Mean-variance analysis of wholesale price contracts with a capital-constrained retailer: Trade credit financing vs. bank credit financing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Honglin Yang ◽  
Wenyan Zhuo ◽  
Lusheng Shao ◽  
Srinivas Talluri
Keyword(s):  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Variance Analysis ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Mean Variance

scholarly journals Joint financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained supply chain with risk preference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Zhen ◽  
Jing Ru Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
Credit Financing

We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one dominant supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The retailer needs to solve the shortage of working capital either from a bank or from its core supplier, which offers trade credit when it is also beneficial to itself. We assume the retailer is risk-averse behavior and the supplier has different risk preference behaviors that jointly model risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-taking. With a wholesale price contract, we incorporate each member’s risk preference behavior into its objective function. Then we derive the optimal decisions in a Stackelberg game under bank credit financing and trade credit financing, respectively. We find that there exists a supplier’s risk preference threshold that distinguishes financing scheme. When the supplier is a relatively higher risk preference, trade credit financing makes both the retailer and the supplier better off and is a unique financing equilibrium. Otherwise, the members prefer bank credit financing . Besides, the supplier with relatively higher risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a low initial capital as a partner; the supplier with relatively lower risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a higher initial capital level. The above theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis.

The Influence of the Enterprise’s Market Power on its Availability for Trade Credit and Bank Credit Financing - Based on the Empirical Test about the Listed Companies of Electrical Energy

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 4794-4798
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yan Luo
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Electrical Energy ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Linear Regression Models ◽  
Trade Credits ◽  
Credit Financing

The paper, sampling the data from A-shares listed companies of electrical energy during the period of 2009 to 2012, checks out the influence of the enterprise’s market power on its capacity for trade credit and bank credit financing. The paper tries to find out the internal relationship among them by building linear regression models of the explained variable, Credit, the explaining variable, MP, and the control variables, SIZE, EBIT, LIQ, CFO, SBA and SBA*MP. In the study, we find that the target customers of trade credits and bank loans are almost enterprises with a high market power.

scholarly journals Coordinating contracts as an instrument of supply chain profit maximization under short-term financing necessity

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 57-94
Author(s):  
Irina Berezinets ◽  
◽  
Tatyana Voronova ◽  
Nikolay Zenkevich ◽  
Natalia Nikolchenko ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Bank Financing ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Credit Financing

In this paper the problem of the supply chain expected profit maximization under the assumption of the short-term financing necessity for one of the supply chain parties using a coordinating contract is considered. The solution is derived for a two-echelon supply chain under the assumption of product demand being distributed as uniformly. A revenue-sharing contract with bank financing and a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing are explored. It is stated that none of the studied contracts is coordinating, as they do not provide the supplier’s expected profit maximum. The conditional coordination of supply chain with a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing is considered if the supply chain and the retailer’s expected profit maximum are reached and the supplier’s expected profit is greater than in case of application of a modified wholesale price contract with trade credit financing and a revenue-sharing contract with bank financing. It is proved that it is beneficial for both supply chain parties and the problem of the supply chain expected profit maximization under the assumption of the short-term financing necessity for one of the supply chain parties can be solved using a modified revenue-sharing contract with trade credit financing.

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Research on Trade Credit and Bank Credit Based on Dynamic Inventory

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (13) ◽  
pp. 3608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei ◽  
Xu ◽  
Yang
Keyword(s):  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Stock Status ◽  
Business Financing

Trade credit is a short-term business financing based on purchases between the retailer and the supplier. This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a well-funded supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. At the beginning of each sales season, the retailer need to place an order from the supplier to meet the stochastic demand. The capital-constrained retailer determines the order quantity and whether to borrow loans from a bank or the supplier or just use its initial capital, according to its finance and stock status with the wholesale price provided by the supplier. We build the Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and divide the retailer’s initial inventory and capital into different wealth regions to discuss the optimal strategies of different wealth regions. We extend to the two-period dynamic financing model based on dynamic inventory and capital flow so as to obtain the optimal strategy matrix of the retailer and the supplier under bank and trade credit. Numerical results validate our theoretical analysis of bank credit and supplier credit with dynamic inventory under different period setting.

