Samkhya Philosophy, Deep Ecology and Sustainable Development

Samkhya philosophy is one of the oldest philosophies in the Indian philosophical system. This philosophy is independent in origin and mainly known for its evolution theory. Samkhya philosophy has accepted the two ultimate and independent realities, Nature and pure Consciousness. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the notion of deep ecology from the Samkhya’s evolution theory perspective. In this paper, firstly, we have elucidated the Samkhya philosophy of suffering and the solution to the problem. In the second part of the article, we have argued that how Samkhya’s philosophical notion of Nature demonstrates our embeddedness in Nature. Therefore, the idea of deep ecology is always there in one or another form in Samkhya philosophy. It has also connections to the idea of sustainable development.

Anthropological approach to the concept of legal values: classic, non-classical and post-non-classical

The article is devoted to the study of the concept of legal values, their classification. Analysis of legal literature led to the conclusion that legal values are considered only in line with legal positivism, which have a faade in relation to the subject of law. According to the author, anthropological approaches - classical, non-classical and post-non-classical - can become a milestone in a conceptually different understanding of the values of law. In this regard, the purpose of the paper is to conduct a study of the values of law in line with anthropological research programs. To achieve the goal, the following tasks were set: 1) to describe the classical (neoclassical), non-classical and post-non-classical anthropological programs; 2) to formulate the concept of legal values and truth within the framework of three paradigms of legal thinking; 3) to classify and rank the values of law. As a result of the study, the following conclusions were made: The legal value in the classical (neoclassical) anthropological paradigm lies in the safe-guarding and protection of inviolability of the biopsychophysiological integrity of the organism, which identifies an individual as a physical person. Therefore, the law has an objectified and alienated from the individual subject character. The value of law in non-classical anthropological discourse is imperative-attributive experiences (legal psyche) or intentional acts of consciousness that constitute legal reality, with which a person is identified - a legal personality. The post-non-classical model of cognition is focused on the discovery of the true essence of a person through identification with a legal being (or pure consciousness), which is an absolute value and creator of transpersonal and extra-social legal reality.

Higher Consciousness Management: Transcendence for Spontaneous Right Action

Business organizations, managers, and all of us need to adapt to a rapidly evolving socio-technical environment and to the climate change and other environmental crises we are all facing. Managers, and all of us, need to engage with the opportunities and threats posed by exponential development of technologies of production, distribution, and consumption and with innovative, and sometimes, risky approaches to dealing with climate change and other aspects of global unsustainability. Managers, and all of us, would do well to unlearn self-limiting beliefs and utilize the highest potential of themselves and their teams to generate visionary designs that will guide pro-social and environmental behaviors toward a flourishing world. We call Higher Consciousness Management (HCM) a way of being and operating that enables managers and others to tap into the source of unbounded potential within themselves. In essence, managers could benefit from transcending surface-level reality and developing problem-solving capabilities with adaptability, creativity, empathy, and vision. The V-theory of transcendence models a wide range of contemplation and meditation techniques to transcend surface reality and connect with pure consciousness, which is the unified field of all the laws of nature. This paper presents three key principles for HCM, and some ways of developing those capabilities in organizations. We model HCM using two case studies, and outline a vision of what HCM might portend for the future.

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

<p>A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p>

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

<p>A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p>

Evidence Synthesis Indicates Contentless Experiences in Meditation are Neither Truly Contentless Nor Identical

Contentless experience involves an absence of mental content such as thoughts, perceptions, and mental images. In academic work it has been traditionally treated as including states like those aimed for in Shamatha, Transcendental, and Stillness Meditation. We have used evidence synthesis to select and review 135 expert texts from within the three traditions. In this paper we identify the features of contentless experience referred to in the expert texts and determine whether the experiences are the same or different across the practices with respect to each feature. We identify 65 features reported or implied in one or more practices, with most being reported or implied in all three. While there are broad similarities in the experiences across the traditions, we find that there are differences with respect to four features and possibly many others. The main difference identified is that Shamatha involves substantially greater attentional stability and vividness. Another key finding is that numerous forms of content are present in the experiences, including wakefulness, naturalness, calm, bliss/joy, and freedom. The findings indicate that meditation experiences described as contentless in the academic literature can in fact involve considerable variation, and that in many and perhaps most cases these experiences are not truly contentless. This challenges traditional understandings in academic research that in these so-called contentless experiences all content is absent, and that the experiences are therefore an identical state of pure consciousness or consciousness itself. Implications for neuroscientific and clinical studies and for basic understandings of the practices are discussed.

