Detecting HTTP-based application layer DoS attacks on web servers in the presence of sampling

2017 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Hadian Jazi ◽  
Hugo Gonzalez ◽  
Natalia Stakhanova ◽  
Ali A. Ghorbani
Author(s):  
Hosam F. El-Sofany ◽  
Samir Abou El-Seoud

Cloud computing is a new paradigm for hosting hardware and software resources and provides a web-based services to organizations and consumers. It also provides an easy to use and on-demand access to cloud based computing resources that can be published by easy, minimal administration and with a great efficiency. Services of cloud computing are accessing and sharing through internet connection thus it is open for attacker to attack on its security. Application layer based attacks is one of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) that can cause a big problem in cloud security. The main objective of DDoS attacks is to infect computer resources (e.g., software applications, network, CPU, etc.) and make them not working properly for the authorized users. In DDoS, the attacker tries to overload the web-based service with traffic. HTTP and XML-based DDoS attacks are founded under the application layer based category of DoS attacks. This category of attack is focused on particular web applications. The main objective of this research paper is to introduce an effective approach to protect cloud-based systems against application layer based attacks. Complexity analysis, effectiveness and performance evaluations of the presented approach are presented.  The feedbacks of the experimental results were highly promising, for protecting cloud computing systems against both DoS and DDoS attacks. Correlation analysis model is also used to validate the efficiency of the proposed approach.


Organizational web servers reflect the public image of an organization and serve web pages/information to organizational clients via web browsers using HTTP protocol. Some of the web server software may contain web applications that enable users to perform high-level tasks, such as querying a database and delivering the output through the web server to the client browser as an HTML file. Hackers always try to exploit the different vulnerabilities or flaws existing in web servers and web applications, which can pose a big threat for an organization. This chapter provides the importance of protecting web servers and applications along with the different tools used for analyzing the security of web servers and web applications. The chapter also introduces different web attacks that are carried out by an attacker either to gain illegal access to the web server data or reduce the availability of web services. The web server attacks includes denial of service (DOS) attacks, buffer overflow exploits, website defacement with sql injection (SQLi) attacks, cross site scripting (XSS) attacks, remote file inclusion (RFI) attacks, directory traversal attacks, phishing attacks, brute force attacks, source code disclosure attacks, session hijacking, parameter form tampering, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, HTTP response splitting attacks, cross-site request forgery (XSRF), lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) attacks, and hidden field manipulation attacks. The chapter explains different web server and web application testing tools and vulnerability scanners including Nikto, BurpSuite, Paros, IBM AppScan, Fortify, Accunetix, and ZAP. Finally, the chapter also discusses countermeasures to be implemented while designing any web application for any organization in order to reduce the risk.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clifford Kemp ◽  
Chad Calvert ◽  
Taghi M. Khoshgoftaar

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Cherubin ◽  
Jamie Hayes ◽  
Marc Juarez

Abstract Website Fingerprinting (WF) allows a passive network adversary to learn the websites that a client visits by analyzing traffic patterns that are unique to each website. It has been recently shown that these attacks are particularly effective against .onion sites, anonymous web servers hosted within the Tor network. Given the sensitive nature of the content of these services, the implications of WF on the Tor network are alarming. Prior work has only considered defenses at the client-side arguing that web servers lack of incentives to adopt countermeasures. Furthermore, most of these defenses have been designed to operate on the stream of network packets, making practical deployment difficult. In this paper, we propose two application-level defenses including the first server-side defense against WF, as .onion services have incentives to support it. The other defense is a lightweight client-side defense implemented as a browser add-on, improving ease of deployment over previous approaches. In our evaluations, the server-side defense is able to reduce WF accuracy on Tor .onion sites from 69.6% to 10% and the client-side defense reduces accuracy from 64% to 31.5%.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-47
Author(s):  
Jeferson Eleazar Martínez-Lozano ◽  
Pedro Sandino Atencio-Ortiz

This article illustrates by means of a demonstration and taking advantage of the vulnerability “Open redirect”, how easy it can be to attack web servers through distributed attacks of denial of services. In it, the Cyber Kill Chain® model is used to carry out this attack in phases. In the development of the research, a systematic UFONet tool is applied and the results obtained are analyzed and it is recommended to protect the Internet application services of said attacks through web application firewalls (WAF) whose presence allows the DDoS traffic of the application layer (including the HTTP-GET flood) arrives effortlessly at the destination server.


Sensors ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (8) ◽  
pp. 2445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Granjal ◽  
João Silva ◽  
Nuno Lourenço

It is well recognized that security will play a major role in enabling most of the applications envisioned for the Internet of Things (IoT). We must also note that most of such applications will employ sensing and actuating devices integrated with the Internet communications infrastructure and, from the minute such devices start to support end-to-end communications with external (Internet) hosts, they will be exposed to all kinds of threats and attacks. With this in mind, we propose an IDS framework for the detection and prevention of attacks in the context of Internet-integrated CoAP communication environments and, in the context of this framework, we implement and experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of anomaly-based intrusion detection, with the goal of detecting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and attacks against the 6LoWPAN and CoAP communication protocols. From the results obtained in our experimental evaluation we observe that the proposed approach may viably protect devices against the considered attacks. We are able to achieve an accuracy of 93% considering the multi-class problem, thus when the pattern of specific intrusions is known. Considering the binary class problem, which allows us to recognize compromised devices, and though a lower accuracy of 92% is observed, a recall and an F_Measure of 98% were achieved. As far as our knowledge goes, ours is the first proposal targeting the usage of anomaly detection and prevention approaches to deal with application-layer and DoS attacks in 6LoWPAN and CoAP communication environments.


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