scholarly journals Qualia realism and representationalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
A.A. Gusev ◽  

The article deals with the problem of naturalistic explanation of an essential feature of all conscious mental states – the phenomenal character. The conception of qualia realism can be considered as one of the options for a non-naturalistic explanation of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that the phenomenal character of experience can be explained in terms of representational content that are more acceptable to naturalism. As a rule, in these discussions, qualia are identified with the non-representational properties of experience – mental paint. The author analyzes in detail the relationship between the concepts of “qualia” and “mental paint” in the key work of G. Harman. It is shown that Harman’s argument against qualia realism fails. He defined qualia in terms of the mental paint conception, which contains consequences that replace the original thesis of qualia realism. To attack the foundations of qualia realism in a more relevant way, the author develops A. Kind’s idea of the epistemic dimension of qualia. Kind points out that since the philosophers arrived at the question of the existence of qualia by considering the plausibility of functionalism, they were so focused on metaphysical considerations that they forgot that this phenomenon is connected in the first epistemic dimension. On the basis of this, a new version of the argument from transparency of experience versus qualia realism was proposed. The argument demonstrates that the qualia realism fails the test of introspective analysis of perceptual experience. Qualia turn out to be theoretical objects that do not fulfill their prescribed explanatory function. This undermines the foundations of metaphysical arguments against the reductionist approach to consciousness, since they proceeded from the assumption of the existence of referents of the concept of “qualia”. The variant of the explanation of the phenomenal character of experience in terms of representationalism also faces internal problems. In this regard, the author offers the option of direct realism, since it is well compatible with the transparency thesis and is generally consistent with the naturalistic attitudes of the representationalism.

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-270
Author(s):  
Alberto Voltolini

In this article, first of all, the author wants to show that a new justification can be provided for the idea, originally maintained in the disjunctivist camp, that genuine perceptions and hallucinations are metaphysically different kinds of mental states, independently of the fact that they all are perceptual experiences. For even if they share their phenomenal character and their representational content is put aside for the purpose of their metaphysical individuation, as some conjunctivists maintain, they still differ in their mode, insofar as they differ in their functional role. Once things are so put at the metaphysical level, moreover, this account of perceptual experiences leaves room for reintroducing content for such experiences from the rear door; namely, as a (metaphysically irrelevant) singular representational content, just as some direct realists have originally suggested. Finally, this move enables the account to explain not only some intuitive data about perceptual experiences, but also to corroborate its viability, even if it does not rely on antiskeptical motivations.


Author(s):  
Susanna Schellenberg

Chapter 8 discusses the repercussions of capacitism for the justification of beliefs, the credences we should assign to perceptual beliefs, and the luminosity of mental states. In light of this discussion, the chapter explores the consequences of capacitism for various familiar problem cases: speckled hens, identical twins, brains in vats, new evil demon scenarios, matrixes, and Swampman. I show why perceptual capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in perception and their employment in relevant hallucinations and illusions is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by employing such capacities. I show, moreover, why capacitism is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. Finally, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence in light of an externalist view of perceptual content.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Wykowska ◽  
Jairo Pérez-Osorio ◽  
Stefan Kopp

This booklet is a collection of the position statements accepted for the HRI’20 conference workshop “Social Cognition for HRI: Exploring the relationship between mindreading and social attunement in human-robot interaction” (Wykowska, Perez-Osorio & Kopp, 2020). Unfortunately, due to the rapid unfolding of the novel coronavirus at the beginning of the present year, the conference and consequently our workshop, were canceled. On the light of these events, we decided to put together the positions statements accepted for the workshop. The contributions collected in these pages highlight the role of attribution of mental states to artificial agents in human-robot interaction, and precisely the quality and presence of social attunement mechanisms that are known to make human interaction smooth, efficient, and robust. These papers also accentuate the importance of the multidisciplinary approach to advance the understanding of the factors and the consequences of social interactions with artificial agents.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Baek ◽  
Diana Tamir ◽  
Emily B. Falk