Joint Operational and Financial Collaboration in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Under Manufacturer Collateral

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gongbing Bi ◽  
Yalei Fei ◽  
Xiaoyong Yuan ◽  
Dong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Constraint Problem ◽  
Fierce Competition

Operational collaboration in a supply chain is important due to the fierce competition among supply chains. However, the collaboration in a supply chain is often hindered by its distribution channel’s lack of funds. It is of significance to alleviate the capital constraint problem of the distribution channel and explore new joint operational and financial collaboration solutions. In this paper, we focus on exploring the optimal solution of operational collaboration in the presence of manufacturer collateral. We consider a supply chain consisting of a well-capitalized manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer that faces difficulties obtaining credit from the bank. To help the retailer access financing for a purchase order, the manufacturer promises to pay the lender a proportion of the retailer’s loan if the retailer goes bankrupt. We find that when the bank credit with manufacturer collateral is considered as a mix of trade credit and bank credit, the retailer’s financing equilibrium depending on the maximum wholesale price what the manufacturer can set, can be neither trade credit nor bank credit alone, but a combination of them. Moreover, the retailer’s order quantity and the chain’s operational collaboration level will benefit from the manufacturer collateral.

scholarly journals Financing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement in a Supply Chain considering Retailers’ Competition

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Man Yu ◽  
Tuo Li ◽  
Zhanwen Shi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Financing Channels ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Financing Strategy

This paper investigates the issues of financing channels (bank credit financing, trade credit financing, and dual-channel financing) and carbon emission abatement in a supply chain consisting of one capital-constrained manufacturer and two capital-constrained retailers. Compared with bank credit, we find that every member can make more profit under trade credit when only one financing channel is available. When both bank credit and trade credit are available, the retailers’ financing strategy highly depends on the interest rates charged by the creditors. In addition, we also examine the impact of financing channels on emission abatement. It shows that the manufacturer reduces more carbon emissions under trade credit. Interestingly, the emission abatement has nothing to do with trade credit interest rate when retailers only adopt trade credit, whereas it is closely related to trade credit interest rate under dual-channel financing.

scholarly journals Optimal Procurement Strategy for Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Backorder under CVaR Criterion

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 10201
Author(s):  
Gaoke Wu ◽  
Bo Feng ◽  
Libin Guo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Confidence Level ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Financial Pressure ◽  
Strategy Model ◽  
Credit Financing

Some capital-constrained and risk-averse retailers may unable to obtain financing from banks due to insufficient collateral and high loan costs, so some retailers tend to use trade credit financing to ease their financial pressure. For the two echelon supply chain composed of a well-funded supplier and a capital-constrained retailer with risk-averse preference, a trade credit strategy model with the supplier-led is established in this paper. By analyzing both parties’ benefits, we derive the model solution and provide optimal decisions to all petitioners. The results obtained in this paper show that the optimum order quantity under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion declines w.r.t. the confidence level, and the wholesale price of the supplier increases w.r.t. the confidence level. The reason is that when the retailer makes fewer orders, the supplier will correspondingly increase the wholesale price to maximize their profit. On the other hand, the ordering policy with allowing backorder will make the retailer place fewer orders. Finally, the proposed model is indicated by the given numerical experiments.

Trade credit, SMEs and short-run survivorship: what we know and what we would like to know

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 346-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Belinda Laura Del Gaudio ◽  
Claudio Porzio ◽  
Vincenzo Verdoliva
Keyword(s):  
Trade Credit ◽  
Time Span ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Alternative Form ◽  
Substitution Effects ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Firm Financing ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Cost

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to draw the state of the art on the trade credit, one of the most alternative form of firm financing, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Design/methodology/approach The present study first reviews the theoretical papers focusing on the raison d’être of trade credit financing. Then the study identifies the empirical research studies in SMEs’ context and summarizes them on the basis of the following drivers: the country and the period analysed, the methodology used, the main findings and the presence of a shock in time span. Findings Findings reveal a discrepancy of results, especially in testing Meltzer’s hypothesis of substitution effects among trade and bank credit. The heterogeneity of results should be driven by lending infrastructure of the country analysed and the presence or not of a shock in time span considered. Financial constraints can reconcile the discrepancy of results. Then, most of the studies analysed are based on the assumption that trade credit is more expensive than bank credit. Originality/value This paper provides valuable conclusion on past and present studies on trade credit. First is providing a rule of the thumb in the reading of empirical evidences. Also researchers and academicians should deal with consideration regarding the cost of trade credit that still appears as a black box. This is an important issue in corporate finance, as it influences the financial decision of firms and it will be useful for conducting a deeper comparison on the alternative cost of firm financing.

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