Dividend payouts and catering to demands: Evidence from a dividend tax reform

Author(s):  
Xin Yu ◽  
Yuetang Wang ◽  
Yingrun Chen ◽  
Guojun Wang
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 165-179
Author(s):  
Ida Suriya Ismail ◽  
Mohd Rizal Palil ◽  
Rosiati Ramli ◽  
Mara Ridhuan Che Abdul Rahman

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Bernard Yeung

In 2003, the United States enacted a tax reform that reduced, but did not eliminate, individual dividend income taxes. Cutting the dividend tax deprives corporate insiders of a justification for retaining earnings to build unprofitable corporate empires. But not eliminating it entirely preserves an advantage for institutional investors, who can put pressure on underperforming managers. This balance is broadly appropriate in the United States—whose large companies are freestanding and widely held. In addition, preserving the existing tax on intercorporate dividends, in place since the Roosevelt era, discourages the pyramidal corporate groups commonplace in other countries, and preserves America's large corporate sector of free-standing widely held firms.


2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 435-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven A. Bank ◽  
Brian R. Cheffins

Although corporate pyramids are currently commonplace world-wide and although there have been “noteworthy pyramiders” in American business history, this controversial form of corporate organization is now a rarity in the United States. The conventional wisdom is that corporate pyramids disappeared in the U.S. when New Deal policymakers began taxing dividends paid to corporate shareholders. This version of events is more fable than truth. The introduction of the intercorporate dividend tax did not foster a rapid dismantling of corporate pyramids. Instead, pyramidal arrangements were already rare in the U.S., other than in the utilities sector, and the demise of utility pyramids was prompted by the Public Util- ities Holding Company Act of 1935 rather than by tax reform.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 963-990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Hang Liu ◽  
Chenkai Ni ◽  
Kangtao Ye

The 2012 Dividend Tax Reform in China ties individual investors’ dividend tax rates to the length of their shareholding period. We find that firms facing a reduction (increase) in their individual investors’ dividend tax rates are more (less) likely to increase dividend payout. Such an effect is concentrated in firms where incentives of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are aligned. Furthermore, investors respond to this tax law change by reducing trading activities before the cum-dividend day and successfully lower their dividend tax penalty. Overall, our evidence enhances the notion that individual investors’ tax profiles shape firms’ payout policies.


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