a controlling shareholder? The chapter discusses both questions using the example of the German Corporate Governance Code.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 280-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Hermes ◽  
Theo J.B.M. Postma ◽  
Orestis Zivkov

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Viviane de Beaufort

The comparative study of Corporate Governance Codes relevant to the European Union and its Member-States[1], finalised in March 2002, establishes that differences remain at a national scale on corporate governances issues. Beyond the identities of national firms in European Union lies the question: is there a European corporate governance identity? At the present time, European legislation does not cover certain essential aspects of the firm: that is where the shoe pinches! What a company is and what its aims are remain a national question; in the same time transparency requirements are established on a global dimension at least for quoted companies and some new projects of Directives and Recommendations dealing with corporate governance issues attempt to create common rules or principles. This article tries to synthesise the European action in this field and to a certain extend to criticise it not to have a more ambitious project.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-105
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kusztykiewicz-Fedurek

Political security is very often considered through the prism of individual states. In the scholar literature in-depth analyses of this kind of security are rarely encountered in the context of international entities that these countries integrate. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to key aspects of political security in the European Union (EU) Member States. The EU as a supranational organisation, gathering Member States first, ensures the stability of the EU as a whole, and secondly, it ensures that Member States respect common values and principles. Additionally, the EU institutions focus on ensuring the proper functioning of the Eurozone (also called officially “euro area” in EU regulations). Actions that may have a negative impact on the level of the EU’s political security include the boycott of establishing new institutions conducive to the peaceful coexistence and development of states. These threats seem to have a significant impact on the situation in the EU in the face of the proposed (and not accepted by Member States not belonging to the Eurogroup) Eurozone reforms concerning, inter alia, appointment of the Minister of Economy and Finance and the creation of a new institution - the European Monetary Fund.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document