On Pareto-improving voluntary export restraints

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantinos Syropoulos
2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 647-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Grossmann ◽  
Panu Poutvaara
Keyword(s):  

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinod K. Aggarwal ◽  
Robert O. Keohane ◽  
David B. Yoffie

Recent protectionism by the United States has principally taken the form of negotiated barriers to trade, such as voluntary export restraints. These barriers tend to evolve over time and to display three patterns, which we label institutionalized, temporary, and sporadic protectionism. Cartel theory and studies of the politics of protection suggest that the dynamics of negotiated protectionism will depend on three variables: the barriers to entry into an industry, the size of the domestic industry, and the exit barriers for domestic firms. Low barriers to entry will lead to institutionalized protectionism when the domestic industry is large and exit difficult; temporary protectionism results when the domestic industry is small and exit easy; and sporadic protectionism is likely when barriers to entry are high. Brief studies of U.S. protectionism in textiles and apparel, steel, footwear, televisions, and automobiles illustrate the value of this framework.


2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Gori ◽  
Marina Pireddu ◽  
Antonio Villanacci
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Zhanbo Sun ◽  
Yu Tan ◽  
Rui Ma ◽  
Xia Yang ◽  
Jie Zhang

Emissions produced by urban transportation activities are harmful to people’s health and they also affect people’s trip-making decisions. In this paper, we explore the multiple equilibrium behaviors considering human exposure to vehicular emissions. We assume that a portion of transportation users are environmental advocates and their route decisions are based on some composite cost functions comprise of a travel time component and an emission exposure component. We then study the multiple equilibrium behaviors with multiple types of users on a traffic network. The multiple equilibrium problems are further converted into variational inequality (VI) problems and they are solved using a method of successive average- (MSA-) based diagonalization method. Per the specific network setting, we find that as travelers become more concerned about their exposure to vehicular emissions, the system emission exposure, travel time, and the total cost get reduced; i.e., Pareto improving solutions are achieved. By analyzing the multiple equilibrium behaviors, we find that the system gets better if more users become environmental advocates. And the change of a small percentage of users should already lead to a good system improvement.


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