Environment, growth, and optimal policy design

1996 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Mohtadi
Keyword(s):  
2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michael Orszag ◽  
Dennis J. Snower

Abstract This paper explores the optimal design of subsidies for hiring unemployed workers (`employment vouchers' for short) in the context of a simple dynamic model of the labour market. Focusing on the short-term and long-term effects of the vouchers on employment and unemployment, the analysis shows how the optimal policy depends on the rates of hiring and firing, and on the problems of displacement and deadweight. It also examines the roles of the government budget constraint and of the level of unemployment benefits in optimal policy design. We calibrate the model and evaluate the effectiveness of employment vouchers in reducing unemployment for a wide range of feasible parameters.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Cicowiez ◽  
Bernard Decaluwe ◽  
Mustapha K. Nabli
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (10) ◽  
pp. 3061-3101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Ales ◽  
Musab Kurnaz ◽  
Christopher Sleet

This paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design. A task-to-talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem. Technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks. The overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes, while raising those on middle to high incomes. The reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution, reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom. (JEL D31, H21, H23, H24, J31, O33)


2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Jara-Díaz ◽  
Francisco Javier Ramos-Real

1986 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 27-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.G. Becker ◽  
B. Dwolatzky ◽  
E. Karakitsos ◽  
B. Rustem

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