scholarly journals Assessing joint commitment as a process in great apes

iScience ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 102872
Author(s):  
Raphaela Heesen ◽  
Adrian Bangerter ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler ◽  
Katia Iglesias ◽  
Christof Neumann ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Great Apes ◽  
Joint Commitment

scholarly journals Evidence of joint commitment in great apes' natural joint actions

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphaela Heesen ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler ◽  
Adrian Bangerter ◽  
Katia Iglesias ◽  
Federico Rossano ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Social Bonds ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Body Part ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Joint Actions ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Mutual Obligation ◽  
Previous Location

Human joint action seems special, as it is grounded in joint commitment—a sense of mutual obligation participants feel towards each other. Comparative research with humans and non-human great apes has typically investigated joint commitment by experimentally interrupting joint actions to study subjects’ resumption strategies. However, such experimental interruptions are human-induced, and thus the question remains of how great apes naturally handle interruptions. Here, we focus on naturally occurring interruptions of joint actions, grooming and play, in bonobos and chimpanzees. Similar to humans, both species frequently resumed interrupted joint actions (and the previous behaviours, like grooming the same body part region or playing the same play type) with their previous partners and at the previous location. Yet, the probability of resumption attempts was unaffected by social bonds or rank. Our data suggest that great apes experience something akin to joint commitment, for which we discuss possible evolutionary origins.

scholarly journals How apes get into and out of joint actions

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Genty ◽  
Raphaela Heesen ◽  
Jean-Pascal Guéry ◽  
Federico Rossano ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Joint Actions ◽  
Joint Activities ◽  
Evolutionary Response ◽  
Action Coordination ◽  
Complex Joint

Abstract Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework.

Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Account ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Shared Intentionality

Abstract Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.

Learning from Communication Versus Observation: Great Apes Ignore Their Observation When It Contradicts Communicatively Transmitted Information

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Marno ◽  
Christoph Johannes Völter ◽  
Brandon Tinklenberg ◽  
Dan Sperber ◽  
Josep Call
Keyword(s):  
Great Apes ◽  
Transmitted Information

Responsibility, Authority, and the Bindingness of Norms

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bennett W. Helm
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Recognition Respect

In having reactive attitudes, we hold each other responsible to the norms of a community. Doing so appropriately presupposes both that one has the requisite authority and that the other is bound by that norm. We can understand this by turning to communities of respect and the patterns of reactive attitudes discussed in Chapter 3. As a member of a community of respect, one is party to a joint commitment, constituted by interpersonal rational patterns of reactive attitudes, to the import of that community and thereby to the import of its members and norms. This joint commitment binds one to those norms and makes one be responsible to them. Likewise, to have authority is to have dignity as a member of such a community and so be a fit object of recognition respect by others who thereby normally ought to respond to the “call” of one’s reactive attitudes.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
General Demand

Given the practical significance of demand-rights, it is important to understand how they are possible. This is the general demand-right problem. Solving it turns out to be a challenging task, one that takes us beyond the resources of the central contemporary theories of rights.This book has provided a solution to the general demand-right problem: joint commitment is a ground of demand-rights....

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