The Ties that Blind: Misperceptions of the Opponent Fringe and the Miscalibration of Political Contempt

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Ashley Parker ◽  
Matthew Feinberg ◽  
Alexa Mary Tullett ◽  
Anne E Wilson

Americans’ hostility toward political opponents has intensified to a degree not fully explained by actual ideological polarization. We propose that political animosity may be based particularly on partisans’ overestimation of the prevalence of extreme, egregious views held by only a minority of opponents but imagined to be widespread. Across five studies (N= 4993; three preregistered), we examine issue extremity as an antecedent of false polarization. Both liberals and conservatives report high agreement with their party’s moderate issues but low agreement with the extreme issues associated with their side. As expected, false polarization did not occur for all issues. Partisans were fairly accurate in estimating opponents’ moderate issues (even underestimating agreement somewhat). In contrast, partisans consistently overestimated the prevalence of their opponents’ extreme, egregious political attitudes. (Over)estimation of political opponents’ agreement with extreme issues predicted cross-partisan dislike, which in turn predicted unwillingness to engage with opponents, foreclosing opportunities to correct misperceptions (Studies 2-4b). Participants explicitly attributed their dislike of political opponents to opponents’ views on extreme issues more than moderate issues (Study 3). Partisans also reported greater unwillingness to publicly voice their views on their side’s extreme (relative to moderate) issues, a self-silencing which may perpetuate misconceptions (Studies 1, 2, 4a&b). Time spent watching partisan media (controlling political orientation) predicted greater overestimations of the prevalence of extreme views (Studies 2, 4a&b). Salience of opponents’ malevolence mattered: first reflecting on opponents’ (presumed nefarious) election tactics made partisans on both sides subsequently more accepting of unfair tactics from their own side (Studies 4a&b).

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne E Wilson ◽  
Victoria Parker ◽  
Matthew Feinberg

Political polarization is on the rise in America. Although social psychologists frequently study the intergroup underpinnings of polarization, they have traditionally had less to say about macro societal processes that contribute to its rise and fall. Recent cross-disciplinary work on the contemporary political and media landscape provides these complementary insights. In this paper, we consider the evidence for and implications of political polarization, distinguishing between ideological, affective, and false polarization. We review three key societal-level factors contributing to these polarization phenomena: the role of political elites, partisan media, and social media dynamics. We argue that institutional polarization processes (elites, media and social media) contribute to people’s misperceptions of division among the electorate, which in turn can contribute to a self-perpetuating cycle fueling animosity (affective polarization) and actual ideological polarization over time.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095679762110218
Author(s):  
Emily A. Willoughby ◽  
Alexandros Giannelis ◽  
Steven Ludeke ◽  
Robert Klemmensen ◽  
Asbjørn S. Nørgaard ◽  
...  

Where do our political attitudes originate? Although early research attributed the formation of such beliefs to parent and peer socialization, genetically sensitive designs later clarified the substantial role of genes in the development of sociopolitical attitudes. However, it has remained unclear whether parental influence on offspring attitudes persists beyond adolescence. In a unique sample of 394 adoptive and biological families with offspring more than 30 years old, biometric modeling revealed significant evidence for genetic and nongenetic transmission from both parents for the majority of seven political-attitude phenotypes. We found the largest genetic effects for religiousness and social liberalism, whereas the largest influence of parental environment was seen for political orientation and egalitarianism. Together, these findings indicate that genes, environment, and the gene–environment correlation all contribute significantly to sociopolitical attitudes held in adulthood, and the etiology and development of those attitudes may be more important than ever in today’s rapidly changing sociopolitical landscape.


