Impacts of Metering-Based Dynamic Priority Schemes

Several works published over the last two decades have shown for a stylized set-up with homogeneous users that metering-based priority (MBP) schemes may generate Pareto improving departure time adjustments similar to those induced by congestion pricing, but without any financial transaction. We investigate whether MBP (i) still generates significant savings and (ii) remains Pareto-improving, with various sources of heterogeneity (in schedule flexibility, desired arrival time, and capacity usage). We consider two types of schemes: one where the priority status is allocated randomly (R-MBP) and another (HOV-MBP), which only prioritizes users with small capacity usage (e.g., carpoolers). We find that the relative total cost savings of R-MBP decrease with heterogeneity in flexibility, but may increase with heterogeneity in desired arrival time. It fails however to be Pareto-improving, as nonprioritized users are almost systematically worse-off. HOV-MBP circumvents this issue by generating an ordering effect and a modal shift, which both contribute to a better distribution of benefits among users. Under favorable circumstances, they may even restore a Pareto improvement. Overall, MBP appears as a realistic way to alleviate congestion, scoring well both in terms of efficiency and social acceptability.

Strategy Analysis of Selling Model Selection in Vertical Competition Supply Chains: A Game Theoretic Model

This paper takes the supply chain perspective to study the choice of selling model for manufacturers and e-tailers. To accomplish our objective, we consider three selling models, including reselling, agency selling, and mixed selling. By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium outcomes of the three selling models, we obtain some beneficial results. These results show that manufacturers and e-tailers cannot manage to make a profit at the same time whether they choose the reselling model or agency selling model. Our results also show that the mixed selling model may improve supply chain performance, as long as the cross-price elasticity is not low. Especially when the cross-price elasticity is comparatively high, a manufacturer and an e-tailer in vertical competition can achieve a profit-Pareto-improving situation, regardless of the market share of the e-tailer.

Welfare implications of mitigating investment uncertainty

This study explores the welfare implications of mitigating investment uncertainty in the context of Easley and O’Hara (Rev Financ Stud 22:1817–1843, 2009) While one may expect welfare gains by encouraging participation in financial markets by ambiguity-averse investors, we formally show that it hurts other investors and thus is not Pareto-improving without appropriate income transfers. We also examine the welfare effects of income redistribution among heterogeneous investors and government spending on investor education.

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

This paper considers a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both A and $B$ can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). First we show that an outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a certain market share in the final good market. This generates an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect, which is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Finally, it is shown that whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, all consumers prefer the other contract.

Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia

Under dynamic efficiency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme helps the current generation of retirees but hurts future generations because they are forced to saveviaa return-dominated scheme. Abandoning it is deemed welfare-improving but typically not for all generations. But what if agents are present-biased (hence, undersave for retirement) and the “paternalistically motivated forced savings” component of a PAYG scheme motivated its existence in the first place? This paper shows it is possible to transition from such a PAYG scheme on to a higher return, mandated fully-funded scheme; yet, no generation is hurt in the process. The results inform the debate on policy design of pension systems as more and more policy makers push for the transition to take place but are forced to recognize that current retirees may get hurt along the way.