Replication value as a function of citation impact and sample size

Researchers seeking to replicate original research often need to decide which of several relevant candidates to select for replication. Several strategies for study selection have been proposed, utilizing a variety of observed indicators as criteria for selection. However, few strategies clearly specify the goal of study selection and how that goal is related to the indicators that are utilized. We have previously formalized a decision model of replication study selection in which the goal of study selection is to maximize the expected utility gain of the replication e?ort. We further define the concept of replication value as a proxy for expected utility gain (Isager et al., 2020). In this article, we propose a quantitative operationalization of replication value. Wefirst discuss how value and uncertainty - the two concepts used to determine replication value – could be estimated via information about citation count and sample size. Second, we propose an equation for combining these indicators into an overall estimate of replication value, which we denote RVCn. Third, we suggest how RVCn could be implemented as part of a broader study selection procedure. Finally, we provide preliminary data suggesting that studies that were in fact selected for replication tend to have relatively high RVCn estimates. The goal of this article is to explain how RVCn is intended to work and, in doing so, demonstrate the many assumptions that should be explicit in any replication study selection strategy.

Relaxed Core Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games

The core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended to model coalition formation such as hedonic games. The fact that the number of deviating agents (that have to coordinate themselves) can be arbitrarily high, and the fact that agents may benefit only by a tiny amount from their deviation (while they could incur in a cost for deviating), suggest that the core is not able to suitably model many practical scenarios in large and highly distributed multi-agent systems. For this reason, we consider relaxed core stable outcomes where the notion of permissible deviations is modified along two orthogonal directions: the former takes into account the size of the deviating coalition, and the latter the amount of utility gain for each member of the deviating coalition. These changes result in two different notions of stability, namely, the q-size core and k-improvement core. We investigate these concepts of stability in fractional hedonic games, that is a well-known subclass of hedonic games for which core stable outcomes are not guaranteed to exist and it is computationally hard to decide nonemptiness of the core. Interestingly, the considered relaxed notions of core also possess the appealing property of recovering, in some notable cases, the convergence, the existence and the possibility of computing stable solutions in polynomial time.

Deciding what to replicate: A formal definition of “replication value” and a decision model for replication study selection.

Robust scientific knowledge is contingent upon replication of original findings. However, researchers who conduct replication studies face a difficult problem; there are many more studies in need of replication than there are funds available for replicating. To select studies for replication efficiently, we need to understand which studies are the most in need of replication. In other words, we need to understand which replication efforts have the highest expected utility. In this article we propose a general rule for study selection in replication research based on the replication value of the claims considered for replication. The replication value of a claim is defined as the maximum expected utility we could gain by replicating the claim, and is a function of (1) the value of being certain about the claim, and (2) uncertainty about the claim based on current evidence. We formalize this definition in terms of a causal decision model, utilizing concepts from decision theory and causal graph modeling. We discuss the validity of using replication value as a measure of expected utility gain, and we suggest approaches for deriving quantitative estimates of replication value.

Think Smart, Play Dumb: Analyzing Deception in Hardware Trojan Detection Using Game Theory

In recent years, integrated circuits (ICs) have become<br>significant for various industries and their security has<br>been given greater priority, specifically in the supply chain.<br>Budgetary constraints have compelled IC designers to offshore manufacturing to third-party companies. When the designer gets the manufactured ICs back, it is imperative to test for potential threats like hardware trojans (HT). In this paper, a novel multilevel game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze the interactions between a malicious IC manufacturer and the tester. In particular, the game is formulated as a non-cooperative, zerosum, repeated game using prospect theory (PT) that captures different players’ rationalities under uncertainty. The repeated game is separated into a learning stage, in which the defender<br><div>learns about the attacker’s tendencies, and an actual game stage, where this learning is used. Experiments show great incentive for the attacker to deceive the defender about their actual rationality by “playing dumb” in the learning stage (deception). This scenario is captured using hypergame theory to model the attacker’s view of the game. The optimal deception rationality of the attacker is analytically derived to maximize utility gain. For the defender, a first-step deception mitigation process is proposed to thwart the effects of deception. Simulation results show that the attacker can profit from the deception as it can successfully insert HTs in the manufactured ICs without being detected.</div><div><br></div><div>This paper has been accepted for publication in <b>IEEE Cyber Science Conference 2020</b><br></div>