The Path to Contentless Experience in Meditation: An Evidence Synthesis Based on Expert Texts

In contentless experience (sometimes termed pure consciousness) there is an absence of mental content such as thoughts, perceptions, and mental images. The path to contentless experience in meditation can be taken to comprise the meditation technique, and the experiences (“interim-states”) on the way to the contentless “goal-state/s”. Shamatha, Transcendental, and Stillness Meditation are each said to access contentless experience, but the path to that experience in each practice is not yet well understood from a scientific perspective. We have employed evidence synthesis to select and review 135 expert texts from those traditions. In this paper we describe the techniques and interim-states based on the expert texts and compare them across the practices on key dimensions. Superficially, Shamatha and Transcendental Meditation appear very different to Stillness Meditation in that they require bringing awareness to a meditation object. The more detailed and systematic approach taken in this paper indicates that posturally Shamatha is closer to Stillness Meditation, and that on several other dimensions Shamatha is quite different to both other practices. In particular, Shamatha involves greater measures to cultivate attentional stability and vividness on an object, greater focusing, less tolerance of mind-wandering, more monitoring, and more deliberate doing/control. Achieving contentless experience in Shamatha is much slower, more difficult, and less frequent. The findings have important implications for consciousness, neuroscientific, and clinical research and practice.

The Meaning of "Accounting" In a Religious-Based Organization

Objective - Accounting has been defined as the art of recording since it is trapped at a technical level. However, accounting as a symbol have different meanings for different people depending on one's interests, goals, knowledge, and perspectives. The aim of this study was to better understand the meaning of accounting in religious organizations, especially in pesantren (Indonesian Islamic boarding schools). Methodology/Technique - In the interpretive paradigm, this study uses Husserl's transcendental phenomenological theory. Data analysis begins with identifying noema (texture analysis), then obtaining noesis through bracketing (structural analysis). Furthermore, understanding the noema-noesis relationship results in deliberate analysis. Finally, the whole process of generating pure consciousness is called eidetic reduction. Findings - Each informant has a different meaning to accounting depending on individual experience. Beyond materialism, the meaning of accounting is fascinating. According to the findings of the study, accounting has two meanings: first, accounting is ikhlas (sincere), and second, accounting is a discipline. Novelty - Accounting will not be separated from theology and spirituality, especially accounting applied in religious organizations. Based on the experience of "I", accounting has a different meaning from conventional accounting. Type of Paper - Empirical. Keywords: Accounting; Interpretive; Pesantren; Transcendental Phenomenology. JEL Classification: M41, M49.

Redressing a Straw Man: Correcting Critical Misunderstandings of Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy

This essay reinvigorates the Huxley/Osmond theory that psychedelic drugs can occasion a cross-cultural mystical experience characterized by a sense of “unity with ultimate reality.” It offers a long-overdue rejoinder to the position of Constructivist authors such as Steven T. Katz, Hans Penner, and Stephen Prothero that Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy is a defunct position. Specifically, the essay answers three erroneous charges: (1) that Huxley posited his viewpoint as the “core” or “essence” of religion, (2) that Huxley believed he was describing a set of universally shared religious beliefs, and (3) that Huxley’s position depends on a belief in—and the possibility of—a state of “pure consciousness.” In all cases, these charges will be shown to be erroneous. Moreover, it will also be argued that these claims are inaccurate for most forms of the Perennial Philosophy, and that the Perennial Philosophy is not a homogenous viewpoint, but rather a family of theories as are Existentialism, Postmodernism, and Idealism. The essay ends with a look at new directions for testing the Huxley/Osmond position, including with psychedelic drugs.

The Phenomenology of “Pure” Consciousness as Reported by an Experienced Meditator of the Tibetan Buddhist Karma Kagyu Tradition. Analysis of Interview Content Concerning Different Meditative States

A philosopher and a cognitive neuroscientist conversed with Buddhist lama Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt (TLB) about the unresolved phenomenological concerns and logical questions surrounding “pure” consciousness or minimal phenomenal experience (MPE), a quasi-contentless, non-dual state whose phenomenology of “emptiness” is often described in terms of the phenomenal quality of luminosity that experienced meditators have reported occurs in deep meditative states. Here, we present the excerpts of the conversation that relate to the question of how it is possible to first have and later retrieve such non-dual states of selflessness and timelessness that are unrelated to sensory input. According to TLB, a “pure” experience of consciousness contains the phenomenal quality of luminous clarity, which is experienced solely in the transitional phase from the non-dual state of absolute emptiness to the state of minimal emptiness, when the person gradually returns to duality. However, this quality of luminous clarity can also be experienced in non-minimal states as in the experiential mode of being awakened. TLB describes this transition as a kind of ephemeral afterglow in the form of a maximally abstract phenomenal quality, i.e., luminosity, which justifies the conclusion of having been in a state of “pure” consciousness.