Can prices be insensitive to unit cost variations? A game-theoretic alternative to the kinked demand curve explanation

2012 ◽  
Vol 116 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-91
Author(s):  
Giorgos Stamatopoulos ◽  
Minas Vlassis
2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Prafulla Joglekar ◽  
Patrick Lee ◽  
Alireza M. Farahani

Operations researchers have always assumed that when a product's unit cost is constant and its demand curve is known and stationary, a retailer of the product would find it optimal to replenish the inventory with a fixed quantity and to sell the product always at a fixed price. We present, with proof, a model that shows that, in such a case, an e-tailer is better off using a continuously increasing price strategy than using a fixed price strategy within each inventory cycle. Sensitivity analysis shows that this strategy is particularly profitable when demand is highly price sensitive and the inventory ordering and carrying costs are high.


Author(s):  
Gianluca Grilli

Natural environments represent background settings for most outdoor recreation activities, which are important non-consumptive benefits that people obtain from nature. Recreation has been traditionally considered a non-market service because it is practiced free of charge in public spaces and therefore of secondary relevance for the economy. Although outdoor recreation in natural parks became relevant during the 19th century, the increased popularity of recreation after the Second World War required tools for the assessment of recreational benefits, which were not considered in the evaluation of investments in recreational facilities, and increasing spending for recreational equipment captured the attention of outdoor recreation as an economic sector. In the 1990s, it was observed that many recreational activities were commercialized and started being considered equally important to tourism as a means to boost the economy of local communities. The expansion of outdoor recreation is reflected in a growing interest in the economic aspects, including cost–benefit calculations of the investments in recreational facilities and research on appropriate methods to evaluate the non-market benefits of recreation. The first economic technique used for valuing recreation was the travel cost method that consisted in the assessment of a demand curve, where the demanded quantity is the number of trips to a specific site and the cost is the unit cost of travel to the destination. After this first intuition, the number of contributions on recreation valuation exponentially grew, and new methods were proposed, including methods based on stated preferences for recreation that can be used when travel cost data that reveal consumers’ behavior are not available. A regular assessment of recreational benefits has several advantages for public policy, including the evaluation of investments and information on visitor profile and preferences, income, and price elasticity, which are essential to understand the market of outdoor recreation and propose effective strategies and recreation-oriented management. The increasing environmental pressure associated with participation in outdoor recreation required effective conservation activities, which in turn posed limitations to economic activities of local communities who live in contact with natural resources. Therefore, a balance between environmental, social, and economic interests is essential for recreational destination to avail of benefits without conflicts among stakeholders.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Hausken

A decision and game theoretic model is developed for how one and two news organisations strike balances between producing clickbait or fake news, and real news. Each news organisation seeks to attract gullible consumers who consume more clickbait or fake news than real news, and non-gullible consumers who conscientiously consume only real news. Increasing a news organisation budget results in obtaining both more clickbait or fake news, and more real news. More clickbait or fake news is produced if the news organisation’s unit cost of effort to produce real news, the production efficiency for clickbait or fake news, and the fraction of consumers consuming clickbait or fake news, increase. In contrast, less clickbait or fake news is produced if a news organisation’s unit cost of effort to produce clickbait or fake news, and the production efficiency for real news, increase, and the gullible consumers consume real news with a higher frequency. Lower unit effort costs and higher budget and production efficiencies cause higher utility for a news organisation and lower utility for the competing news organisation. Higher weight assigned to the contest over clickbait or fake news induces both news organ-isations to exert higher effort to produce clickbait or fake news. When the gullible consumers of a news organisation consume a relatively large amount of real news in comparison to the consumers of another news organisation, then the first news organisation exerts higher effort to produce real news and obtains higher utility than the other news organisation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghack Lee ◽  
Jungran Cho

Purpose Many governments around the world have strategically privatized their ports. The privatized ports try to maximize profits by setting higher charges for port services and attracting transship cargos. This paper shows that such privatization of ports can be complemented by adjusting the number of ports. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to derive the optimal number of ports in cases in which ports serve transship and domestic cargos. Design/methodology/approach This paper constructs a theoretical model in which ports compete with each other for transship and domestic cargos. In the first stage, the government determines the number of ports. In the second stage, the ports compete with each other in quantity to maximize profits. The authors have derived the optimal number of ports that maximizes national welfare. Findings The optimal number of ports is expressed as a function of the slope of the demand curve, the slope of the supply curve, and the share of domestic demand relative to total demand for port services. It is shown that the optimal number of ports tends to increase as the share of domestic cargo increases. The optimal number of ports, n*, is given as n*=1/(1−θ), where θ denotes the share of domestic demand in total demand for port services, when the unit cost of port services is constant. Research limitations/implications The analysis in the present paper is confined to the case of unilateral intervention by the government of the domestic country. Analyzing interaction among governments via competition policy would offer valuable policy implications. Practical implications The results of the current research offer important implications for Korean port policy in the context of maritime industrial changes, in particular, China’s New Silk Road initiative. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that Korea’s investment in ports should be concentrated on ports with competitive advantages. Originality/value Relatively scant attention has been paid to the possibility, or need, of strategic privatization being complemented by governmental competition policy. Filling this knowledge gap, the authors have shown that the government can mitigate the negative effects of privatization on domestic consumer surplus by introducing competition in the supply of port services.


Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
W. Sabrina Lin ◽  
Feng Han ◽  
Yu-Han Yang ◽  
Zoltan Safar ◽  
...  

While demand response has achieved promising results on making the power grid more efficient and reliable, the additional dynamics and flexibility brought by demand response also increase the uncertainty and complexity of the centralized load forecast. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic demand response scheme that can transform the traditional centralized load prediction structure into a distributed load prediction system by the participation of customers. Moreover, since customers are generally rational and thus naturally selfish, they may cheat if cheating can improve their payoff. Therefore, enforcing truth-telling is crucial. We prove analytically and demonstrate with simulations that the proposed game-theoretic scheme is incentive compatible, i.e., all customers are motivated to report and consume their true optimal demands and any deviation will lead to a utility loss. We also prove theoretically that the proposed demand response scheme can lead to the solution that maximizes social welfare and is proportionally fair in terms of utility function. Moreover, we propose a simple dynamic pricing algorithm for the power substation to control the total demand of all customers to meet the target demand curve. Finally, simulations are shown to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic algorithm.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (03) ◽  
pp. 247-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
KJELL HAUSKEN

A system of two components is analyzed as a two-period game. After period 1 the system can be fully operational, in two states of intermediate degradation, or fail. Analogously to changing failure rates in dependent systems analyzed with Markov analysis, unit costs of defense and attack, and contest intensities, change in period 2. As the values of the two intermediate states increase from zero which gives the series system, towards their maxima which gives the parallel system, the defender becomes more advantaged, and the attacker more disadvantaged. Simulations illustrate the players' efforts in the two time periods and utilities dependent on parametric changes. The defender withdraws from defending the system when the values of both degraded states are very low. The attacker withdraws from attacking the system when the values of both degraded states are very high. In the benchmark case the defender prefers the one-period game and the attacker prefers the two-period game, but if the attacker's unit cost of attack is large for one component, and the value of the degraded system with this component operational is above a low value, the defender prefers the two-period game to obtain high utility in period 2 against a weak attacker. When the values of the degraded states are above certain low values, the players exert higher efforts in period 1 of a two-period game than in a one-period game, as investments into the future to ensure high versus low reliability in period 2.


2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.


2018 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
O. Yu. Bondarenko

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.


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