Think Smart, Play Dumb: Analyzing Deception in Hardware Trojan Detection Using Game Theory

In recent years, integrated circuits (ICs) have become<br>significant for various industries and their security has<br>been given greater priority, specifically in the supply chain.<br>Budgetary constraints have compelled IC designers to offshore manufacturing to third-party companies. When the designer gets the manufactured ICs back, it is imperative to test for potential threats like hardware trojans (HT). In this paper, a novel multilevel game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze the interactions between a malicious IC manufacturer and the tester. In particular, the game is formulated as a non-cooperative, zerosum, repeated game using prospect theory (PT) that captures different players’ rationalities under uncertainty. The repeated game is separated into a learning stage, in which the defender<br><div>learns about the attacker’s tendencies, and an actual game stage, where this learning is used. Experiments show great incentive for the attacker to deceive the defender about their actual rationality by “playing dumb” in the learning stage (deception). This scenario is captured using hypergame theory to model the attacker’s view of the game. The optimal deception rationality of the attacker is analytically derived to maximize utility gain. For the defender, a first-step deception mitigation process is proposed to thwart the effects of deception. Simulation results show that the attacker can profit from the deception as it can successfully insert HTs in the manufactured ICs without being detected.</div><div><br></div><div>This paper has been accepted for publication in <b>IEEE Cyber Science Conference 2020</b><br></div>

Think Smart, Play Dumb: Analyzing Deception in Hardware Trojan Detection Using Game Theory

In recent years, integrated circuits (ICs) have become<br>significant for various industries and their security has<br>been given greater priority, specifically in the supply chain.<br>Budgetary constraints have compelled IC designers to offshore manufacturing to third-party companies. When the designer gets the manufactured ICs back, it is imperative to test for potential threats like hardware trojans (HT). In this paper, a novel multilevel game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze the interactions between a malicious IC manufacturer and the tester. In particular, the game is formulated as a non-cooperative, zerosum, repeated game using prospect theory (PT) that captures different players’ rationalities under uncertainty. The repeated game is separated into a learning stage, in which the defender<br><div>learns about the attacker’s tendencies, and an actual game stage, where this learning is used. Experiments show great incentive for the attacker to deceive the defender about their actual rationality by “playing dumb” in the learning stage (deception). This scenario is captured using hypergame theory to model the attacker’s view of the game. The optimal deception rationality of the attacker is analytically derived to maximize utility gain. For the defender, a first-step deception mitigation process is proposed to thwart the effects of deception. Simulation results show that the attacker can profit from the deception as it can successfully insert HTs in the manufactured ICs without being detected.</div><div><br></div><div>This paper has been accepted for publication in <b>IEEE Cyber Science Conference 2020</b><br></div>

The contribution of female health to economic development

We analyse the economic consequences for poor countries of investing in female health within a unified growth model featuring health-related gender differences in productivity. Better female health accelerates the demographic transition and thereby the take-off towards sustained economic growth. By contrast, male health improvements delay the transition and take-off because they tend to raise fertility. However, households tend to prefer male health improvements over female health improvements because they imply a larger static utility gain. This highlights the existence of a dynamic trade-off between the short-run interests of households and long-run development goals.

Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule

The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is well-known for its desirable fairness and efficiency properties. It is one of the most prominent protocols for the random assignment problem. However, Probabilistic Serial is not incentive-compatible, thereby these desirable properties only hold for the agents' declared preferences, rather than their genuine preferences. A substantial utility gain through strategic behaviors would trigger self-interested agents to manipulate the mechanism and would subvert the very foundation of adopting the mechanism in practice. In this paper, we characterize the extent to which an individual agent can increase its utility by strategic manipulation. We show that the incentive ratio of the mechanism is 3/2. That is, no agent can misreport its preferences such that its utility becomes more than 1.5 times of what it is when reports truthfully. This ratio is a worst-case guarantee by allowing an agent to have complete information about other agents' reports and to figure out the best response strategy even if it is computationally intractable in general. To complement this worst-case study, we further evaluate an agent's utility gain on average by experiments. The experiments show that an agent' incentive in manipulating the rule is very limited. These results shed some light on the robustness of Probabilistic Serial against strategic manipulation, which is one step further than knowing that it is not incentive-compatible.