An Empirical Distribution of the Number of Subsets in the Core Partitions of Hedonic Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheida Etemadidavan ◽  
Andrew J. Collins
Game Theory ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Cesco

Hedonic games are simple models of coalition formation whose main solution concept is that of core partition. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of core partitions have been proposed so far. In this paper, we explore hedonic games where a reduced family of coalitions determines the development of the game. We allow each coalition to select a subset of it so as to act as its set of representatives (a distribution). Then, we introduce the notion of subordination of a hedonic game to a given distribution. Subordination roughly states that any player chosen as a representative for a coalition has to be comfortable with this decision. With subordination we have a tool, within hedonic games, to compare how a “convenient” agreement reached by the sets of representatives of different groups of a society is “valued” by the rest of the society. In our approach, a “convenient” agreement is a core partition, so this paper is devoted to relate the core of a hedonic game with the core of a hedonic game played by the sets of representatives. Thus we have to tackle the existence problem of core partitions in a reduced game where the only coalitions that matter are those prescribed by the distribution as a set of representatives. We also study how a distribution determines the whole set of core partitions of a hedonic game. As an interesting example, we introduce the notion of hedonic partitioning game, which resembles partitioning games studied in the case where a utility, transferable or not, is present. The existence result obtained in this new class of games is later used to provide a nonconstructive proof of the existence of a stable matching in the marriage model.


Author(s):  
Nathanaël Barrot ◽  
Kazunori Ota ◽  
Yuko Sakurai ◽  
Makoto Yokoo

We study hedonic games under friends appreciation, where each agent considers other agents friends, enemies, or unknown agents. Although existing work assumed that unknown agents have no impact on an agent’s preference, it may be that her preference depends on the number of unknown agents in her coalition. We extend the existing preference, friends appreciation, by proposing two alternative attitudes toward unknown agents, extraversion and introversion, depending on whether unknown agents have a slightly positive or negative impact on preference. When each agent prefers coalitions with more unknown agents, we show that both core stable outcomes and individually stable outcomes may not exist. We also prove that deciding the existence of the core and the existence of an individual stable coalition structure are respectively NPNP-complete and NP-complete.


Author(s):  
Kazunori Ohta ◽  
Nathanaël Barrot ◽  
Anisse Ismaili ◽  
Yuko Sakurai ◽  
Makoto Yokoo

We investigate hedonic games under enemies aversion and friends appreciation, where every agent considers other agents as either a friend or an enemy. We extend these simple preferences by allowing each agent to also consider other agents to be neutral. Neutrals have no impact on her preference, as in a graphical hedonic game.Surprisingly, we discover that neutral agents do not simplify matters, but cause complexity. We prove that the core can be empty under enemies aversion and the strict core can be empty under friends appreciation. Furthermore, we show that under both preferences, deciding whether the strict core is non-empty, is NP^NP-complete. This complexity extends to the core under enemies aversion. We also show that under friends appreciation, we can always find a core stable coalition structure in polynomial time.


Author(s):  
Angelo Fanelli ◽  
Gianpiero Monaco ◽  
Luca Moscardelli

The core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended to model coalition formation such as hedonic games. The fact that the number of deviating agents (that have to coordinate themselves) can be arbitrarily high, and the fact that agents may benefit only by a tiny amount from their deviation (while they could incur in a cost for deviating), suggest that the core is not able to suitably model many practical scenarios in large and highly distributed multi-agent systems. For this reason, we consider relaxed core stable outcomes where the notion of permissible deviations is modified along two orthogonal directions: the former takes into account the size of the deviating coalition, and the latter the amount of utility gain for each member of the deviating coalition. These changes result in two different notions of stability, namely, the q-size core and k-improvement core. We investigate these concepts of stability in fractional hedonic games, that is a well-known subclass of hedonic games for which core stable outcomes are not guaranteed to exist and it is computationally hard to decide nonemptiness of the core. Interestingly, the considered relaxed notions of core also possess the appealing property of recovering, in some notable cases, the convergence, the existence and the possibility of computing stable solutions in polynomial time.


Author(s):  
Martin Bullinger ◽  
Stefan Kober

A common theme of decision making in multi-agent systems is to assign utilities to alternatives, which individuals seek to maximize. This rationale is questionable in coalition formation where agents are affected by other members of their coalition. Based on the assumption that agents are benevolent towards other agents they like to form coalitions with, we propose loyalty in hedonic games, a binary relation dependent on agents' utilities. Given a hedonic game, we define a loyal variant where agents' utilities are defined by taking the minimum of their utility and the utilities of agents towards which they are loyal. This process can be iterated to obtain various degrees of loyalty, terminating in a locally egalitarian variant of the original game. We investigate axioms of group stability and efficiency for different degrees of loyalty. Specifically, we consider the problem of finding coalition structures in the core and of computing best coalitions, obtaining both positive and intractability results. In particular, the limit game possesses Pareto optimal coalition structures in the core.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Gainotti

Abstract The target article carefully describes the memory system, centered on the temporal lobe that builds specific memory traces. It does not, however, mention the laterality effects that exist within this system. This commentary briefly surveys evidence showing that clear asymmetries exist within the temporal lobe structures subserving the core system and that the right temporal structures mainly underpin face familiarity feelings.


Author(s):  
T. Kanetaka ◽  
M. Cho ◽  
S. Kawamura ◽  
T. Sado ◽  
K. Hara

The authors have investigated the dissolution process of human cholesterol gallstones using a scanning electron microscope(SEM). This study was carried out by comparing control gallstones incubated in beagle bile with gallstones obtained from patients who were treated with chenodeoxycholic acid(CDCA).The cholesterol gallstones for this study were obtained from 14 patients. Three control patients were treated without CDCA and eleven patients were treated with CDCA 300-600 mg/day for periods ranging from four to twenty five months. It was confirmed through chemical analysis that these gallstones contained more than 80% cholesterol in both the outer surface and the core.The specimen were obtained from the outer surface and the core of the gallstones. Each specimen was attached to alminum sheet and coated with carbon to 100Å thickness. The SEM observation was made by Hitachi S-550 with 20 kV acceleration voltage and with 60-20, 000X magnification.


Author(s):  
M. Locke ◽  
J. T. McMahon

The fat body of insects has always been compared functionally to the liver of vertebrates. Both synthesize and store glycogen and lipid and are concerned with the formation of blood proteins. The comparison becomes even more apt with the discovery of microbodies and the localization of urate oxidase and catalase in insect fat body.The microbodies are oval to spherical bodies about 1μ across with a depression and dense core on one side. The core is made of coiled tubules together with dense material close to the depressed membrane. The tubules may appear loose or densely packed but always intertwined like liquid crystals, never straight as in solid crystals (Fig. 1). When fat body is reacted with diaminobenzidine free base and H2O2 at pH 9.0 to determine the distribution of catalase, electron microscopy shows the enzyme in the matrix of the microbodies (Fig. 2). The reaction is abolished by 3-amino-1, 2, 4-triazole, a competitive inhibitor of catalase. The fat body is the only tissue which consistantly reacts positively for urate oxidase. The reaction product is sharply localized in granules of about the same size and distribution as the microbodies. The reaction is inhibited by 2, 6, 8-trichloropurine, a competitive inhibitor of urate oxidase.


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