Integration of pricing and inventory decisions of deteriorating item in a decentralized supply chain: a Stackelberg-game approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rubi Das ◽  
Abhijit Barman ◽  
Pijus Kanti De
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Inventory Decisions

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Models of Green Products in a Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Xiaozhen Dai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Layer Model ◽  
Numerical Illustration ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.

scholarly journals A Composite Contract for Coordinating a Supply Chain with Price and Effort Dependent Stochastic Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Shuang Liu ◽  
Yun Shang ◽  
Hong-yan Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Stochastic Demand ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Inventory Decisions

As the demand is more sensitive to price and sales effort, this paper investigates the issue of channel coordination for a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer facing price and effort dependent stochastic demand. A composite contract based on the quantity-restricted returns and target sales rebate can achieve coordination in this setting. Two main problems are addressed: (1) how to coordinate the decentralized supply chain; (2) how to determine the optimal sales effort level, pricing, and inventory decisions under the additive demand case. Numerical examples are presented to verify the effectiveness of combined contract in supply chain coordination and highlight model sensitivities to parametric changes.

Analysis of Double Marginalization Effect on the Wholesale Price Contract Coordination

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 1840005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Due to double marginalization effect, the wholesale price contract has been proved that it cannot coordinate a decentralized supply chain (DSC) based on the framework of Stackelberg game, in which the upstream firm acts as a leader and the downstream firm acts as a follower. Nevertheless, it has shown that the partnership between the enterprises tends to be equality. Motivated by this factor, this paper studies the coordination of wholesale price contract under the perspective of equality between enterprises. First, an innovative wholesale price contract is constructed and to prove that the constructed contract can flexibly coordinate the DSC. Second, the adaptability of the constructed contract is analyzed and compared with the revenue sharing contract, which is designed under the framework of Stackelberg game. Third, numerical analysis is calculated to verify the effectiveness and operation of the model.

scholarly journals Analysis of Production - Inventory Decisions in a Decentralized Supply Chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Alaei ◽  
Masoud Behravesh ◽  
Nayere Karegar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Production Inventory ◽  
Inventory Decisions

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decision-Making Based on Warehouse Receipt Pledge and Risk Consideration under Twice Ordering Mode

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Liang Wang ◽  
Tingjia Xu ◽  
Shi Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Risk Control ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Monotonically Increasing Function ◽  
Increasing Function

This paper studies supply chain decisions making between the retailer, supplier, and bank based on warehouse receipt pledge and risk consideration under twice ordering mode. The decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain are divided by whether the supplier provides repurchase guarantees and whether the retailer offers revenue sharing. We develop a Stackelberg game model to analyze the influential mechanism among various actors and use the method of downside risk control to discuss the bank’s expected loss and the optimal loan pledge ratio. We carry out a simulation analysis, and the result is shown as follows: (i) either for decentralized or centralized supply chain, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the optimal proportion that the number of goods pledged by the retailer’s twice ordering accounts for the number of first-ordering goods are all unique; (ii) the bank’s loan pledge ratio is a monotonically increasing function of disposal value of the unit remaining commodity; (iii) for centralized supply chain, the bank’s loan pledge ratio is the monotonically increasing function of repurchase ratio and wholesale price provided by the supplier, respectively; (iv) in the decentralized supply chain, the supplier’s return mainly comes from the wholesale revenue and is positively related to the wholesale volume and wholesale price; in the centralized supply chain, the supplier’s return is mainly from the retailer’s revenue sharing.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

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