Harnessing Moral Psychology to Reduce Meat Consumption

How can we make moral progress on factory farming? Part of the answer lies in human moral psychology. Meat consumption remains high, despite increased awareness of its negative impact on animal welfare. Weakness of will is part of the explanation: acceptance of the ethical arguments doesn’t always motivate changes in dietary habits. However, we draw on scientific evidence to argue that many consumers aren’t fully convinced that they morally ought to reduce their meat consumption. We then identify two key psychological mechanisms—motivated reasoning and social proof—that lead people to resist the ethical reasons. Finally, we show how to harness these psychological mechanisms to encourage reductions in meat consumption. A central lesson for moral progress generally is that durable social change requires socially-embedded reasoning.

Politically motivated aesthetic judgments

Are people motivated to feel that clothes worn by members of their political ingroup (outgroup) are more (less) beautiful and valuable? Building on research on politically motivated judgments, affective polarization, and social distancing, this study investigated how aesthetic judgments about the design and color of clothes, and willingness to pay for identical clothes, changed among Swedes (N=638) after they learnt that the clothes were worn by politicians from their most- or least-liked party. The results supported both a negative outgroup effect (i.e., clothes associated with the least-liked party became less attractive) and a positive ingroup effect (i.e., clothes associated with the most-liked party became more attractive and valuable). Clothes worn by non-politicians were evaluated similarly after the identity of the person wearing them was revealed. Particularly the positive ingroup effect was stronger among rightists than leftists, consistent with theoretical accounts that posit ideological asymmetries in motivated reasoning and relational motivations.

Good news reduces trust in government and its efficacy: The case of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine announcement

The announcement of Pfizer/BioNTech’s COVID-19 vaccine success on November 9, 2020 led to a global stock market surge. But how did the general public respond to such good news? We leverage the unexpected vaccine announcement to assess the effect of good news on citizens’ government evaluations, anxiety, beliefs and elicited behaviors in the US and the UK. While most outcomes were unaffected by the news, trust in government and elected politicians (and their competency) saw a significant decline in both countries. As the news did not concern the governments, and the governments did not have time to act on the news, our results suggest that the decline of trust is more likely explained by the psychological impact of good news on reasoning style. In particular, we suggest two possible styles of reasoning that might explain our results: a form of motivated reasoning and a reasoning heuristic of relative comparison.

Own-Party Bias: How Voters Evaluate Electoral Outcomes

A voluminous literature documents that citizens' perceptions of democracy are shaped by electoral victories and defeats, but what reasoning do citizens use to evaluate parties as winners or losers? Drawing on research on partisan-motivated reasoning, I propose an own-party bias in winner–loser evaluations according to which voters evaluate the electoral fate of their party more favourably than that of other parties. Data gathered in the aftermath of the Danish parliamentary election in 2015 support this expectation. Citizens are more inclined to interpret the election outcome as successful for their preferred party, regardless of the actual election result. This is more pronounced the stronger their partisan attachment and among the less politically knowledgeable, who also assign less importance to objective indicators of electoral success. The findings have implications for our understanding of electoral winners and losers and of how electoral results shape party support and polarization.

Motivated reasoning, fast and slow

Are people more likely to (mis)interpret information so that it aligns with their ideological identity when relying on feelings compared to when engaging in analytical thinking? Or is it the other way around: Does deliberation increase the propensity to (mis)interpret information to confirm existing political views? In a behavioral experiment, participants (n = 1207, Swedish sample) assessed numerical information concerning the effects of gender quotas and immigration either under time pressure or under no time pressure. To measure trait differences in cognitive sophistication, we also collected data on numeric ability. We found clear evidence of motivated reasoning when assessing both the effects of gender quotas on companies’ financial results and the effect of refugee intake on crime rates. Subjects who prioritized equality over liberty on the labor market were 13 percentage points less likely to correctly assess numerical information depicting that companies that used gender quotas when hiring made less profit. Subjects who classified themselves as ‘Swedes’ rather than ‘World citizens’ were 14 percentage points less likely to correctly assess numerical information depicting that crime rates decreased following immigration. Time pressure did not affect the likelihood to engage in motivated reasoning, while subjects with higher numeric ability were less likely to engage in motivated reasoning when analyzing information concerning refugee intake, but more likely to engage in motivated reasoning when analyzing information regarding the effect of gender quotas. Together these results indicate that motivated reasoning is primarily driven by individual differences in analytical thinking at the trait level and not by situational factors such as time pressure, and that whether motivated reasoning is primarily driven by analysis or feelings depends on the topic at hand.

Going veggie: Identifying and overcoming the social and psychological barriers to veganism

We conceptualize the journey to ethical veganism in the stages of the transtheoretical model of change, from precontemplation through contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance. At each stage, we explore the psychological barriers to progressing towards veganism, discuss how they manifest, and explore ways to overcome them. It is hoped that this paper can be used as a guide for animal advocates to identify the stage an individual is at, and understand and overcome the social and psychological barriers they may face to progressing. We argue that, while many people are ignorant of the cruel practices entailed in animal farming, many deliberately avoid thinking about the issue, are unable to appreciate the scale of the issue, and simply tend to favour the status quo. When engaging with the issue of farm animal suffering, meat-eaters are largely driven by cognitive dissonance, which manifests as motivated reasoning aimed at protecting one’s image of oneself and one’s society. This is facilitated by confirmation bias and complicit media which cater to the preferred views of their meat-eating audience. Even once convinced of veganism, habit and willpower present further barriers to acting on those beliefs. This is all in the context of a speciesist and carnistic culture where meat consumption is normal, farming is noble, and vegans are ‘others’. We locate and elucidate each of these biases within the stages of the transtheoretical model and discuss the implications of this model for animal advocates and for further research.