Network structures and credit risk in cross-shareholdings among listed Japanese companies

This study has examined cases of management buyouts (MBOs), which have been increasing rapidly in number since around 2000. First, an overview of MBO practices is provided, indicating the beginning of an increase in divestment-type MBOs as a new means to implement corporate restructuring. Subsequently, the factors used by Japanese companies to decide on whether to pursue divestment MBO were analyzed while particularly addressing the parent companies––the sellers of the business units. Results suggest the following factors leading to the parent company divestment of subsidiaries and business units through MBOs: 1) poor performance of the business of the parent company, 2) high debt-to-asset ratio (debt reliance) of the parent company, 3) wide diversification of parent company operations, and 4) active reorganization of the parent company’s corporate group. The structure of corporate governance also affects MBO trends, indicating that 5) companies for which shareholding ratios of institutional investors and directors are high are more likely to implement a divestment MBO. Conversely, 6) companies that are protected by cross-shareholdings are less likely to implement corporate restructuring.

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Credit Risk Contagion and Systemic Risk on Networks

Mathematics ◽

10.3390/math7080713 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 7 (8) ◽

pp. 713 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Marina Dolfin ◽

Damian Knopoff ◽

Michele Limosani ◽

Maria Gabriella Xibilia

Keyword(s):

Credit Risk ◽

Systemic Risk ◽

Small World ◽

Financial Networks ◽

Network Structures ◽

Small World Networks ◽

Underlying Network ◽

Credit Risk Contagion ◽

Long Term Behavior

This paper proposes a model of the dynamics of credit contagion through non-performing loans on financial networks. Credit risk contagion is modeled in the context of the classical SIS (Susceptibles-Infected-Susceptibles) epidemic processes on networks but with a fundamental novelty. In fact, we assume the presence of two different classes of infected agents, and then we differentiate the dynamics of assets subject to idiosyncratic risk from those affected by systemic risk by adopting a SIIS (Susceptible-Infected1-Infected2-Susceptible) model. In the recent literature in this field, the effect of systemic credit risk on the performance of the financial network is a hot topic. We perform numerical simulations intended to explore the roles played by two different network structures on the long-term behavior of assets affected by systemic risk in order to analyze the effect of the topology of the underlying network structure on the spreading of systemic risk on the structure. Random graphs, i.e., the Erdös–Rényi model, are considered “benchmark” network structures while core-periphery structures are often indicated in the literature as idealized structures, although they are able to capture interesting, specific features of real-world financial networks. Moreover, as a matter of comparison, we also perform numerical experiments on small-world networks.

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Problem behavior in autism spectrum disorders: A paradigmatic self-organized perspective of network structures

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18001188 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 42 ◽

Author(s):

Lucio Tonello ◽

Luca Giacobbi ◽

Alberto Pettenon ◽

Alessandro Scuotto ◽

Massimo Cocchi ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Autism Spectrum Disorder ◽

Problem Behaviors ◽

Autism Spectrum ◽

The Self ◽

Network Structures ◽

Self Organized ◽

Critical Equilibrium ◽

Self Organized Criticality ◽

Acute Agitation ◽

Spectrum Disorders

AbstractAutism spectrum disorder (ASD) subjects can present temporary behaviors of acute agitation and aggressiveness, named problem behaviors. They have been shown to be consistent with the self-organized criticality (SOC), a model wherein occasionally occurring “catastrophic events” are necessary in order to maintain a self-organized “critical equilibrium.” The SOC can represent the psychopathology network structures and additionally suggests that they can be considered as self-organized systems.

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Cyclic co-evolution of cooperative behaviors and network structures

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e428672008-001 ◽

2008 ◽

Author(s):

Reiji Suzuki ◽

Masanori Kato ◽

Takaya Arita

Keyword(s):

Network Structures ◽

Cooperative Behaviors

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Validation of an integrity-based selection measure for credit risk potential

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e518422013-654 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Kelly D. Dages ◽

John W. Jones ◽

Bailey Klinger

Keyword(s):

Credit Risk ◽

Risk Potential

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Comprehensive Evaluation of Credit Risk of Warehousing Logistics Financial Business Supervisor

ICLEM 2010 ◽

10.1061/41139(387)525 ◽

2010 ◽

Author(s):

Juan He ◽

Liwei Kang ◽

Zhonghua Ma ◽

Ming Li

Keyword(s):

Credit Risk ◽

Comprehensive Evaluation

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Hidden “holes” in the capital of banks and the supply of credit to the real sector of economy

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2018-5-49-68 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 49-68 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

M. E. Mamonov

Keyword(s):

Credit Risk ◽

The Other ◽

Real Sector ◽

Capital Management ◽

Loan Loss ◽

Short Term ◽

The Real ◽

Ex Post ◽

The One

Our analysis documents that the existence of hidden “holes” in the capital of not yet failed banks - while creating intertemporal pressure on the actual level of capital - leads to changing of maturity of loans supplied rather than to contracting of their volume. Long-term loans decrease, whereas short-term loans rise - and, what is most remarkably, by approximately the same amounts. Standardly, the higher the maturity of loans the higher the credit risk and, thus, the more loan loss reserves (LLP) banks are forced to create, increasing the pressure on capital. Banks that already hide “holes” in the capital, but have not yet faced with license withdrawal, must possess strong incentives to shorten the maturity of supplied loans. On the one hand, it raises the turnovers of LLP and facilitates the flexibility of capital management; on the other hand, it allows increasing the speed of shifting of attracted deposits to loans to related parties in domestic or foreign jurisdictions. This enlarges the potential size of ex post revealed “hole” in the capital and, therefore, allows us to assume that not every loan might be viewed as a good for the economy: excessive short-term and insufficient long-term loans can produce the source for future losses.

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