Pricing policies of a competitive dual-channel green supply chain

2016 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 2029-2042 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Li ◽  
Mengyan Zhu ◽  
Yushan Jiang ◽  
Zhenhong Li
Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zilong Song ◽  
Shiwei He ◽  
Baifeng An

This paper investigated, for the first time, the game and coordination of a dual-channel, three-layered, green fresh produce supply chain, with regard to its economic, social, and environmental performance. Considering that the market demand is dual-channel priced and sensitive to the degree of greenness and the freshness-level, four game models, under different scenarios have been established. These included a centralized scenario, a decentralized scenario, and two contractual scenarios. The equilibrium solutions under the four scenarios were characterized. From the perspective of a sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental performance of the supply chain was analyzed. To enhance the supply chain performance, two contract mechanisms were designed and the conditions for a multi-win outcome were obtained. Accordingly, many propositions and management implications were provided. The results showed that, (1) compared to the centralized supply chain case, the performance of the decentralized supply chain case is inferior; (2) in addition to increasing the concentration of the supply chain decisions, the two contracts proposed can effectively coordinate the green supply chain and improve its sustainable performance; and (3) the performance of the supply chain is positively driven by the consumers’ sensitivity to greenness degree and the freshness level of fresh produce. This paper fills a research gap and helps the participants of the channel recognize the operational decision principle of a complex green supply chain, in order to achieve a higher and a long-term sustainable-development performance.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Junjie Ma ◽  
Wenchao Yu ◽  
Shuxia Li ◽  
Linghong Zhang ◽  
Shaobin Zang

This paper develops a two-echelon green supply chain that consists of one green manufacturer and one retailer. The green manufacturer has both online direct and offline retail channels. Considering manufacturer’s risk attitude and product’s green level, the paper constructs centralized and decentralized game models when the online channel’s demand is uncertain. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the impacts of a set of factors, including consumer environmental awareness (CEA), product green level, and risk attitude on decision-making in the supply chain. Finally, we present numerical examples. The main findings are as follows: the manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from the improvement of CEA; hence, they could invest more to obtain more profits by improving CEA; manufacturer’s risk attitude has a negative impact on the pricing and profits of the supply chain; as such, the members of the supply chain should improve the accuracy of their demand forecast, so as to minimize risks and losses resulting from uncertainty in demand.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Xiaochun Chen ◽  
Rui Zhang ◽  
Bo Lv

With the rapid development of the Internet and changes in consumer buying habits, many manufacturers are increasingly relying on online channels to sell their products as opposed to traditional retail channels. In this study, we innovatively investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consumer green preferences (CGP) on supply chain performance and product green level in the dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC). Specifically, four models of DCGSC (centralized, independent CSR, cooperative CSR, and collaboration contract) are investigated. Next, we use game theory to investigate the optimal product green level, online and offline selling prices, social welfare, profits of supply chain enterprises, and the whole supply chain under the four models. We give numerical examples to demonstrate the effectiveness and viability of the four models. We find several interesting conclusions. First, increasing the attention to both CSR and CGP by supply chain enterprises is conducive to stimulating innovation and improving product green level. Second, when supply chain enterprises actively execute their CSR, they can reasonably control online and offline selling prices and increase consumer surplus and the profits of whole supply chain and social welfare are increased. Third, it is beneficial to increase the value of supply chain enterprises to enhance CSR within a certain threshold, but when CSR is higher than the threshold, the profitability of supply chain enterprises is weakened. Finally, collaboration contracts are capable of coordinating DCGSC and guaranteeing the profitability of supply chain enterprises.


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