scholarly journals Evidence that instrumental conditioning requires conscious awareness in humans

Cognition ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 208 ◽  
pp. 104546
Author(s):  
L.I. Skora ◽  
M.R. Yeomans ◽  
H.S. Crombag ◽  
R.B. Scott
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lina Skora ◽  
Martin Yeomans ◽  
Hans C. Crombag ◽  
Ryan Bradley Scott

Instrumental conditioning is a crucial substrate of adaptive behaviour, allowing individuals to selectively interact with the stimuli in their environment to maximise benefit and minimise harm. The extent to which complex forms of learning, such as instrumental conditioning, are possible without conscious awareness is a topic of considerable importance and ongoing debate. In light of recent theoretical and empirical contributions casting doubt on the early demonstrations of unconscious instrumental conditioning, we revisit the question of its feasibility in two modes of conditioning. In Experiment 1, we used trace conditioning, following a prominent paradigm (Pessiglione et al., 2008) and enhancing its sensitivity. Success in this task requires participants to learn to approach reward-predictive stimuli and avoid punishment-predictive stimuli through monetary reinforcement. All stimuli were rendered unconscious using forward-backward masking. In Experiment 2, we used delay conditioning to shorten the stimulus-outcome delay, retaining the structure of the original task but presenting the stimuli under continuous flash suppression to allow for an overlap of the stimulus, action, and outcome, as well as replacing monetary reinforcement with primary appetitive reinforcement. In both experiments, we found evidence for absence of unconscious instrumental conditioning, showing that participants were unable to learn to adjust their behaviour to approach positive stimuli and avoid negative ones. This result is consistent with evidence that unconscious stimuli fail to bring about long-term behavioural adaptations, and provides empirical evidence to support theoretical proposals that consciousness might be necessary for adaptive behaviour, where selective action is required.


1991 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 623-624
Author(s):  
Mardi J. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer R Sadler ◽  
Grace Elisabeth Shearrer ◽  
Nichollette Acosta ◽  
Kyle Stanley Burger

BACKGROUND: Dietary restraint represents an individual’s intent to limit their food intake and has been associated with impaired passive food reinforcement learning. However, the impact of dietary restraint on an active, response dependent learning is poorly understood. In this study, we tested the relationship between dietary restraint and food reinforcement learning using an active, instrumental conditioning task. METHODS: A sample of ninety adults completed a response-dependent instrumental conditioning task with reward and punishment using sweet and bitter tastes. Brain response via functional MRI was measured during the task. Participants also completed anthropometric measures, reward/motivation related questionnaires, and a working memory task. Dietary restraint was assessed via the Dutch Restrained Eating Scale. RESULTS: Two groups were selected from the sample: high restraint (n=29, score >2.5) and low restraint (n=30; score <1.85). High restraint was associated with significantly higher BMI (p=0.003) and lower N-back accuracy (p=0.045). The high restraint group also was marginally better at the instrumental conditioning task (p=0.066, r=0.37). High restraint was also associated with significantly greater brain response in the intracalcarine cortex (MNI: 15, -69, 12; k=35, pfwe< 0.05) to bitter taste, compared to neutral taste.CONCLUSIONS: High restraint was associated with improved performance on an instrumental task testing how individuals learn from reward and punishment. This may be mediated by greater brain response in the primary visual cortex, which has been associated with mental representation. Results suggest that dietary restraint does not impair response-dependent reinforcement learning.


Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher

This chapter examines the concept of free will as it is discussed in philosophy and neuroscience. It reviews reflective and perceptual theories of agency and argues against neuro-centric conclusions about the illusory nature of free will. Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet suggest that neural activations prior to conscious awareness predict specific actions. This has been taken as evidence that challenges the traditional notion of free will. Libet’s experiments, arguably, are about motor control processes on an elementary timescale and say nothing about freely willed intentional actions embedded in personal and social contexts that involve longer-term, narrative timescales. One implication of this interpretation is that enactivism is not a form of simple behaviorism. Agency is not a thing reducible to elementary neuronal processes; nor is it an idea or a pure consciousness. It rather involves a structure of complex relations.


Author(s):  
Drew Leder

This chapter undertakes a phenomenology of inner-body experience, starting with a focus on visceral interoception. While highly personal, such experience also reveals a level of the lived body that is pre-personal, beyond our understanding and control. In contrast to exteroception, elements of the visceral field can be inaccessible, or surface only indistinctly and intermittently to conscious awareness. Nonetheless, interoception is more than just a series of such sensations. This chapter argues for the “exterior interior”—that is, we interpret inner body experiences through models drawn from the outer world, and interoception itself is bound up with emotion, purpose, and projects. In the West, we tend to valorize the interiority of rational thought; by contrast, experience of the inner body is a kind of “inferior interior,” often overlooked or overridden, yet inside insights—gained from attending to messages from the inner body—may preserve our health and wellbeing.


1978 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Rachlin ◽  
Barbara Burkhard

PsyCh Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 228-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Montemayor

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