2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (8) ◽  
pp. 1473-1502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carly Wayne ◽  
Roni Porat ◽  
Maya Tamir ◽  
Eran Halperin

How does accountability impact political decisions? Though previous research on accountability has demonstrated its potential effects in the realms of business, elections, and more, very little research has explored the effect of citizen accountability in highly ideological, intractable, and political conflicts. This article addresses this issue, looking at the unique interaction between accountability and ideology on Israeli citizens’ political attitudes regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The results of two experimental studies in Israel reveal that accountable individuals behave in significantly more ideologically partisan ways than their nonaccountable counterparts. Moreover, this polarization is dependent on the specific conflict context, with leftists more affected by the issue of negotiations and rightists by security concerns. This signals that ideological polarization under accountability may depend on the “issue ownership” each ideological group feels toward the specific conflict context and its corresponding social goal of projecting ideological consistency on these issues.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Sütterlin ◽  
Torvald F. Ask ◽  
Sophia Mägerle ◽  
Sandra Glöckler ◽  
Leandra Wolf ◽  
...  

AI-generated “deep fakes” are becoming increasingly professional and can be expected to become an essential tool for cybercriminals conducting targeted and tailored social engineering attacks, as well as for others aiming for influencing public opinion in a more general sense. While the technological arms race is resulting in increasingly efficient forensic detection tools, these are unlikely to be in place and applied by common users on an everyday basis any time soon, especially if social engineering attacks are camouflaged as unsuspicious conversations. To date, most cybercriminals do not yet have the necessary resources, competencies or the required raw material featuring the target to produce perfect impersonifications. To raise awareness and efficiently train individuals in recognizing the most widespread deep fakes, the understanding of what may cause individual differences in the ability to recognize them can be central. Previous research suggested a close relationship between political attitudes and top-down perceptual and subsequent cognitive processing styles. In this study, we aimed to investigate the impact of political attitudes and agreement with the political message content on the individual’s deep fake recognition skills.In this study, 163 adults (72 females = 44.2%) judged a series of video clips with politicians’ statements across the political spectrum regarding their authenticity and their agreement with the message that was transported. Half of the presented videos were fabricated via lip-sync technology. In addition to the particular agreement to each statement made, more global political attitudes towards social and economic topics were assessed via the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS).Data analysis revealed robust negative associations between participants’ general and in particular social conservatism and their ability to recognize fabricated videos. This effect was pronounced where there was a specific agreement with the message content. Deep fakes watched on mobile phones and tablets were considerably less likely to be recognized as such compared to when watched on stationary computers.To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate and establish the association between political attitudes and interindividual differences in deep fake recognition. The study further supports very recently published research suggesting relationships between conservatism and perceived credibility of conspiracy theories and fake news in general. Implications for further research on psychological mechanisms underlying this effect are discussed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022098760
Author(s):  
John V. Petrocelli

Bullshit results from communicating with little to no regard for truth, evidence, or established knowledge (Frankfurt, 1986; Petrocelli, 2018a). Such disregard for truth serves as a common source of antiscientific beliefs and endorsement of alternative facts and is thereby critical to understand. To examine how social perceptions of bullshit may be conditional upon the political orientation of a source and the extremity of one’s political attitudes, two experiments manipulated the alleged political source of bullshit messages and measured the direction and strength of political orientation. In Experiment 1, participants rated the profundity of nonsense statements allegedly stated by high-profile left/liberal or right/conservative political leaders. Experiment 2 participants rated the profundity of both bullshit statements and factual quotations regarding innovation. Results of both experiments suggest that bullshit receptivity and bullshit sensitivity are dependent on the alignment of the source’s bullshit content with the direction and extremity of one’s political attitudes.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sheetal ◽  
Krishna Savani

What attitudes, values, and beliefs serve as key markers of cultural change? To answer this question, we examined 221,485 respondents from the World Values Survey, a multi-wave cross-country survey of people’s attitudes, values and beliefs. We trained a machine learning model to classify respondents into seven waves (i.e., periods). Once trained, the machine learning model identified a separate group of 24,611 respondents’ wave with a balanced accuracy of 77%. We then queried the model to identify the attitudes, values, and beliefs that contributed the most to its classification decisions, and therefore, served as markers of cultural change. These included religiosity, social attitudes, political attitudes, independence, life satisfaction, Protestant work ethic, and prosociality. Although past research in cultural change has discussed decreasing religiosity and increasing liberalism and independence, it has not yet identified Protestant work ethic, political orientation, and prosociality as values relevant to cultural change. Thus, the current research points to new directions for future research on cultural change that might not be evident from either a deductive or an inductive approach. This research illustrates that the abductive approach of machine learning, which focuses on the most likely explanations for an outcome, can provide novel insights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Edita Fino ◽  
Michela Menegatti ◽  
Alessio Avenanti ◽  
Monica Rubini

