scholarly journals Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Henry Collin
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Necessary Truths

scholarly journals A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Zhao
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Safety Condition ◽  
Necessary Truths

AbstractThe safety condition is supposed to be a necessary condition on knowledge which helps to eliminate epistemic luck. It has been argued that the condition should be globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition believed to account for why not all beliefs in necessary truths are safe. A remaining issue is which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not. In the literature, solutions have been proposed to determine the relevance of propositions. This paper examines a case of luckily true belief—thus a case of ignorance—and a case of knowledge. It argues that no solution in the literature offers a correct verdict in either case. Therefore, the strategy to globalize safety remains unsatisfactory.

Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

scholarly journals Correction to: Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nilanjan Das
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Original Publication ◽  
Section Heading

In the original publication of the article, on page 20, the section heading should be “Gaṅgeśa on Testimony and Epistemic Luck” instead of “Testimony and Epistemic Luck”.

On the Nature of Necessary Truths in Jurisprudence: Putting Wittgensteinian Hinges to Use

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-237
Author(s):  
Yi Tong
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
The Law

Inquiring into the fundamental nature of law has been traditionally formulated as an attempt to answer the question, “What is Law?” Such an inquiry typically proceeds by identifying the necessary features of law. Joseph Raz, for example, writes: A theory consists of necessary truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of the law. We talk of ‘the nature of law’, or the nature of anything else, to refer to those of the law’s characteristics which are of the essence of law, which make law into what it is. That is those properties without which the law would not be law.1

Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Navarro
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Epistemic Risk

scholarly journals Leibniz on Necessary and Contingent Truths

2012 ◽  
pp. 117-135
Author(s):  
Md Abdul Muhit
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
General Notion ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Philosophical Writings

The distinction between necessary and contingent truths has so much important role in the explication of Leibniz’s philosophy of logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of science that the distinction spreads throughout most of his philosophical writings. My aim in this paper is to try to provide a clear and detailed account of some of the aspects of Leibniz’s distinction between necessary and contingent truths. This paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, an analysis of Leibniz’s general notion of “truth” (“the Principle of the Predicate-in-Notion”) is given. This will be followed by his distinction between necessary truths and contingent truths, which he also terms as “truths of reason” and “truths of fact” respectively. Thirdly, the implication of this distinction in Leibniz’s theory of human freedom will be addressed. I will end my discussion with an answer to the following questions: The distinction goes traditionally under Leibniz' name; but is it his own invention, or has he merely picked it up from one of his predecessors? And secondly, how far this distinction has an impact (if any) on the philosophies of his contemporaries, especially on Wolff, Hume and Kant? DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/afj.v4i0.12936 The Arts Faculty Journal Vol.4 July 2010-June 2011 pp.117-135

Tacking and Epistemic Luck

2009 ◽  
pp. 143-160
Author(s):  
Jarrett Leplin
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

scholarly journals El discurso sobre el poder en la intervención profesional: otro caso de la colonización del trabajo social por el régimen de verdad de las ciencias sociales

2011 ◽  
pp. 111
Author(s):  
Rubens Ramón Méndez
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Work ◽  
Professional Practice ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Social ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Trabajo Social ◽  
Use Of Knowledge

Cuando el Trabajo Social comenzó a sistematizarse y a organizarse a partir de Mary Richmond, se proponía como un programa de investigación distinto dentro de las Ciencias Sociales (Lakatos, 1999). Distinto porque toma los planteos teóricos dados en las Ciencias Sociales desde �las circunstancias históricamente determinadas y existencialmente posicionadas; creando nuevas perspectivas sobre esos planteos teóricos� (Méndez, 2006) y porque con su práctica profesional, evalúa y muestra el problema de las consecuencias efectivas y potenciales de la utilización de los conocimientos (Dewey, 1967) en la construcción de las prácticas sociales (discursivas o no discursivas).Presentar la emergencia de un discurso propio de las personas y documentar lo real de las prácticas sociales, mostrar cómo es que a algunos enunciados que no son en sí mismos ni verdaderos ni falsos, se les otorgan el �estatuto de verdad�; es lo que hace que el Trabajo Social deba ser vigilado y desarmado en sus efectos.Si el discurso no es el medio por lo que se establecen las luchas en esta sociedad de discursos; sino que es por el discurso, por lo que se lucha. Si el discurso es �aquel poder del que quiere uno adueñarse� (Foucault, 1983), las Ciencias Sociales no podían dejar al azar el discurso del Trabajo Social.When Social Work became systematized and organized after Mary Richmond, it was described as a different research program within the social sciences (Lakatos, 1999). It was different because it considered the theoretical propositions in the social sciences from �historically determined and existentially positioned circumstances, thereby creating new perspectives on those theoretical propositions� (Méndez, 2006) and because through professional practice Social Work assesses and highlights the problem of the real and potential consequences of the use of knowledge in the construction of social practices (Dewey, 1967), whether discursive or non-discursive.As Social Work presents the emergence of people�s own discourse and documents the reality of social practices while it also presents statements which are neither true nor false as necessary truths, Social Work should be watched and disarmed in its consequences.Discourse is not the means through which fights are established in our discourse society; it is discourse that is fought about. If discourse is �that power we wish to get hold of� (Foucault, 1983), then the social sciences should not ignore the discourse of Social Work.

scholarly journals “Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Anaya
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Epistemic Agency

AbstractIt is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a result it can be met luckily. I shall argue that this kind of luck is inconsistent with knowledge. In order to prevent this pernicious form of luck I introduce a “defeaters-responsiveness” condition, according to which subjects ought to be disposed to adequately address defeaters if they were to arise (even if they in fact do not arise).

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