Knowing your sources: Partisan media and voters’ perceptions of the economy

2021 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 102314
Author(s):  
Lie Philip Santoso
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 141 ◽  
pp. 57-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Burgers ◽  
Melanie Jong Tjien Fa ◽  
Anneke de Graaf
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Kathleen Searles ◽  
Joshua P. Darr ◽  
Mingxiao Sui ◽  
Nathan Kalmoe ◽  
Raymond Pingree ◽  
...  

Abstract Previous study demonstrates that partisans perceive in-party news outlets as fair, and out-party news outlets as unfair. However, much of this study relies on one-shot designs. We create an ecologically valid design that randomly assigns participants to news feeds within a week-long online news portal where the balance of in-party and out-party news outlets has been manipulated. We find that sustained exposure to a feed that features out-party news media attenuates Democrats' beliefs that Fox News is unfair, but the same is not true for Republican's perceptions of MSNBC's fairness. Unexpectedly, repeated exposure to in-party news did increase Republicans' beliefs that Fox News is unfair. This study updates our understanding of partisan news effects in a fragmented online news environment.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne E Wilson ◽  
Victoria Parker ◽  
Matthew Feinberg

Political polarization is on the rise in America. Although social psychologists frequently study the intergroup underpinnings of polarization, they have traditionally had less to say about macro societal processes that contribute to its rise and fall. Recent cross-disciplinary work on the contemporary political and media landscape provides these complementary insights. In this paper, we consider the evidence for and implications of political polarization, distinguishing between ideological, affective, and false polarization. We review three key societal-level factors contributing to these polarization phenomena: the role of political elites, partisan media, and social media dynamics. We argue that institutional polarization processes (elites, media and social media) contribute to people’s misperceptions of division among the electorate, which in turn can contribute to a self-perpetuating cycle fueling animosity (affective polarization) and actual ideological polarization over time.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Ashley Parker ◽  
Matthew Feinberg ◽  
Alexa Mary Tullett ◽  
Anne E Wilson

Americans’ hostility toward political opponents has intensified to a degree not fully explained by actual ideological polarization. We propose that political animosity may be based particularly on partisans’ overestimation of the prevalence of extreme, egregious views held by only a minority of opponents but imagined to be widespread. Across five studies (N= 4993; three preregistered), we examine issue extremity as an antecedent of false polarization. Both liberals and conservatives report high agreement with their party’s moderate issues but low agreement with the extreme issues associated with their side. As expected, false polarization did not occur for all issues. Partisans were fairly accurate in estimating opponents’ moderate issues (even underestimating agreement somewhat). In contrast, partisans consistently overestimated the prevalence of their opponents’ extreme, egregious political attitudes. (Over)estimation of political opponents’ agreement with extreme issues predicted cross-partisan dislike, which in turn predicted unwillingness to engage with opponents, foreclosing opportunities to correct misperceptions (Studies 2-4b). Participants explicitly attributed their dislike of political opponents to opponents’ views on extreme issues more than moderate issues (Study 3). Partisans also reported greater unwillingness to publicly voice their views on their side’s extreme (relative to moderate) issues, a self-silencing which may perpetuate misconceptions (Studies 1, 2, 4a&b). Time spent watching partisan media (controlling political orientation) predicted greater overestimations of the prevalence of extreme views (Studies 2, 4a&b). Salience of opponents’ malevolence mattered: first reflecting on opponents’ (presumed nefarious) election tactics made partisans on both sides subsequently more accepting of unfair tactics from their own side (Studies 4a&b).


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-171
Author(s):  
Reese Butterfuss ◽  
Joseph Aubele ◽  
Panayiota Kendeou

Sources of scientific information vary in partisanship and epistemic stance toward science. The current study examined how hedged language (certain vs. tentative) and partisanship of sources (liberal vs. conservative vs. scientific sources) interacted with participants’ epistemic beliefs and political ideology to influence belief in science-related claims and trust in sources. Findings showed that “hedged” language influenced belief in information for individuals with certain epistemic profiles. Participants with higher faith in intuition demonstrated lower belief in claims from scientific sources. Additionally, individuals with a higher conviction that “truth” is political demonstrated lower belief when liberal sources used certain language.


2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shira Dvir-Gvirsman ◽  
R. Kelly Garrett ◽  
Yariv Tsfati

The bulk of current literature on partisan media explores its various detrimental influences on the democratic sphere. This study highlights a possible positive outcome of partisan media consumption: enhanced political participation. It is hypothesized that consumption of congruent partisan media will tilt perceptions of opinion climate so that it is viewed as more supportive of one’s views, while consumption of incongruent partisan media is viewed as less supportive. Consequently, consumers of congruent partisan media will participate more, and vice versa. The hypotheses are tested using two panel studies: the first conducted during the 2012 U.S. presidential elections ( N = 377) whereas the second, during the 2013 Israeli election ( N = 340). In the Israeli case, survey data are supplemented with behavioral measures. All hypotheses are supported except the one regarding the effects of incongruent partisan media exposure. The results are discussed in light of the spiral of silence theory and the selective exposure hypothesis.


Author(s):  
Matthew Levendusky

Four potential mechanisms explore the linkages between partian media outlets and attitudinal polarization, as well as discusses how such outlets cause polarization and influence American politics more generally: partisan media outlets can have direct effects on their audience, indirect effects on the broader population, effects on the news media, and effects on political elites. Some challenges and questions remain to be answered in each area in the hopes of spurring more, and broader, work on these media institutions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 009365022091504
Author(s):  
Jay D. Hmielowski ◽  
Sarah Staggs ◽  
Myiah J. Hutchens ◽  
Michael A. Beam

In this article, we test a dynamic intracommunication process looking at the relationships between interpersonal discussion, perceived credibility of partisan media, and partisan media use. Using the theoretical foundation of hostile media perceptions, with a specific focus on relative hostile media, we examine whether interpersonal communication affects perceived credibility of liberal and conservative media outlets and whether these effects translate into increased use or avoidance of partisan media outlets. Using data collected during the 2016 U.S. election, we find that supportive interpersonal discussion is associated with greater perceived credibility of liberal media outlets (e.g., MSNBC) among liberals, which results in increased use of liberal leaning news outlets. In addition, we find that discussion with those who hold opposing views is associated with increased perceived credibility of conservative media outlets (e.g., Fox News) among conservatives, which translates into greater use of conservative leaning outlets. Similarly, talking to those who hold opposing views decreases perceived credibility of liberal media outlets (e.g., MSNBC) among conservatives, resulting in decreased use of liberal leaning outlets.


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