scholarly journals Greasing the wheels: Pork and public goods contributions in a legislative bargaining experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 64-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nels Christiansen
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 443-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hülya Eraslan ◽  
Kirill S. Evdokimov

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.


2018 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSICA GOTTLIEB ◽  
KATRINA KOSEC

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas.


2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Parks ◽  
Blythe Duell ◽  
Larry Sanna
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Agnar Sandmo
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.


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