scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Inventory and Pricing Decisions Under Wholesale Price Contract with Social Preferences

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuren Liu ◽  
Huina Chen ◽  
Lili Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

AbstractThis paper introduces the other-regarding preferences coefficients and studies the impact of social preferences on supply chain performance in the price-setting newsvendor setting. It is assumed that the stochastic demand is multiplicative. The manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg game. We analyze the impact of the decision-maker’s social preferences on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, the retailer’s optimal retail price and order quantity, the supply chain member’s profits and utilities, and the supply chain system’s profits and utilities under three different cases that only the retailer, only the manufacturer and both are with social preferences. We show that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find a spiteful retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with generous liability, to improve the entire supply chain. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate these results.

scholarly journals Joint financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained supply chain with risk preference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Zhen ◽  
Jing Ru Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
Credit Financing

We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one dominant supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The retailer needs to solve the shortage of working capital either from a bank or from its core supplier, which offers trade credit when it is also beneficial to itself. We assume the retailer is risk-averse behavior and the supplier has different risk preference behaviors that jointly model risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-taking. With a wholesale price contract, we incorporate each member’s risk preference behavior into its objective function. Then we derive the optimal decisions in a Stackelberg game under bank credit financing and trade credit financing, respectively. We find that there exists a supplier’s risk preference threshold that distinguishes financing scheme. When the supplier is a relatively higher risk preference, trade credit financing makes both the retailer and the supplier better off and is a unique financing equilibrium. Otherwise, the members prefer bank credit financing . Besides, the supplier with relatively higher risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a low initial capital as a partner; the supplier with relatively lower risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a higher initial capital level. The above theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1357
Author(s):  
Xiaoli Zhang ◽  
Guoyi Xiu ◽  
Fakhar Shahzad ◽  
Yupeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Financing Strategy

The purpose of this research is to examine the green supply chain (GSC) financing decisions of manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers in order to establish a Stackelberg game model under decentralized and centralized decision-making. This paper studies the influence of retailers’ choice of trade credit or bank loan financing strategy on a GSC’s performance and analyzes their decision-making tendency. The results show that manufacturers should provide trade credit and participate in retailers’ financing decisions to avoid double marginal effects under both centralized and decentralized decision-making. Interestingly, the optimal value of green marketing effort and retailer order quantity was twice as high as the decentralized under the centralized decision, indicating that the centralized decision could better improve GSC’s financing efficiency. Especially when the trade credit financing strategy is feasible, this effect is more significant. Finally, the outcomes are verified through numerical simulation, which references GSC practitioners in management decisions.

scholarly journals The Optimal Strategies of Risk-Averse Newsvendor Model for a Dyadic Supply Chain with Financing Service

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianxin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies the budget-constrained newsvendor problem under risk aversion with financing service and builds a two-stage supply chain decision model on the order quantity and wholesale price. The budget-constrained retailer as a newsvendor faces a nonnegative random demand and the financial institution provides the loan service for the retailer who is risk-averse. This paper first explores the impact of risk aversion on the decisions in financial supply chain. Different from the existing research, we analyze how the financing service of bank loan impacts the risk-averse newsvendor’s decision and how the risk-averse behavior of the retailer influences the optimal strategies in supply chain with CVaR risk measure criterion. It is found that the order quantity decreases in the degree of risk aversion. The optimal order quantity is decreasing in initial budget, wholesale price, and interest rate. It is worth noting that the financing service can improve the profit of the supply chain system when the retailer has a low initial wealth. Finally, to compare with the existing results the theoretical analysis and numerical examples are also illustrated.

scholarly journals Trade Credit with Barter in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11361
Author(s):  
Yangyang Huang ◽  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Rate ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity ◽  
And Performance

Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.

Optimal decisions and coordination strategy of a capital-constrained supply chain under customer return and supplier subsidy

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gongbing Bi ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Yalei Fei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Modeling Framework ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Joint Operations ◽  
Fixed Proportion ◽  
Customer Returns ◽  
Credit Financing

