The Relativity of Indeterminacy

A long-standing tradition, largely present in both the physical and the philosophical literature, regards the advent of (special) relativity—with its block-universe picture—as the failure of any indeterministic program in physics. On the contrary, in this paper, we note that upholding reasonable principles of finiteness of information hints at a picture of the physical world that should be both relativistic and indeterministic. We thus rebut the block-universe picture by assuming that fundamental indeterminacy itself should also be regarded as a relative property when considered in a relativistic scenario. We discuss the consequence that this view may have when correlated randomness is introduced, both in the classical case and in the quantum one.

II. Your Present Moment in Spacetime

This essay extends the argument begun in "Why Quantum Mechanics Makes Sense," exploring the conditions under which a physical world can define and communicate information. I argue that like the structure of quantum physics, the principles of Special and General Relativity can be understood as reflecting the requirements of a universe in which things are observable and measurable. I interpret the peculiar hyperbolic structure of spacetime not as the static, four-dimensional geometry of an unobservable "block universe", but as the background metric of an evolving web of communicated information that we, along with all our measuring instruments and recording devices, actually experience in our local "here and now." Our relativistic universe is conceived as a parallel distributed processing system, in which a common objective reality is constantly being woven out of many kinds of facts determined separately in countless local measurement-contexts.

God, Time, and the Implicate Order Theory

In this article, the God’s relationship to time is viewed from the perspective of modern physics. The purpose is to examine new perspectives by introducing a theory of time that has been unexplored in contemporary theology. The paper begins with an analysis of the two competing views of God’s relationship to time: timelessness and temporality. They are reviewed from the perspective of the special theory of relativity. In contemporary theology, God’s timelessness is usually combined with the block universe theory, which is based on the concept of unchanging spacetime. God’s temporality is usually associated with presentism, which denies the concept of spacetime. This division reflects a central conflict in physics: the mainstream interpretation of the special theory of relativity treats time as unchanging spacetime, while quantum physics treats time as dynamic and flowing. To resolve this conflict between the ontologies of the special theory of relativity and quantum physics, the implicate order theory is introduced. The implicate order theory was developed by David Bohm (1917–1992), one of the most visionary physicists of the 20th century. After introducing the theory, it is applied to the context of God’s relationship to time. This produces interesting new opportunities for theological research.

Causal Intuition and Delayed-Choice Experiments

The conventional explanation of delayed-choice experiments appears to violate our causal intuition at the quantum level. I reanalyze these experiments using time-reversed and time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics. The time-reversed formulation does not give the same experimental predictions. The time-symmetric formulation gives the same experimental predictions but actually violates our causal intuition at the quantum level. I explore the reasons why our causal intuition may be wrong at the quantum level, suggest how conventional causation might be recovered in the classical limit, propose a quantum analog to the classical block universe viewpoint, and speculate on implications of the time-symmetric formulation for cosmological boundary conditions.

The Unchanging Universe

Heraclitus declares the being (that which exists, nature) but identifies it with becoming, but Parmenides declares just the Being; only what is, is, what is not, is not. All “follows” from that: change, he argues, is logically impossible and so what is, is one and unchangeable! This dazzling absolute monism is in daring disagreement with sense perception, but curiously it has found a well-known genius as a supporter. Emboldened by his theory of relativity, Einstein considers the universe as a four-dimensional “block” (a space-time continuum like a loaf of bread) which, remarkably, contains all moments of time (of past, present, and future) always, and where change is an illusion. He said, “For we convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent.” In the block universe, the past is not gone, it is present; and the future, like the present, is, well, present, too.

Temporal Naturalism—Analysis of the Paper by Lee Smolin

Lee Smolin wants to convince physicists that time is real. His biggest problem is that he does not know what time is—its intrinsic nature and its basis in the universe. He cannot answer the questions: What is time? Why does time exist? and Why does time have the specific qualities that it has? As a result, in this essay Smolin does not focus very much on time itself. Instead he focuses on discussion of extraneous issues and unrealistic speculations. He wants to promote temporal naturalism, but does so by contrasting it with timeless naturalism, the block universe view of time, which is an unrealistic fiction. He brings up timeless naturalism, panpsychism, and relationalism, all of which distract from any attempt to show that time is real. This paper clarifies why these extraneous issues have no place in a discussion of the reality of time. Further, Smolin believes there is no such thing as the scientific method, which blocks him from any realistic attempt to understand time. Included here is a description of the scientific method and why that method is required to achieve an understanding of time.