Root Cause Analysis of Adverse Events Involving Opioid Overdoses in the Veterans Health Administration

Author(s):  
Brittany Norris ◽  
Christina Soncrant ◽  
Peter D. Mills ◽  
William Gunnar
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (9) ◽  
pp. e579-e590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Aboumrad ◽  
Alexander Fuld ◽  
Christina Soncrant ◽  
Julia Neily ◽  
Douglas Paull ◽  
...  

Purpose: Oncology providers are leaders in patient safety. Despite their efforts, oncology-related medical errors still occur, sometimes resulting in patient injury or death. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center of Patient Safety used data obtained from root cause analysis (RCA) to determine how and why these adverse events occurred in the VHA, and how to prevent future reoccurrence. This study details the types of oncology adverse events reported in VHA hospitals and their root causes and suggests actions for prevention and improvement. Methods: We searched the National Center for Patient Safety adverse event reporting database for RCA related to oncology care from October 1, 2013, to September 8, 2017, to identify event types, root causes, severity of outcomes, care processes, and suggested actions. Two independent reviewers coded these variables, and inter-rater agreement was calculated by κ statistic. Variables were evaluated using descriptive statistics. Results: We identified 48 RCA reports that specifically involved an oncology provider. Event types included care delays (39.5% [n = 19]), issues with chemotherapy (25% [n = 12]) and radiation (12.5% [n = 6]), other (12.5% [n = 6]), and suicide (10.5% [n = 5]). Of the 48 events, 27.1% (n = 13) resulted in death, 4.2% (n = 2) in severe harm, 18.8% (n = 9) in temporary harm, 20.8% (n = 10) in minimal harm, and 2.1% (n = 1) in no harm. The majority of root causes identified a need to improve care processes and policies, interdisciplinary communication, and care coordination. Conclusion: This analysis highlights an opportunity to implement system-wide changes to prevent similar events from reoccurring. These actions include comprehensive cancer clinics, usability testing of medical equipment, and standardization of processes and policies. Additional studies are necessary to assess oncologic adverse events across specialties.


AORN Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (4) ◽  
pp. 386-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina M. Soncrant ◽  
Lisa J. Warner ◽  
Julia Neily ◽  
Douglas E. Paull ◽  
Lisa Mazzia ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 134 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward J. Dunn ◽  
Paul J. Moga

Abstract Context Mislabeled laboratory specimens are a common source of harm to patients, such as repeat phlebotomy; repeat diagnostic procedure, including tissue biopsy; delay in a necessary surgical procedure; and the execution of an unnecessary surgical procedure. Mislabeling has been estimated to occur at a rate of 0.1% of all laboratory and anatomic pathology specimens submitted. Objective To identify system vulnerabilities in specimen collection, processing, analysis, and reporting associated with patient misidentification involving the clinical laboratory, anatomic pathology, and blood transfusion services. Design A qualitative analysis was performed on 227 root cause analysis reports from the Veterans Health Administration. Content analysis of case reports from March 9, 2000, to March 1, 2008, was facilitated by a Natural Language Processing program. Data were categorized by the 3 stages of the laboratory test cycle. Results Patient misidentification accounted for 182 of 253 adverse events, which occurred in all 3 stages of the test cycle. Of 132 misidentification events occurring in the preanalytic phase, events included wrist bands labeled for the wrong patient were applied on admission (n  =  8), and laboratory tests were ordered for the wrong patient by selecting the wrong electronic medical record from a menu of similar names and Social Security numbers (n  =  31). Specimen mislabeling during collection was associated with “batching” of specimens and printed labels (n  =  35), misinformation from manual entry on laboratory forms (n  =  14), failure of 2-source patient identification for clinical laboratory specimens (n  =  24), and failure of 2-person verification of patient identity for blood bank specimens (n  =  20). Of 37 events in the analytic phase, relabeling all specimens with accession numbers was associated with mislabeled specimen containers, tissue cassettes, and microscopic slides (n  =  27). Misidentified microscopic slides were associated with a failure of 2-pathologist verification for cancer diagnosis (n  =  4), and wrong patient transfusions were associated with mislabeled blood products (n  =  3) and a failure of 2-person verification for blood products before release by the blood bank (n  =  3). There were 13 events in the postanalytic phase in which results were reported into the wrong patient medical record (n  =  8), and incompatible blood transfusions were associated with failed 2-person verification of blood products (n  =  5). Conclusions Patient misidentification in the clinical laboratory, anatomic pathology, and blood transfusion processes were due to a limited set of causal factors in all 3 phases of the test cycle. A focus on these factors will inform systemic mitigation and prevention strategies.


2004 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. A. Neal ◽  
D. Watson ◽  
T. Hicks ◽  
M. Porter ◽  
D. Hill

The Department of Health publication Building a Safer NHS for Patients sets out the Government's plans for promoting patient safety (Department of Health, 2001). This follows growing international recognition that health services around the world have underestimated the scale of unintended harm or injury experienced by patients as a result of medical error and adverse events occurring in health care settings. These plans include a commitment to replace the procedures set out in the Department of Health circular HSG(94)27. This guidance details the methods for investigating every homicide (and some suicides) by patients in current or recent contact with specialist mental health services. Part of the process to modernise HSG(94)27 includes a plan to build expertise within the National Health Service (NHS) in the technique of root cause analysis. This investigative process was developed in industry to identify causal or systems factors in serious adverse events.


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