Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning

Cognition ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 188 ◽  
pp. 39-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David G. Rand
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Trevors

Under certain conditions, attempting to correct misinformation ironically result in its strengthening. In the current integrative review, I draw upon cognitive, motivational, and social psychology and political science literatures to examine instances of correction failure that are due to individuals’ intentional rejection of attempted corrections, which I refer to as intentional correction resistance. The review highlighted that when individuals are faced with corrections that target misconceptions that are closely associated with individual and group identity, identity-protective motivation may explain why intentional correction resistance occurs. Further, the review also identified several mechanisms that may explain how this phenomenon occurs, including validation, distrust, inhibition failure, disfluency, threat appraisal, negative moral emotions, motivated reasoning, and reactance. By sketching out potential antecedents and consequences of this costly phenomenon, I hope that researchers and educators may have a more complete theoretical picture with which to enhance the effectiveness of corrective efforts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-434
Author(s):  
Stephanie Edgerly ◽  
Emily K. Vraga

A by-product of today’s hybrid media system is that genres—once uniformly defined and enforced—are now murky and contested. We develop the concept of news-ness, defined as the extent to which audiences characterize specific content as news, to capture how audiences understand and process media messages. In this article, we (a) ground the concept of news-ness within research on media genres, journalism practices, and audience studies, (b) develop a theoretical model that identifies the factors that influence news-ness and its outcomes, and (c) situate news-ness within discussions about fake news, partisan motivated reasoning, and comparative studies of media systems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (11) ◽  
pp. 4944-4957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Adam Bear ◽  
Evan T. Collins ◽  
David G. Rand

What can be done to combat political misinformation? One prominent intervention involves attaching warnings to headlines of news stories that have been disputed by third-party fact-checkers. Here we demonstrate a hitherto unappreciated potential consequence of such a warning: an implied truth effect, whereby false headlines that fail to get tagged are considered validated and thus are seen as more accurate. With a formal model, we demonstrate that Bayesian belief updating can lead to such an implied truth effect. In Study 1 (n = 5,271 MTurkers), we find that although warnings do lead to a modest reduction in perceived accuracy of false headlines relative to a control condition (particularly for politically concordant headlines), we also observed the hypothesized implied truth effect: the presence of warnings caused untagged headlines to be seen as more accurate than in the control. In Study 2 (n = 1,568 MTurkers), we find the same effects in the context of decisions about which headlines to consider sharing on social media. We also find that attaching verifications to some true headlines—which removes the ambiguity about whether untagged headlines have not been checked or have been verified—eliminates, and in fact slightly reverses, the implied truth effect. Together these results contest theories of motivated reasoning while identifying a potential challenge for the policy of using warning tags to fight misinformation—a challenge that is particularly concerning given that it is much easier to produce misinformation than it is to debunk it. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-167
Author(s):  
Aleš Kudrnáč

This study explores youth accuracy judgments of disinformative and nondisinformative claims. Analyses are based on a nationally representative youth (16–20 years old) survey experiment conducted in the Czech Republic in 2017. When they were exposed to posts regarding refugee crisis, young people were asked to judge the accuracy of the statements accompanying the posts. Motivated reasoning of youth depended primarily on the alignment with the posts and the ideology of participants. Results of this research suggest that motivated reasoning works differently for liberals and conservatives. Perceived amount of media literacy training does not seem to affect directional motivation. General trust works as moderator of motivated reasoning and, in combination with ideology, appears to be important for understanding directional motivation when exposed to disinformation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil L Levy ◽  
Robert M Ross

In this chapter, we provide a necessarily brief and partial survey of recent work in the cognitive sciences directly on or closely related to the psychology of fake news, in particular fake news in the political domain. We focus on whether and why people believe fake news. While we argue that it is likely that a large proportion of people who purport to believe fake news really do, we provide evidence that this proportion might be significantly smaller than is usually thought (and smaller than is suggested by surveys). Assertion of belief is inflated, we suggest, by insincere report, whether to express support for one side of political debate or simply for fun. It is also inflated by the use of motivated inference of one sort or another, which lead respondents to report believing things about which they had no opinion prior to being probed. We then turn to rival accounts that aim to explain why people believe in fake news when they do. While partisan explanations, turning on motivated reasoning, are probably best known, we show they face serious challenges from accounts that explain belief by reference to analytic thinking.


Author(s):  
Stephanie Jean Tsang

With the hostile media phenomenon as an overarching framework, this chapter discusses how challenging it can be for media literacy education to successfully combat motivated reasoning in which individuals are likely to be hostile when exposed to news content that is incongruent with their personal point of view. Such discussion is vital in times when news audiences are cynical and skeptical towards both politicians and media agencies. Given the importance of understanding and studying individuals' perceptions of news biases and assessments of news credibility, this chapter makes a case for establishing more objective standards for journalistic work to overcome the challenges brought about by the rise of fake news in the digital era.


Author(s):  
Stephanie Jean Tsang

With the hostile media phenomenon as an overarching framework, this chapter discusses how challenging it can be for media literacy education to successfully combat motivated reasoning in which individuals are likely to be hostile when exposed to news content that is incongruent with their personal point of view. Such discussion is vital in times when news audiences are cynical and skeptical towards both politicians and media agencies. Given the importance of understanding and studying individuals' perceptions of news biases and assessments of news credibility, this chapter makes a case for establishing more objective standards for journalistic work to overcome the challenges brought about by the rise of fake news in the digital era.


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