Abstract Spontaneous emotionally congruent facial responses (ECFR) to others’ emotional expressions can occur by simply observing others’ faces (i.e., smiling) or by reading emotion related words (i.e., to smile). The goal of the present study was to examine whether language describing political leaders’ emotions affects voters by inducing emotionally congruent facial reactions as a function of readers’ and politicians’ shared political orientation. Participants read sentences describing politicians’ emotional expressions, while their facial muscle activation was measured by means of electromyography (EMG). Results showed that reading sentences describing left and right-wing politicians “smiling” or “frowning” elicits ECFR for ingroup but not outgroup members. Remarkably, ECFR were sensitive to attitudes toward individual leaders beyond the ingroup vs. outgroup political divide. Through integrating behavioral and physiological methods we were able to consistently tap on a ‘favored political leader effect’ thus capturing political attitudes towards an individual politician at a given moment of time, at multiple levels (explicit responses and automatic ECFR) and across political party membership lines. Our findings highlight the role of verbal behavior of politicians in affecting voters’ facial expressions with important implications for social judgment and behavioral outcomes.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1072-1091 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shira Dvir-Gvirsman

The study suggests that media consumers favor certain websites not only due to their content but also due to their audience. A new concept is introduced: “audience homophily,” which describes one’s preference for partisan media websites catering to a homogeneous, likeminded consumership. This attraction is explained in terms of the need for self-consistency, and I suggest that over time such behavior will polarize political identity through a spiral of reinforcement. Based on both a survey-experiment ( N = 300) and a panel study combined with web-tracking technology that recorded online-exposure behavior ( N = 397), it was found that individuals with more extreme ideology present higher levels of audience homophily and that, longitudinally, audience homophily is somewhat associated with ideological polarization, intolerance, and accessibility of political self-definition.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne E Wilson ◽  
Victoria Parker ◽  
Matthew Feinberg

Political polarization is on the rise in America. Although social psychologists frequently study the intergroup underpinnings of polarization, they have traditionally had less to say about macro societal processes that contribute to its rise and fall. Recent cross-disciplinary work on the contemporary political and media landscape provides these complementary insights. In this paper, we consider the evidence for and implications of political polarization, distinguishing between ideological, affective, and false polarization. We review three key societal-level factors contributing to these polarization phenomena: the role of political elites, partisan media, and social media dynamics. We argue that institutional polarization processes (elites, media and social media) contribute to people’s misperceptions of division among the electorate, which in turn can contribute to a self-perpetuating cycle fueling animosity (affective polarization) and actual ideological polarization over time.


2021 ◽  
pp. 33-38
Author(s):  
V.V. Zagrebin ◽  
◽  
E.S. Kalinin

Presented is the study of the role of the academic environment in the formation of political attitudes of modern Russian students on the example of the city of Yaroslavl. The theoretical interpretation of the political attitude is presented. The definition of political attitudes, structure, typology and functions are disclosed. The material presented in the article is based on the results of the author's sociological study of the political attitudes of students, primarily through the study of the university environment as a factor in the formation of political attitudes. The political involvement of students, their protest moods, electoral behavior, political views, trust in political institutions and leaders, popular sources of political information among students, social activity and other aspects are analyzed. The results of the study showed that the influence of the academic environment on the political attitudes of students is rather moderate. It was found that academic performance, the level of student social activity, the faculty of education do not have a significant impact on the political orientations of students. Communication with other students and teachers is essential. Moreover, the influence of teachers and disciplines of a socio-political orientation rather leads to an increase in political literacy and greater involvement of students in the political sphere.


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