General transformations from single-generation to multi-generation for homomorphic message authentication schemes in network coding

2019 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 416-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinyong Chang ◽  
Yanyan Ji ◽  
Maozhi Xu ◽  
Rui Xue
Keyword(s):  
Network Coding ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Single Generation ◽  
Authentication Schemes

scholarly journals Efficient Side-Channel Secure Message Authentication with Better Bounds

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-53
Author(s):  
Chun Guo ◽  
François-Xavier Standaert ◽  
Weijia Wang ◽  
Yu Yu
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Cryptographic Primitives ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Leakage Resilience ◽  
Authentication Schemes ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks ◽  
Provably Secure

We investigate constructing message authentication schemes from symmetric cryptographic primitives, with the goal of achieving security when most intermediate values during tag computation and verification are leaked (i.e., mode-level leakage-resilience). Existing efficient proposals typically follow the plain Hash-then-MAC paradigm T = TGenK(H(M)). When the domain of the MAC function TGenK is {0, 1}128, e.g., when instantiated with the AES, forgery is possible within time 264 and data complexity 1. To dismiss such cheap attacks, we propose two modes: LRW1-based Hash-then-MAC (LRWHM) that is built upon the LRW1 tweakable blockcipher of Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner, and Rekeying Hash-then-MAC (RHM) that employs internal rekeying. Built upon secure AES implementations, LRWHM is provably secure up to (beyond-birthday) 278.3 time complexity, while RHM is provably secure up to 2121 time. Thus in practice, their main security threat is expected to be side-channel key recovery attacks against the AES implementations. Finally, we benchmark the performance of instances of our modes based on the AES and SHA3 and confirm their efficiency.

Security Analysis and Improvements on Two Homomorphic Authentication Schemes for Network Coding

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 993-1002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chi Cheng ◽  
Jemin Lee ◽  
Tao Jiang ◽  
Tsuyoshi Takagi
Keyword(s):  
Network Coding ◽  
Security Analysis ◽  
Authentication Schemes

scholarly journals Information-Theoretically Secure Data Origin Authentication with Quantum and Classical Resources

Cryptography ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Georgios M. Nikolopoulos ◽  
Marc Fischlin
Keyword(s):  
Broad Class ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Authentication Codes ◽  
Message Authentication Codes ◽  
Secure Data ◽  
Authentication Schemes ◽  
Better Than

In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of whether quantum resources can offer any advantage over classical unconditionally secure message authentication codes. It is shown that a broad class of symmetric prepare-and-measure quantum message-authentication schemes cannot do better than their classical counterparts.

Secure quantum network coding based on quantum homomorphic message authentication

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen-zhen Li ◽  
Gang Xu ◽  
Xiu-Bo Chen ◽  
Yi-Xian Yang
Keyword(s):  
Network Coding ◽  
Quantum Network ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Quantum Network Coding

ROBUST MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION OVER A COLLECTIVE-NOISE CHANNEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (06) ◽  
pp. 1250064 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAO-QIU CAI ◽  
QING-QING LIU
Keyword(s):  
Message Authentication ◽  
Collective Noise ◽  
Authentication Codes ◽  
Message Authentication Codes ◽  
Authentication Schemes ◽  
Computational Resources ◽  
Logical Qubit

We give two robust message authentication schemes over a collective-noise channel. Each logical qubit is made up of two physical qubits and it is invariant over a collective-noise channel. We also analyze the security and show that it is not possible to forge valid message authentication codes for an adversary even if he/she has unlimited computational resources in the two schemes.

scholarly journals V-LDAA: A New Lattice-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme for VANETs System

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Liquan Chen ◽  
Tianyang Tu ◽  
Kunliang Yu ◽  
Mengnan Zhao ◽  
Yingchao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Privacy Protection ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Quantum Computer ◽  
Security Analysis ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Direct Anonymous Attestation ◽  
Authentication Schemes

Privacy protection and message authentication issues in VANETs have received great attention in academia. Many authentication schemes in VANETs have been proposed, but most of them are based on classical difficult problems such as factorization in RSA setting or Elliptic Curve setting and are therefore not quantum resistant. If a quantum computer becomes available in the next few decades, the security of these schemes will be at stake. This paper presents a vehicular lattice-based direct anonymous attestation (V-LDAA) scheme adopting an optimized signature scheme based on automorphism stability which achieves postquantum security. A distributed pseudonym update and vehicle revocation mechanism based on the lattice is introduced in this paper, which means vehicles can update their pseudonyms and revoke the identity certificate by themselves without the need for pseudonym resolutions or CRLs checking. Compared with the existing lattice-based attestation schemes in VANETs, computation costs during signing and verification operations in V-LDAA are no longer related to the number of users, which makes it suitable for large-scale VANETs. Security analysis shows that V-LDAA resists TPM theft attacks and provides users with user-controlled anonymity, user-controlled unlinkability, and unforgeability against quantum adversaries. Experimental results show that V-LDAA reduces the blind signature size by 18%. The speed of blind signing is increased by 30%, and blind verification operation is accelerated 3 times compared with the existing lattice-based direct anonymous attestation (LDAA) scheme.

scholarly journals Substitution Attacks against Message Authentication

2019 ◽  
pp. 152-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Armour ◽  
Bertram Poettering
Keyword(s):  
Message Authentication ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Authentication Protocols ◽  
New Class ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Software Updates ◽  
Authentication Schemes ◽  
Generic Attacks ◽  
Regular Scheme ◽  
Mass Surveillance

This work introduces Algorithm Substitution Attacks (ASAs) on message authentication schemes. In light of revelations concerning mass surveillance, ASAs were initially introduced by Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway as a novel attack class against the confidentiality of encryption schemes. Such an attack replaces one or more of the regular scheme algorithms with a subverted version that aims to reveal information to an adversary (engaged in mass surveillance), while remaining undetected by users. While most prior work focused on subverting encryption systems, we study options to subvert symmetric message authentication protocols. In particular we provide powerful generic attacks that apply e.g. to HMAC or Carter–Wegman based schemes, inducing only a negligible implementation overhead. As subverted authentication can act as an enabler for subverted encryption (software updates can be manipulated to include replacements of encryption routines), we consider attacks of the new class highly impactful and dangerous.

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