How the expanded crowd-funding mechanism of some southern rural areas in China affects cooperative behaviors in threshold public goods game

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

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A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198915500048 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 17 (03) ◽

pp. 1550004 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Friedel Bolle

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Equilibrium Selection ◽

Costs And Benefits ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Public Project ◽

Binary Decision ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

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The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments

Developments on Experimental Economics - Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_14 ◽

2007 ◽

pp. 163-167

Author(s):

Yasuyo Hamaguchi

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Mixed Effect ◽

Threshold Public Goods

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Common knowledge promotes cooperation in the threshold public goods game by reducing uncertainty

Evolution and Human Behavior ◽

10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.12.003 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Paul Deutchman ◽

Dorsa Amir ◽

Matthew R. Jordan ◽

Katherine McAuliffe

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Common Knowledge ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Threshold Public Goods

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Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game

Environmental and Resource Economics ◽

10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 74 (3) ◽

pp. 1331-1353 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Doruk İriş ◽

Jungmin Lee ◽

Alessandro Tavoni

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Public Pressure ◽

Threshold Public Goods

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Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Games ◽

10.3390/g10010012 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 12

Author(s):

Catherine Molho ◽

Daniel Balliet ◽

Junhui Wu

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Real Time ◽

Social Life ◽

Social Dilemmas ◽

Dictator Game ◽

Relative Power ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Power Asymmetry ◽

Fundamental Feature ◽

Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

Download Full-text