Biological markets and the effects of partner choice on cooperation and friendship

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 33-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pat Barclay
PeerJ ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. e6332 ◽  
Author(s):  
André S. Pereira ◽  
Inês D. Rebelo ◽  
Catarina Casanova ◽  
Phyllis C. Lee ◽  
Vasilis Louca

A large body of evidence suggests that female Old World monkeys maintain selective long-term grooming interactions with fitness benefits. The last two decades have produced evidence that the regulation of social interactions among primates can be, in part, explained by the Biological Markets theory, with grooming behaviour as the focus of these studies. Grooming facilitates bonding between individuals, constituting an essential part of the regulation of social relationships among female cercopithecids. In contrast to the well-studied baboons (Papio spp), knowledge about the nature of grooming interactions and their regulation is generally lacking for the large, terrestrial species of mandrills (Mandrillus sphinx). We used a combination of social network analysis tools and well-established methods for assessing partner diversity and reciprocity to characterise grooming networks, partner choice and patterns of trade (be groomed, give grooming) among females in a captive group of mandrills, both within and across two separate observation periods. Our results suggest that, even though the relatively stable conditions of captivity allowed the studied females to maintain selective grooming interactions across time, small scale demographic changes affected the grooming dynamics of the group in accordance with the expectations of the Biological Markets theory. In particular, the maturation and consequent integration of a high ranking female into the group’s grooming network from one period to the next resulted in a more pronounced effect of rank on the regulation of grooming interactions. In addition, the influence of the maturation of a dependent infant on the grooming interactions of his mother were evident between periods. Our results also demonstrate that grooming networks are dynamic and that high ranking individuals are not necessarily the most central in grooming networks. Finally, we discuss the potential of social network analysis to identify cases of social exclusion and its consequences for captive management.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 274-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Wincenciak ◽  
Corey L. Fincher ◽  
Claire I. Fisher ◽  
Amanda C. Hahn ◽  
Benedict C. Jones ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1687) ◽  
pp. 20150101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hammerstein ◽  
Ronald Noë

Cooperation between organisms can often be understood, like trade between merchants, as a mutually beneficial exchange of services, resources or other ‘commodities’. Mutual benefits alone, however, are not sufficient to explain the evolution of trade-based cooperation. First, organisms may reject a particular trade if another partner offers a better deal. Second, while human trade often entails binding contracts, non-human trade requires unwritten ‘terms of contract’ that ‘self-stabilize’ trade and prevent cheating even if all traders strive to maximize fitness. Whenever trading partners can be chosen, market-like situations arise in nature that biologists studying cooperation need to account for. The mere possibility of exerting partner choice stabilizes many forms of otherwise cheatable trade, induces competition, facilitates the evolution of specialization and often leads to intricate forms of cooperation. We discuss selected examples to illustrate these general points and review basic conceptual approaches that are important in the theory of biological trade and markets. Comparing these approaches with theory in economics, it turns out that conventional models—often called ‘Walrasian’ markets—are of limited relevance to biology. In contrast, early approaches to trade and markets, as found in the works of Ricardo and Cournot, contain elements of thought that have inspired useful models in biology. For example, the concept of comparative advantage has biological applications in trade, signalling and ecological competition. We also see convergence between post-Walrasian economics and biological markets. For example, both economists and biologists are studying ‘principal–agent’ problems with principals offering jobs to agents without being sure that the agents will do a proper job. Finally, we show that mating markets have many peculiarities not shared with conventional economic markets. Ideas from economics are useful for biologists studying cooperation but need to be taken with caution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1856) ◽  
pp. 20170904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lena Grinsted ◽  
Jeremy Field

A major aim in evolutionary biology is to understand altruistic help and reproductive partitioning in cooperative societies, where subordinate helpers forego reproduction to rear dominant breeders' offspring. Traditional models of cooperation in these societies typically make a key assumption: that the only alternative to staying and helping is solitary breeding, an often unfeasible task. Using large-scale field experiments on paper wasps ( Polistes dominula ), we show that individuals have high-quality alternative nesting options available that offer fitness payoffs just as high as their actual chosen options, far exceeding payoffs from solitary breeding. Furthermore, joiners could not easily be replaced if they were removed experimentally, suggesting that it may be costly for dominants to reject them. Our results have implications for expected payoff distributions for cooperating individuals, and suggest that biological market theory, which incorporates partner choice and competition for partners, is necessary to understand helping behaviour in societies like that of P. dominula . Traditional models are likely to overestimate the incentive to stay and help, and therefore the amount of help provided, and may underestimate the size of reproductive concession required to retain subordinates. These findings are relevant for a wide range of cooperative breeders where there is dispersal between social groups.


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