Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 136 ◽  
pp. 109819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xianjia Wang ◽  
Wenman Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Spatial Threshold ◽  
Rate Mechanism ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

scholarly journals Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 1331-1353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doruk İriş ◽  
Jungmin Lee ◽  
Alessandro Tavoni
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Cross-national gender differences in behavior in a threshold public goods game: Japan versus Canada

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Yasuyo Hamaguchi ◽  
Toshiji Kawagoe ◽  
Elizabeth Maynes ◽  
Fei Song
Keyword(s):  
Gender Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Cross National ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Communication in a threshold public goods game under ambiguity

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (53) ◽  
pp. 5821-5842
Author(s):  
Matteo M. Marini ◽  
Aurora García-Gallego ◽  
Luca Corazzini
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

scholarly journals Common Knowledge Promotes Cooperation in the Threshold Public Goods Game by Reducing Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Deutchman ◽  
Dorsa Amir ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Matthew Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge—a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others’ cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution—a threshold—is required. Across two preregistered studies (N = 4,111), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Using structural equation modeling, we found that the predicted number of group members contributing to the public good and certainty about the predicted number of contributors mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people’s cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.

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