Information sharing is a ubiquitous social behavior. What causes people to share? Mentalizing, or considering the mental states of other people, has been theorized to play a central role in information sharing, with higher activity in the brain’s mentalizing system associated with increased likelihood to share information. In line with this theory, we present novel evidence that mentalizing causally increases information sharing. In three pre-registered studies (n = 400, 840, and 3500 participants), participants who were instructed to consider the mental states of potential information receivers indicated higher likelihood to share health news compared to a control condition where they were asked to reflect on the content of the article. Certain kinds of mentalizing were particularly effective; in particular, considering receivers’ emotional and positive mental states, led to the greatest increase in likelihood to share. The relationship between mentalizing and sharing was mediated by feelings of closeness with potential receivers. Mentalizing increased feelings of connectedness to potential receivers, and in turn, increased likelihood of information sharing. Considering receivers’ emotional, positive, and inward-focused mental states was most effective at driving participants to feel closer with potential receivers and increase sharing. Data provide evidence for a causal relationship between mentalizing and information sharing and provide insight about the mechanism linking mentalizing and sharing. Taken together, these results advance theories of information sharing and shed light on previously observed brain-behavior relationships.


Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.


Author(s):  
Gemma Modinos ◽  
Anja Richter ◽  
Alice Egerton ◽  
Ilaria Bonoldi ◽  
Matilda Azis ◽  
...  

AbstractPreclinical models propose that increased hippocampal activity drives subcortical dopaminergic dysfunction and leads to psychosis-like symptoms and behaviors. Here, we used multimodal neuroimaging to examine the relationship between hippocampal regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) and striatal dopamine synthesis capacity in people at clinical high risk (CHR) for psychosis and investigated its association with subsequent clinical and functional outcomes. Ninety-five participants (67 CHR and 28 healthy controls) underwent arterial spin labeling MRI and 18F-DOPA PET imaging at baseline. CHR participants were followed up for a median of 15 months to determine functional outcomes with the global assessment of function (GAF) scale and clinical outcomes using the comprehensive assessment of at-risk mental states (CAARMS). CHR participants with poor functional outcomes (follow-up GAF < 65, n = 25) showed higher rCBF in the right hippocampus compared to CHRs with good functional outcomes (GAF ≥ 65, n = 25) (pfwe = 0.026). The relationship between rCBF in this right hippocampal region and striatal dopamine synthesis capacity was also significantly different between groups (pfwe = 0.035); the association was negative in CHR with poor outcomes (pfwe = 0.012), but non-significant in CHR with good outcomes. Furthermore, the correlation between right hippocampal rCBF and striatal dopamine function predicted a longitudinal increase in the severity of positive psychotic symptoms within the total CHR group (p = 0.041). There were no differences in rCBF, dopamine, or their associations in the total CHR group relative to controls. These findings indicate that altered interactions between the hippocampus and the subcortical dopamine system are implicated in the pathophysiology of adverse outcomes in the CHR state.


Author(s):  
Błażej Skrzypulec

AbstractIn the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan María Songel

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between vernacular architecture and Frei Otto's work, searching for shared principles and specific singularities, and testing whether lightness and sustainability can be identified as a common goal.Design/methodology/approachThe study is focused on tents and yurts, as archetypal examples of traditional architecture, and membrane structures and gridshells, as two types of light structures developed by Frei Otto. A comparative analysis of their behavior, form, elements, types, materials and strength has been carried out.FindingsThe survey carried out shows that Frei Otto's innovative tents and gridshells were not based on form imitation of vernacular architecture, but rather on a thorough understanding of physical form-generating processes, driving specific materials to optimal form, like his experiments with soap film models to generate tensioned minimal surfaces or his experiments with hanging chain net models to generate compressive antifunicular lattice shells.Originality/valueThis paper highlights how Frei Otto's endeavor to get the maximum with the minimum, to achieve a lot from a little, is also a key target of lightness and sustainability, and an essential feature of vernacular architecture.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel T. Shelton

Accounts of crisis in Europe have proliferated since late 2009. This article investigates the relationship between the diagnosis of crisis and the cohesion and enlargement of the ‘European project’ in the context of Southeastern Europe. The article adopts Michel Foucault's understanding of diagnosis as a strategic activity of language in order to re-construct the diagnostic discourse in relation to ongoing events in Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. Diagnostic practice produces accounts of crisis that are clinical, moralising, and prescriptive, affixing meanings to complex and overdetermined events in order that they can be acted upon. Diagnoses of the crises in Greece and Macedonia converge in their identification of political and cultural features of the national political economy in need of expert correction. The diagnosis of crisis emerges as an essential feature of European Union governmentality, which functions to delimit the bounds of political contestation in times of uncertainty and upheaval in favor of technocratic interventions.


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