scholarly journals Contents of Unconscious Color Perception

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Błażej Skrzypulec
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Color Perception ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Theoretical Investigations ◽  
Significant Support

AbstractIn the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors.

Higher Order Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Order State

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, because represented by, another, but higher order, cognitive state. The theory arises from the doubtful supposition of unconscious perception and mistakenly construes intrinsic phenomenal character extrinsically, as one state's serving as the content of another. Yet it remains mysterious how and why a higher order state might be so potent as to determine phenomenal character at all. Better to resist higher order theory’s embrace of dubious unconscious perceptual states and account for states so-called simply in terms of humdrum mnemonic malfeasance. Moreover, since the suspect theory allows higher order misrepresentation, it implies sufferance of impossible phenomenal character. Equally problematic, representationalism pitched at the higher order entails the existence of bogus phenomenal character when upstairs states represent downstairs nonperceptual states.

Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Non-Conceptual Content

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uriah Kriegel ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
The Face ◽  
Content Of Experience ◽  
Representational Approach

One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On the face of it, conscious perceptual experience appears to be experience of a structured world, hence to be at least partly conceptual. To validate the appeal to non-conceptual content, the representationalist must therefore hold that the content of experience is partly conceptual and partly non-conceptual. But how can the conceptual and the non-conceptual combine to form a single content? The only way to make sense of this notion, I argue, leads to a surprising consequence, namely, that the representational approach to perceptual consciousness is a disguised form of functionalism.

scholarly journals Qualia realism and representationalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
A.A. Gusev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Transparency Of Experience ◽  
Epistemic Dimension ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mental Paint ◽  
Reductionist Approach

The article deals with the problem of naturalistic explanation of an essential feature of all conscious mental states – the phenomenal character. The conception of qualia realism can be considered as one of the options for a non-naturalistic explanation of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that the phenomenal character of experience can be explained in terms of representational content that are more acceptable to naturalism. As a rule, in these discussions, qualia are identified with the non-representational properties of experience – mental paint. The author analyzes in detail the relationship between the concepts of “qualia” and “mental paint” in the key work of G. Harman. It is shown that Harman’s argument against qualia realism fails. He defined qualia in terms of the mental paint conception, which contains consequences that replace the original thesis of qualia realism. To attack the foundations of qualia realism in a more relevant way, the author develops A. Kind’s idea of the epistemic dimension of qualia. Kind points out that since the philosophers arrived at the question of the existence of qualia by considering the plausibility of functionalism, they were so focused on metaphysical considerations that they forgot that this phenomenon is connected in the first epistemic dimension. On the basis of this, a new version of the argument from transparency of experience versus qualia realism was proposed. The argument demonstrates that the qualia realism fails the test of introspective analysis of perceptual experience. Qualia turn out to be theoretical objects that do not fulfill their prescribed explanatory function. This undermines the foundations of metaphysical arguments against the reductionist approach to consciousness, since they proceeded from the assumption of the existence of referents of the concept of “qualia”. The variant of the explanation of the phenomenal character of experience in terms of representationalism also faces internal problems. In this regard, the author offers the option of direct realism, since it is well compatible with the transparency thesis and is generally consistent with the naturalistic attitudes of the representationalism.

scholarly journals Yet another Theory of the Metaphysical Difference between Genuine Perceptions and Hallucinations

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-270
Author(s):  
Alberto Voltolini
Keyword(s):  
Functional Role ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Rear Door

In this article, first of all, the author wants to show that a new justification can be provided for the idea, originally maintained in the disjunctivist camp, that genuine perceptions and hallucinations are metaphysically different kinds of mental states, independently of the fact that they all are perceptual experiences. For even if they share their phenomenal character and their representational content is put aside for the purpose of their metaphysical individuation, as some conjunctivists maintain, they still differ in their mode, insofar as they differ in their functional role. Once things are so put at the metaphysical level, moreover, this account of perceptual experiences leaves room for reintroducing content for such experiences from the rear door; namely, as a (metaphysically irrelevant) singular representational content, just as some direct realists have originally suggested. Finally, this move enables the account to explain not only some intuitive data about perceptual experiences, but also to corroborate its viability, even if it does not rely on antiskeptical motivations.

scholarly journals Blur and interoceptive vision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Błażej Skrzypulec
Keyword(s):  
Visual System ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The State ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Blurred Vision

AbstractThe paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision according to which visual experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing the state of the visual system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively presents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus. The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content and with the strong transparency thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, the interoceptive approach is free from controversial assumptions adopted by other philosophical theories of blurred experiences and is able to account for the epistemic and motivational role of visual blur, i.e. that blurred experiences provide a prima facie justification for beliefs regarding our vision and motivate actions directed toward our eyes.

Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 333-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Barth
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
First Order ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
Contemporary Standard ◽  
Order Reflection

The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it. In this conception, the consciousness aspect of phenomenal consciousness is explained in terms of a specific type of attention. This type of attention, in turn, is accounted for in terms of cognitive appetites aiming at knowledge about a represented object by means of initiating cognitive operations on representational content. Furthermore, against the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account, it is argued that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character. According to this view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests on the confusing effect of imperfect acts of attention directed towards representational contents. Holding this view, Leibniz finds fruitful middle ground between contemporary standard positions like higher-order theories, representationalist conceptions, and qualia accounts of phenomenal consciousness. His position possesses resources to meet several objections these standard accounts are confronted with.

Experience and Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Conscious State ◽  
External Object ◽  
Privileged Access

Here I criticize the most popular version of Representationalism, what I call “Externalist Representationalism.” On this view, the phenomenal character of a conscious state is identified with, or supervenes on, its wide representational content. I argue that this position is implausible because of the unpalatable epistemic consequences that follow from it. In particular, on Externalist Representationalism, what it is like for someone is a function of which property of external object they are currently representing, so it’s possible to be wrong about one’s qualitative experience in a way that seems to violate a plausible version of privileged access to such facts.

Language as a mental travel guide

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Travel Guide

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.

What is the purpose of cognition?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
Ben R. Newell
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Number ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
The Way

Abstract The purpose of human cognition depends on the problem people try to solve. Defining the purpose is difficult, because people seem capable of representing problems in an infinite number of ways. The way in which the function of cognition develops needs to be central to our theories.

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