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to explore impacts of financing and supplier subsidy on capital-constrained retailer and the value of returns subsidy contract under a situation where the retailer makes joint operations and finance decisions. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a two-level supply chain, including a retailer and a supplier. Facing problems of capital constraints and even customer returns, the newsvendor-like retailer orders from a well-capitalized supplier. The supplier allows the retailer a delay in payment and provides a subsidy contract to alleviate its problems if it is profitable. Considering their difference of initial capital status, the retailer is assumed to be Follower of Stackelberg Game and the supplier is the Leader. Findings The supplier return subsidy contract has some merits for both of partners in the chain. And it does not coordinate the supply chain when the retailer has enough initial capital; however, when the retailer is capital constrained, it does. In addition, the retailer’s initial capital level significantly affects the supplier’s subsidy decision. Research limitations/implications Return rate is simplified to a fixed proportion of completed demand. In addition, trade credit is only financing source in this paper, and other types of financing methods, such as bank credit, can be taken too. Originality/value This paper first incorporates trade credit financing and customer returns into a modeling framework to investigate the capital-constrained retailer’s joint operations and finance decisions and the value of supplier’s subsidy contract.

scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Chain Model

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

Two-echelon supply chain operational strategy under portfolio financing and tax shield

2019 ◽  
Vol 120 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-656
Author(s):  
Guoshu Dong ◽  
Lihong Wei ◽  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Weisi Zhang ◽  
Zhefu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Shield

Purpose The development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is vital to the economy, as such the financing of SMEs has become the focus of government and enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to find the operational and financial strategies of the supplier and retailer in supply chain. Design/methodology/approach In a Stackelberg game, supplier moves first setting wholesale price, while the retailer follows, setting the ordering quantity. Enterprises maximize their profits by optimization. When measuring profit targets, the capital constraints and income taxes of two companies are considered. In the portfolio financing model, the retailer can obtain products from suppliers through trade credit, and the supplier can use asset-backed securitization (ABS) to solve his/her financing problems. Findings The wholesale price is a decreasing function of retailer’s initial cash balance, and the supplier’s financing interest rate is a decreasing function of his/her own capital, the incentive effect of the supplier’s price discount strategy on retailer is more intense in the supply chain with high-priced product or high-capital retailer. And in a capital-constrained supply chain, an increase in tax rate or financing rate does not necessarily motivate the supplier to increase wholesale price. Most importantly, if the supplier’s markup is moderate, portfolio financing has value for both retailer and supplier, while solving the financing problems of both parties. Research limitations/implications Future research can consider the explicit and implicit interest when supplier provides trade credit to retailer. It is also possible to consider the portfolio financing when multiple retailers are facing financial constraints. Practical implications It provides guidance for supply chain enterprises with financing needs, helping them find optimal decisions. With financial interest, enterprise income tax on the enterprises’ financing factors will produce a tax shield effect; thus, a cost–benefit analysis with the tax shield effect can provide more accurate picture when making corresponding decisions. Social implications Government takes feasible adjustments of tax rate for the sake of motivation on financial SMEs tax shield. Furthermore, ABS calls for service from financial institutions, which will, in turn, expedite financial institutions revenue. Originality/value The authors provide insights on enterprise financing models, combining ABS with trade credit, expanding enterprise financing channels and enriching the theory of financial supply chain and supply chain management. The authors analyze in detail the influence of tax factors on enterprises by introducing tax factors into traditional process of enterprise operation and financing strategy.

scholarly journals The Impact of Advance Selling Strategies on a Three-Echelon Supply Chain in the Presence of Social Influence

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Qianyu Niu ◽  
Feng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Influence ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
New Product ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Advance Selling ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Selling Strategies ◽  
The Impact

As the quality of new products is ex-ante uncertain, social influence plays an important role in the diffusion of a new product. An important question is how to expand public knowledge about consumer experience with a new product by using promotion strategies. This paper discusses the impact of advance selling strategies on a three-echelon supply chain when upstream enterprises launch a new product facing strategic consumers under social influence. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, and a two-advance-selling-discount model is presented. Furthermore, we consider the impact of advance purchase behavior on the financing strategy when the retailer places an advance order. Several results are obtained: (i) the consumers’ utility in the second period is increasing in the number of predecessors. (ii) Upstream enterprises will provide deeper advance selling discounts when consumers become more patient or predecessors have a greater influence on imitators. Moreover, the total demand will increase when the consumer’s discount factor decreases or the impact intensity of predecessors increases. However, high innovation levels will drive enterprises to set high advance selling discounts. We also obtain the condition under which the total demand increases quickly as the innovation level changes. (iii) The two-advance-selling-discount model yields Pareto-improved results compared with the case where there is no advance purchase, though it cannot coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we extend the model to analyze the two-advance-selling-discount model with a minimum order quantity constraining the precommitted order quantity, and we show this can allow the enterprises to increase their profits. We also determine a condition under which the upstream enterprises should put a constraint on the minimum order quantity.

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