Principal Changes Proposed in United States Federal Crop Insurance Programme, Effective 1 October 1979 by Senate Bill No. S.1125

1981 ◽  
pp. 340-344
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 648-680
Author(s):  
SHANE HAMILTON

A range of private and public institutions emerged in the United States in the years before and after the Great Depression to help farmers confront the inherent uncertainty of agricultural production and marketing. This included a government-owned and operated insurance enterprise offering “all-risk” coverage to American farmers beginning in 1938. Crop insurance, initially developed as a social insurance program, was beset by pervasive problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. As managers and policy makers responded to those problems from the 1940s on, they reshaped federal crop insurance in ways that increasingly made the scheme a lever of financialization, a means of disciplining individual farmers to think of farming in abstract terms of risk management. Crop insurance became intertwined with important changes in the economic context of agriculture by the 1960s, including the emergence of the “technological treadmill,” permanently embedding financialized risk management into the political economy of American agriculture.


1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent H. Smith ◽  
Hayley H. Chouinard ◽  
Alan E. Baquet

Using yield data for a sample of 123 dryland wheat producers in Montana, the effects of three area yield contracts, including the contract currently offered by the United States Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and two individual yield contracts on individual farm yield variability, are examined. The results indicate that while the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation area yield contract provides all farmers in the sample with some protection against yield variability, a simpler, actuarially equivalent “almost ideal” area yield contract provides substantially larger reductions in yield variability. However, actuarially equivalent individual yield contracts provide levels of protection against yield variability similar to those obtained under the “almost ideal” area yield contract at much lower premiums.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 262-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Annan ◽  
Wolfram Schlenker

Despite significant progress in average yields, the sensitivity of corn and soybean yields to extreme heat has remained relatively constant over time. We combine county-level corn and soybeans yields in the United States from 1989-2013 with the fraction of the planting area that is insured under the federal crop insurance program, which expanded greatly over this time period as premium subsidies increased from 20 percent to 60 percent. Insured corn and soybeans are significantly more sensitive to extreme heat that uninsured crops. Insured farmers do not have the incentive to engage in costly adaptation as insurance compensates them for potential losses.


2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 639-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. G. Santeramo ◽  
B. K. Goodwin ◽  
F. Adinolfi ◽  
F. Capitanio

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Reyes ◽  
Emile Elias ◽  
Andrew Eischens ◽  
Mark Shilts

A fact sheet produced by the USDA Southwest Climate Hub using publicly available crop insurance data from the USDA Risk Management Agency for the United States.


Author(s):  
Gleeson Simon ◽  
Guynn Randall

This chapter looks at the history and fundamental elements of resolution authority as it has been developed and used in the United States. The goal of resolution authority in the United States has been to deal with failed banks and other financial institutions in a manner that stems runs, avoids contagion and preserves critical operations, the same goal as deposit guarantee schemes. First introduced in the United States in 1933 as part of the deposit insurance programme for banks, resolution authority was originally little more than the method by which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation honoured its obligations to insured depositors before evolving to its current state. Resolution authority, as conceived in the United States, has two principal components—the core resolution powers and the claims process. The core resolution powers consist of the authority to quickly separate the assets and viable parts of a failed bank's business (the good bank) from its capital structure liabilities (the bad bank), so that its critical operations are preserved and runs and contagion are avoided. It is virtually always completed in the United States over a weekend commonly known as resolution weekend. The claims process involves determining the validity and amount of the claims of individual holders of capital structure liabilities in accordance with ordinary principles of due process and distributing the residual value of the good bank to such holders in satisfaction of their claims. The claims process typically takes at least six to nine months to be completed in order to comply with ordinary principles of due process for potential claimants.


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