scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Models of Green Products in a Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Xiaozhen Dai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Layer Model ◽  
Numerical Illustration ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.

scholarly journals Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bingquan Liu ◽  
Xuran Chang ◽  
Boyang Nie ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Lingqi Meng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.

scholarly journals Impacts of government interventions on pricing policies of the dual-channel supply chain by considering retailer services

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (S1) ◽  
pp. 231-252
Author(s):  
Taher Javadi ◽  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Government Interventions ◽  
Response Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Best Response ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

AbstractIn this study, the implications of the government’s tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government’s tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled in six scenarios in a competitive mode about service level, social welfare, and government’s revenue-seeking policies. It can be concluded that retailer services affect the optimal manufacturer and retailer’s decisions. Moreover, with the sensitivities analysis that was studied on government models, it was shown that an integrated SC could better serve the government to achieve its goals. Also, the optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailer of a dual-channel supply chain have been reached to the government’s social and economic goals. It can be found that the government with proper tariffs could coordinate social, economic, and service objectives.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8602
Author(s):  
Haitao Chen ◽  
Zhaohui Dong ◽  
Gendao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Research on the Maritime Logistics Pricing Model of Risk-Averse Retailer-Dominated Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (s2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Qing Fang ◽  
Zeping Tong ◽  
Liang Ren ◽  
Ao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
On Line ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Abstract Price decision is studied in a risk-averse retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain, which consisting of one manufacturers and one retailer with both off-line and on-line channels. Firstly, two mean-variance models in centralized and decentralized supply chain are established. Secondly, the optimal solutions under the two decision modes are compared and analyzed. The results shows that the price of dual-channel of retailer decreased with the increase of retailers’ risk- aversion coefficient and the standard deviation of the fluctuation of market demand, while the wholesale price changes is on the contrary; in addition, when the market demand is greater than a certain value, the prices of dual channel are correspondingly higher in decentralized supply chain than in centralized supply chain, and vice versa. In addition, when the retailer’s risk aversion is in a certain interval, the expected utility of the whole supply chain is greater in centralized supply chain than in decentralized decision, and vice versa. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the above conclusions.

scholarly journals Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Finance

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Peng Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Finance ◽  
Emission Reduction Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1311-1328
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

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