A two-stage supply chain coordination mechanism considering price sensitive demand and quantity discounts

2018 ◽  
Vol 264 (2) ◽  
pp. 524-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bárbara B. Venegas ◽  
José A. Ventura
Author(s):  
S.P. Sarmah ◽  
Santanu Sinha

This chapter analyzes the coordination and competition issues in a two-stage supply-chain in which a vendor distributes a product to two different retailers who compete on their retail prices in the same market. The demand faced by each retailer not only depends on its own price, but also on the price set by the other retailer. Mathematical models have been developed to analyze the coordination mechanism. It is shown here that perfect channel coordination can be achieved by employing simultaneously quantity discounts, volume discounts and franchise fees. Further, it has been shown that under non-cooperative price competition, the steady state equilibrium is dynamically stable in nature under certain conditions. The model is illustrated with suitable numerical examples.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Sandhya Makkar

In the changing market scenario, supply chain management is getting phenomenal importance amongst researchers. Studies on supply chain management have emphasized the vitality of a long-term strategic relationship between the supplier, distributor and retailer. In this article, the authors have studied a two-stage supply chain coordination problem under uncertain costs and demand information when integrated procurement and distribution decisions of supply chain has to be employed. The model incorporates a single supplier transporting its products to multiple destinations of a retailer. This process becomes tedious, as when items have an inventory carrying cost incurred due to perishable nature of products. Different discount policies are offered to procure and transport goods from the one stage to other stage. Fuzzy set theory is applied to estimate the uncertainty associated with the input parameters and triangular fuzzy numbers are used to analyze the model. A case is presented to validate the procedure.


2012 ◽  
Vol 490-495 ◽  
pp. 2489-2493
Author(s):  
Can Can Zhao ◽  
Xiao Dong Zhang ◽  
Jun Jiang Qiu

In order to reflect the initiative, autonomous and coordinative characteristics of the member behaviors in supply chain coordination simulation, an integrated process simulation model was formulated centered on the member agent behavior firstly. Then, the member agent behavior model was emphatically studied, and hierarchical colored Petri-nets were used to describe the agent behavior process and coordinative behavior process. Finally, a supply chain coordination simulation platform was developed based on these models, and the member behavior-oriented modeling and simulation functions were realized. Member behavior-oriented coordination simulation provides a quantitative and dynamic method to analyze the supply chain coordination mechanism


2013 ◽  
Vol 694-697 ◽  
pp. 3466-3471
Author(s):  
Qin Lv

A supply chain profit coordination mechanism based on JIT lot-splitting, which involves a two stage supply chain consisted of a supplier and a buyer, is discussed. Based on the bargaining power of supplier, the profit coordination with and without incentives are respectively explored. For the total cost minimizations of buyer and supplier separately, two stage stackelberg leader-follower game models, in which buyer is the leader and supplier is the follower, are established. Supplier applies JIT delivery to reduce buyer’s cost and the total cost of the supply chain via dividing buyer’s order per batch into some batches to deliver. Finally, a numerical example and a simulation analysis are given and the impact of the variation of relative parameters on the total cost saving of buyer, supplier and system is discussed. In addition, the efficiency of game decision on the basis of JIT lot-splitting is proved.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document