Financing for information-based construction of decentralized supply chain based on stackelberg game theory

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang Min ◽  
Yu Liting
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Models of Green Products in a Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Xiaozhen Dai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Layer Model ◽  
Numerical Illustration ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.

Analysis of Double Marginalization Effect on the Wholesale Price Contract Coordination

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 1840005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Due to double marginalization effect, the wholesale price contract has been proved that it cannot coordinate a decentralized supply chain (DSC) based on the framework of Stackelberg game, in which the upstream firm acts as a leader and the downstream firm acts as a follower. Nevertheless, it has shown that the partnership between the enterprises tends to be equality. Motivated by this factor, this paper studies the coordination of wholesale price contract under the perspective of equality between enterprises. First, an innovative wholesale price contract is constructed and to prove that the constructed contract can flexibly coordinate the DSC. Second, the adaptability of the constructed contract is analyzed and compared with the revenue sharing contract, which is designed under the framework of Stackelberg game. Third, numerical analysis is calculated to verify the effectiveness and operation of the model.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decision-Making Based on Warehouse Receipt Pledge and Risk Consideration under Twice Ordering Mode

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Liang Wang ◽  
Tingjia Xu ◽  
Shi Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Risk Control ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Monotonically Increasing Function ◽  
Increasing Function

This paper studies supply chain decisions making between the retailer, supplier, and bank based on warehouse receipt pledge and risk consideration under twice ordering mode. The decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain are divided by whether the supplier provides repurchase guarantees and whether the retailer offers revenue sharing. We develop a Stackelberg game model to analyze the influential mechanism among various actors and use the method of downside risk control to discuss the bank’s expected loss and the optimal loan pledge ratio. We carry out a simulation analysis, and the result is shown as follows: (i) either for decentralized or centralized supply chain, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the optimal proportion that the number of goods pledged by the retailer’s twice ordering accounts for the number of first-ordering goods are all unique; (ii) the bank’s loan pledge ratio is a monotonically increasing function of disposal value of the unit remaining commodity; (iii) for centralized supply chain, the bank’s loan pledge ratio is the monotonically increasing function of repurchase ratio and wholesale price provided by the supplier, respectively; (iv) in the decentralized supply chain, the supplier’s return mainly comes from the wholesale revenue and is positively related to the wholesale volume and wholesale price; in the centralized supply chain, the supplier’s return is mainly from the retailer’s revenue sharing.

Research on Pricing Decision of Multi-Level Remanufacturing Reverse Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 290-293
Author(s):  
Zhan Feng Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Pricing Problems ◽  
Multi Level

In order to resolve all kinds of pricing problems in reverse supply chain, this paper constructed a multi-level remanufacturing reverse supply chain consisted of single recycler, single manufacturer and single retailer and established a non-cooperative stackelberg game by applying game theory. By solving this model, the equilibrium solution of stackelberg game was got. In non-cooperative game the maximize profits of every company in reverse supply chain and the total profits of the entire supply chain was acquired by using the equilibrium solution. The results show that this model can provide a theoretical basis for the pricing decision of remanufacturing reverse supply chain.

On the Information Sharing Model for Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 2090-2094
Author(s):  
Zhen Li ◽  
Yan Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanisms ◽  
Coordination Theory ◽  
Set Up

This paper, focusing on the two-level supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, tries to set up a supply chain information sharing model with characteristics of the Stackelberg game to analyze whether the retailer and the supplier share the supply chain information. Meanwhile, it deals with the designation of the coordination mechanisms of the supply chain with characteristics of the Stackelberg game, on the basis of the study on the characteristics of the Stackelberg game and the coordination theory of the supply chain.

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