Political tenure, term limits and corruption

Presidential term limits are one of the most important institutions in presidentialism. They are at the center of contemporary and historical debates and political battles between incumbent presidents seeking additional terms and their political opponents warning against democratic backsliding and the dangers of personalism. Bringing the team of country experts, comparativists, theorists, constitutional lawyers, and policy practitioners together, The Politics of Presidential Term Limits is a book that aims to provide a one-stop source for the comprehensive study of this topic. It includes theory and survey chapters that explain presidential term limits as an idea, constitutional norm, and an institution; country and comparative chapters including historical, intra-regime, and comparative regional studies, chapters that examine the effects of term limits as well as studies from the perspective of on-the-ground international constitutional builders and that ask what difference do term limits make.

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Presidential Term Limits and Regime Types: When Do Leaders Respect Constitutional Norms?

Africa Spectrum ◽

10.1177/0002039720945720 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 55 (3) ◽

pp. 251-271 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Anja Osei ◽

Hervé Akinocho ◽

Stephen Mwombela

Keyword(s):

Case Studies ◽

Term Limits ◽

African Continent ◽

Military Regimes ◽

Electoral Laws ◽

Regime Types ◽

Regime Survival ◽

Rules Of The Game ◽

Oriented Approach

Why do some leaders respect constitutional provisions like presidential term limits, while others do not? For all regimes, constitutions are important reference texts that provide some basic rules of the game. Within this framework, term limits and electoral laws are crucial because they are directly concerned with the exercise of power. Using Geddes’ regime typology, this article is proposing a regime-oriented approach to explain the variation on the African continent. Democracies, party-based regimes, and military regimes are surely different from each other, but they have a degree of depersonalisation in common that is not found in personalist regimes. For the latter type, term limits are a question of regime survival. Personalist rulers will therefore seek to amend or ignore constitutions, but their success will depend on the cohesion of their ruling coalition. The argument will be illustrated with two case studies: Togo and Tanzania.

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Presidential Tenure and Constitutional Provisions: Recent Evidence from Central Africa

Africa Spectrum ◽

10.1177/0002039720980457 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 55 (3) ◽

pp. 272-290 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mark Dawson ◽

Daniel J. Young

Keyword(s):

Democratic Republic ◽

Democratic Republic Of Congo ◽

Central Africa ◽

Term Limits ◽

Republic Of Congo ◽

Term Limit ◽

Developing Democracies ◽

The Republic ◽

Constitutional Factor

Constitutions around Africa have been repeatedly tested on the issue of presidential term limits. We explore the four most recent cases of African presidents facing the end of their constitutionally mandated limit, all of which developed in Central Africa. Burundi, Rwanda, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo all adopted constitutions limiting presidential tenure to two terms; yet, in 2015, when these limits were approaching, none of the sitting presidents simply stood down. Our analysis focuses on the constitutional provisions meant to protect the two-term limit, the strategies employed by each of the four presidents, and the difficulty they faced in pursuing extended tenure. We find that constitutional provisions do constrain, but not always to the expected degree. Our analysis adds a consideration of a foundational constitutional factor to the growing literature on term limits in Africa, with implications for other regions of newly developing democracies.

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Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa Spectrum ◽

10.1177/0002039720964218 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 55 (3) ◽

pp. 228-250 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Andrea Cassani

Keyword(s):

Comparative Studies ◽

Political Competition ◽

Chief Executive ◽

Term Limits ◽

Sub Saharan Africa ◽

Phase Model ◽

Econometric Modelling ◽

Three Phase ◽

Sub Saharan ◽

Personal Rule

Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over-stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citizens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three-phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub-Saharan Africa that rests on econometric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation.

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