scholarly journals Assessing sources of error in comparative analyses of primate behavior: Intraspecific variation in group size and the social brain hypothesis

2016 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 126-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron A. Sandel ◽  
Jordan A. Miller ◽  
John C. Mitani ◽  
Charles L. Nunn ◽  
Samantha K. Patterson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Intraspecific Variation ◽  
Primate Behavior ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Comparative Analyses ◽  
Sources Of Error ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals When Individuals Do Not Stop at the Skin

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Barnard
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Collective Consciousness ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Evolution Of Language ◽  
Hunter Gatherers ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
The Social ◽  
Three Phases

This chapter examines contemporary hunter-gatherer societies in Africa and elsewhere in light of the social brain and the distributed mind hypotheses. One question asked is whether African hunter-gatherers offer the best model for societies at the dawn of symbolic culture, or whether societies elsewhere offer better models. The chapter argues for the former. Theoretical concepts touched on include sharing and exchange, universal kin classification, and the relation between group size and social networks. The chapter offers reinterpretations of classic anthropological notions such as Wissler's age-area hypothesis, Durkheim's collective consciousness and Lévi-Strauss's elementary structures of kinship. Finally, the chapter outlines a theory of the co-evolution of language and kinship through three phases (signifying, syntactic and symbolic) and the subsequent breakdown of the principles of the symbolic phase across much of the globe in Neolithic times.

scholarly journals Processing power limits social group size: computational evidence for the cognitive costs of sociality

2013 ◽  
Vol 280 (1765) ◽  
pp. 20131151 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Dávid-Barrett ◽  
R. I. M. Dunbar
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Communication Complexity ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Processing Power ◽  
The Social ◽  
Power Limits ◽  
The Cost

Sociality is primarily a coordination problem. However, the social (or communication) complexity hypothesis suggests that the kinds of information that can be acquired and processed may limit the size and/or complexity of social groups that a species can maintain. We use an agent-based model to test the hypothesis that the complexity of information processed influences the computational demands involved. We show that successive increases in the kinds of information processed allow organisms to break through the glass ceilings that otherwise limit the size of social groups: larger groups can only be achieved at the cost of more sophisticated kinds of information processing that are disadvantageous when optimal group size is small. These results simultaneously support both the social brain and the social complexity hypotheses.

Cliques, Coalitions, Comrades and Colleagues: Sources of Cohesion in Groups

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly Arrow
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Emotional Bonds ◽  
The Social ◽  
Interpersonal Ties

Cohesion may be based primarily on interpersonal ties or rely instead on the connection between member and group, while groups may cohere temporarily based on the immediate alignment of interests among members or may be tied together more permanently by socio-emotional bonds. Together, these characteristics define four prototypical group types. Cliques and coalitions are based primarily on dyadic ties. Groups of comrades or colleagues rely instead on the connection of members to the group for cohesion, which reduces the marginal cost of increasing group size. The strong glue of socio-emotional cohesion binds cliques and comrades, while coalitions and groups of colleagues are often based on weaker forms of cohesion. The mix of strong and weak adhesives and the greater scalability offered by the member-group bond provide the building blocks for assembling very large societies without overtaxing the social brain.

The Social Brain Hypothesis and Human Evolution

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin I. M. Dunbar
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Brain Size ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Behavioral Complexity ◽  
Cognitive Component ◽  
Hominin Evolution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Primate Sociality

Primate societies are unusually complex compared to those of other animals, and the need to manage such complexity is the main explanation for the fact that primates have unusually large brains. Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships that underpin coalitions, which in turn are designed to buffer individuals against the social stresses of living in large, stable groups. This is reflected in a correlation between social group size and neocortex size in primates (but not other species of animals), commonly known as the social brain hypothesis, although this relationship itself is the outcome of an underlying relationship between brain size and behavioral complexity. The relationship between brain size and group size is mediated, in humans at least, by mentalizing skills. Neuropsychologically, these are all associated with the size of units within the theory of mind network (linking prefrontal cortex and temporal lobe units). In addition, primate sociality involves a dual-process mechanism whereby the endorphin system provides a psychopharmacological platform off which the cognitive component is then built. This article considers the implications of these findings for the evolution of human cognition over the course of hominin evolution.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

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