CEO power and labor-friendly policy

2021 ◽  
pp. 101699
Author(s):  
Humyra Jabeen Bristy ◽  
Jianlei Han ◽  
Gary Tian
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyan Cheng ◽  
Lei Gao ◽  
Janice E. Lawrence ◽  
David B. Smith

SUMMARY Section 408 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to review the filings of all SEC registrants every three years. Our study investigates this SEC monitoring role and differs from past SEC research by focusing on the SEC Division of Corporation Finance (DCF) rather than the Division of Enforcement and specifically on DCF's “review and comment” monitoring role. We rely on past theoretical research in management, finance, and accounting that provides us with arguments suggesting the DCF may target companies with strong CEOs and weak monitoring. Our findings cast light on the power struggle between the board and CEO by suggesting that the CEO's influence over the board may adversely affect board oversight. In addition, our results indicate that the DCF-prompted restatements lead companies to re-evaluate their governance structure.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6329
Author(s):  
Sohail Ahmad Javeed ◽  
Tze San Ong ◽  
Rashid Latief ◽  
Haslinah Muhamad ◽  
Wei Ni Soh

Firms in developing economies generally find ways to enhance their reputation and growth in the international market. In this context, an Audit Committee (AC) is composed of multiple skilled members that control and monitor auditing activities and present a transparent image of their firm, which automatically attracts investors and builds investor confidence. Therefore, this study used CEO power and ownership concentration as moderating factors to examine the connection between AC and firm performance. For this purpose, this study used the data of Pakistani manufacturing firms for the period 2008 to 2018 and applied the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, the Fixed Effect (FE) model, and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). To check the robustness of the results, this study used a Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) model. The findings of this study contended that AC and firm performance have a positive association with each other. Moreover, the findings revealed that CEO power positively influenced firm performance. Furthermore, lower ownership concentration is a valuable approach to maximize a firm’s performance. Importantly, the outcomes concluded that AC and firm performance have a positive connection with the moderating effects of CEO power. Moreover, AC and firm performance also have a positive association with the moderating effect of ownership concentration.


Author(s):  
Wolfgang Breuer ◽  
Manuel Hass ◽  
David Johannes Rosenbach
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Boyer

Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners' bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhilesh Bajaj ◽  
Li Sun

PurposeBorderline firms whose bond rating has a plus or minus specification by a rating agency face a greater potential for an upgrade or downgrade by the agency. The authors examine the level of chief executive officer (CEO) power in firms with a plus or minus bond rating. The authors test whether CEOs of these firms become more or less powerful, along with the effect of corporate governance and existing bond rating.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use a panel sample with 16,429 observations from 1992 to 2016 from the ExecuComp database.FindingsThe authors find that CEOs of borderline-rated firms tend to be less powerful, relative to firms with a non-proximate rating. This result is largely present in firms with a plus rating. The authors also find that our primary findings are mainly driven by firms with low bond ratings (i.e. below investment grade) or by firms with weak corporate governance. Lastly, the authors document that CEO personal characteristics (i.e. CEO age, gender and tenure) impact our findings.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, firms in our sample are large public companies, and the external validity of our results to smaller firms that may also be private is unknown. Second, the Compustat database discontinued reporting bond rating data (i.e. S&P bond ratings) in 2017. Hence, the authors are unable to analyze the CEO power of borderline firms in years after 2016.Practical implicationsThe study contributes to the larger debate on whether having powerful CEOs is beneficial to an organization or not, because prior research has examined the consequences of CEO power with mixed results. The authors document evidence to support the research stream that links CEO power to negative consequences.Social implicationsThe authors find that our primary results are enhanced in firms with weak corporate governance, which is consistent with prior research that finds effective governance may mitigate CEO power and agency problems between the CEO and the Board.Originality/valuePrior research primarily uses CEO power as a driver for performance. Our study focuses on CEO power as a dependent variable, with the bond rating change proximity as a driver of CEO power. The authors believe that this helps develop a more comprehensive understanding of CEO power.


Author(s):  
John R. Graham ◽  
Hyunseob Kim ◽  
Mark T. Leary
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Arfan Ikhsan ◽  
Nurlaila Nurlaila ◽  
Herkulanus Bambang Suprasto ◽  
Febi Yanti Batubara

Following the necessity to provide transparent information on social activities, corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is important for companies in Indonesia. This study aims to examine and analyze the effect of information ofCEO Power (CEOP), Board Capital (BCAPDUM), Media Disclosure (PMED), and Profitability (ROA) on CSR. This research usedmanufacturing companies listed on the IDX in 2016 as the subject. Using thepurposive sampling method, 26 companies were selected as the research sample. Research findings showed thatCEOP, PMED, and ROA haveastatistical effect on CSR disclosure, whereas BCAPDUM has no effect on CSR disclosure. Therefore, CEOP, PMED, and ROA have a positive and significant effect on CSR disclosure. Keywords:   CEO Power, Board Capital, Media Disclosure, Profitability, CSR


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