In this paper, we assume that the supply chain for new energy vehicles (NEVs) consists of a manufacturer and N parts suppliers, considering that the R&D investment of both manufacturer and suppliers will affect the market demand of NEVs and NEVs credit, we construct decentralized and centralized decision-making models under the dual-credit policy to study the R&D investment strategy of supply chain enterprises. Furthermore, considering that suppliers can form alliances, we establish bargaining game models under the conditions of the non-alliance and alliance of suppliers, and discuss the coordination strategy for the NEVs supply chain. It is found that, under the dual-credit policy, the higher the credit coefficient of technology improvement, the higher the transaction price of credits, and the higher the R&D investment of supply chain. Dual-credit policy can effectively encourage NEVs supply chain to increase R&D investment, improve NEV technology level, and improve the profit of supply chain. Under the dual-credit policy, the increment profit distribution strategy based on a bargaining game model can coordinate the NEVs supply chain. When suppliers separately negotiate with the manufacturer, bringing the negotiation sequence forward, the supplier can get more profits. However, as the manufacturer has the right to determine the negotiation sequence, the supplier can only get the profit of the last round of negotiation, and the manufacturer can get excess profit. Forming a suppliers alliance can solve this problem effectively, and increase the profit of all suppliers when the alliance`s negotiating power is improved to a certain threshold.
Optimal strategies of automakers with demand and credit price disruptions under the dual-credit policy
