Do Corporate Governance Mechanisms Affect Public Transport Firm Value?

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 916-928
Author(s):  
Ben Mohamed Ezzeddine ◽  
Sami Jarboui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Public Transport ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Value Creation: An Empirical Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musa Usman Kabir ◽  
Norhani Binti Aripin ◽  
Redhwan Ahmed Ali Al-Dhamari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Economic Value Added ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The study examines the perceived effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the value of manufacturing firms in Nigeria by adopting economic value added as the measure of firm value. Corporate governance mechanisms such as concentrated ownership, managerial ownership, the board size, board independence, and foreign ownership as they influence corporate valuation were empirically investigated. 89 listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria were selected for 5 years (2012-2016) for the analysis. The study utilized different tests such as OLS panel data regression and multiple regression model to establish the relationship with panel corrected standard error (PCSE). The study is guided by resource enrichment theory and agency theory. The finding of the study shows that ownership concentration, the board size, and board independence positively impacted on firm value as measured by economic value added. However, managerial ownership and foreign ownership reported negative and insignificant impacts on the value of Nigerian manufacturing firms.

scholarly journals Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Ibrahim ◽  
F. A. Samad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Utilization Ratio ◽  
And Performance

We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non-family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non-family firms.

scholarly journals The use of corporate derivatives: Effects on firm value in the Italian market

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
Alberto Tron ◽  
Federico Colantoni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Italian Market ◽  
Effect Regression ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact

It is an empirical question whether the use of derivatives hedging among firms actually contributes to enhancing firm performances. Despite the increasing use of derivatives by non-financial firms, existing literature still debates about their effect, especially in countries with peculiar corporate governance mechanisms. By using a sample of non-financial Italian firms listed from 2007 to 2018, this paper investigates if the use of several types (currency, interest rate, and commodity) of financial derivatives can affect the value of a company. For measuring the impact of the derivatives and in order to address any possible endogeneity problem, besides using the conventional methodologies applied by previous literature (fixed-effect regression models and system GMM estimators), we run a random forest model, a machine learning technique not yet applied before in this field, and calculate the relative importance of each independent and control variable. Differently from other European countries, findings show that the use of derivatives does not affect the firm value in the Italian market. Therefore, our results confirm the role of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between firm value and the use of derivatives and that their impact is country-specific.

Under- vs over-investment: hotel firms’ value around acquisitions

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 2050-2069 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarik Dogru
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the extent to which under- and over-investment problems affect hotel firms’ value around the time when acquisitions are announced. Design/methodology/approach Hotel firms are classified based on their financial constraints (under-investment), corporate governance mechanisms (over-investment) and organizational structures. Multivariate analyses are conducted utilizing the panel ordinary least squares regression to examine the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms and organizational structures on acquisition returns. Findings The results show that financial constraints have a larger effect on the firm value compared to the effect of corporate governance. Also, acquisitions are viewed as over-investments in poorly governed, franchising and hotel-real estate investment trust (REIT) firms. Research limitations/implications The analyses are limited to gains from acquisitions in the hotel industry. Therefore, future studies may examine the effects of capital expenditures and cash holdings on hotel firm value. Practical implications Acquisitions could help financially constrained firms reduce informational asymmetries. Firms could expand through franchising when they are financially constrained. However, franchising firms should take restrictive actions to control managers from making acquisitions. The hotel-REIT organizational form does not seem to cause under-investment problems, and it functions as an additional corporate governance mechanism. Originality/value In addition to the C-corporation organizational structure, hotel firms extensively adopt REIT and expand through franchising, which might affect under- and over-investment problems. Nonetheless, little is known about whether capital investments create or reduce value for hotel firms. This study helps to explain how financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms and organizational structures affect hotel firms’ value.

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