Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future

Metaphysica ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristie Miller
Keyword(s):  
Open Future ◽  
Backwards Causation ◽  
The Open Future

scholarly journals Two Conceptions of Second Nature

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Activities ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
The One ◽  
First Nature

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.

Time and Truth: The Presentism-Eternalism Debate

Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Stoneham
Keyword(s):  
Open Future ◽  
Equal Footing ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Growing Block ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
Block Universe ◽  
The Way

AbstractThere are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agrees with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first claim is that the familiar ways of articulating these views result in there being no substantive disagreement at all between the three parties. I then show that if we accept the controversial truthmaking principle, we can articulate a substantive disagreement. Finally, I apply this way of formulating the debate to related questions such as the open future and determinism, showing that these do not always line up in quite the way one would expect.

The Open Future, Classical Style

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-83
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Open Future ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
Classical Style ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Semantic Distinction

In this chapter, the author defends his view against the core complaint that it invalidates what has been called “Will Excluded Middle” (either it will be that p or it will be that ~p), and an associated principle that has recently been called “Scopelessness”. According to scopelessness, will is “scopeless” with respect to negation; there is no semantic distinction between ~Willp and Will~p. In this chapter, it is argued that the data that seems to support scopelessness is adequately explained by the thesis that will is “neg-raising predicate”. In normal contexts, “No one should do that” certainly pragmatically implies “Everyone shouldn’t do that”—but the former sentence does not semantically entail the latter; this is, in part, to say that should is a neg-raiser. In general, the author defends the crucial scope distinction between ~Willp and Will~p, and responds to several objections to this view.

The Assertion Problem

2021 ◽  
pp. 181-202
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Future Contingents ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Ordinary Life ◽  
The Open Future

In this chapter, the author responds to a family of related objections to the doctrine of the open future—roughly, problems stemming from the observation that what are plausibly future contingents are often nevertheless properly assertible (despite being, on the author’s view, false). He responds to this family of problems by developing several related themes: (i) even if the author’s view is true, it is properly ignored in ordinary life; (ii) an assertion may assert what is false but nevertheless communicate what is true, and this can explain the appropriateness of that assertion; (iii) there is plausibly replacement talk that we could use that would enable us, if we wished, to avoid saying what is false, but would nevertheless allow us to communicate in satisfactory ways. In the end, then, there is no compelling “assertion problem” for the view defended in this book.

Talmudic Destiny

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-33
Author(s):  
Eli Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
Open Future ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
New View

My aim in this chapter is to explore various connections between the Talmudic topic of “breira” and philosophical issues related to time and destiny. I argue that it is plausible that two leading positions in the Talmudic literature correspond respectively to Aristotle’s view and Ockhamism. I then try to defend the more ambitious claim that Rashi’s position corresponds to a novel third view on the open future not found in any familiar literature. I attempt to explain this new view

scholarly journals Probability and the Open Future View

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Open Future ◽  
The Open Future

The Open Future: Introduction to a Classical Approach

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Classical Approach ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
Open Future ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
Core Idea ◽  
Patrick Todd

In this introductory chapter, Patrick Todd introduces the core idea defended in this book—the idea that future contingents are all false. He clarifies what the book simply presupposes but does not defend, and then provides brief chapter-by-chapter summaries of the book.

The Neo-Molinist Square Stands Firm

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-406
Author(s):  
Elijah Hess ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Open Theism ◽  
Square Of Opposition ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Future Tense ◽  
Previous Issue ◽  
The Open Future

In a previous issue of Philosophia Christi, Kirk MacGregor responded to an essay of mine in which I argued for a neo-Molinist account of open theism. The argument demonstrated how, given standard counterfactual semantics, one could derive an “open future square of opposition,” that is, a depiction of the logical relations that hold between future-tense statements from an open theistic standpoint. Conceding the validity of the argument, MacGregor nevertheless sought to deny its soundness by criticizing both its conclusion and the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics on which the argument was based. In this paper, I argue that MacGregor’s reasons for rejecting the open future square, as well as his Molinist alternative to the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, are uncompelling.

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