The motor roots of minimal self disorders in schizophrenia

2020 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. 302-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Ardizzi ◽  
Marianna Ambrosecchia ◽  
Livia Buratta ◽  
Francesca Ferri ◽  
Francesca Ferroni ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self

The investigation of minimal self based on self-illusion: The embodied constructivism position

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (7) ◽  
pp. 1244
Author(s):  
Jing ZHANG ◽  
Wei CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self

Design and Implementation of a Highly Selective Minimal Self-Replicating System

2006 ◽  
Vol 118 (38) ◽  
pp. 6492-6496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleftherios Kassianidis ◽  
Douglas Philp
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self ◽  
Design And Implementation

Minimal self-replicating systems

2004 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 634-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natasha Paul ◽  
Gerald F Joyce
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self

Selfhood, Schizophrenia, and the Interpersonal Regulation of Experience

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Ratcliffe
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Self ◽  
Traumatic Events ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Intentional State ◽  
Primitive Form ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Psychiatric Conditions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

This paper addresses the view that schizophrenia involves disturbance of the minimal self, and that this distinguishes it from other psychiatric conditions. I challenge the distinction between a minimal and an interpersonally constituted sense of self, through a consideration of the relationship between psychosis and interpersonally induced trauma. First of all, I suggest that even minimal self-experience must include a pre-reflective sense of what kind of intentional state one is in. Then I address the extent to which human experience and thought are interpersonally regulated. I propose that traumatic events, in childhood and/or in adulthood, can erode a primitive form of “trust” in other people that the integrity of intentionality depends upon, thus disrupting the phenomenological boundaries between intentional state types. I conclude that a distinction between minimal and interpersonal self is untenable, and that schizophrenia should be thought of in relational terms rather than simply as a disorder of the individual.

On the stability of the unit circle with minimal self-perimeter in normed planes

2013 ◽  
Vol 131 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-87
Author(s):  
Horst Martini ◽  
Anatoly Shcherba
Keyword(s):  
Unit Circle ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Normed Planes

Minimal Self-Similar Peano Curve of Genus 5 × 5

2020 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-138
Author(s):  
Yu. V. Malykhin ◽  
E. V. Shchepin
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self ◽  
Peano Curve ◽  
Self Similar

scholarly journals S104. WHAT OF THE MINIMAL SELF? IDENTITY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-DISORDERS IN FIRST EPISODE PSYCHOSIS

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (Supplement_2) ◽  
pp. S346-S347
Author(s):  
Susan Berkhout ◽  
Juveria Zaheer ◽  
Gary Remington
Keyword(s):  
First Episode Psychosis ◽  
First Episode ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Episode Psychosis

scholarly journals A map with topological minimal self-joinings in the sense of del Junco

1990 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan L. King
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self ◽  
System A ◽  
Theoretic Concept ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Cutting And Stacking

AbstractAndrés del Junco has proposed a definition of topological minimal self-joinings intended to parallel Dan Rudolph's measure-theoretic concept. By means of a rank-two ‘cutting and stacking’, this article constructs the first example of a system (a subshift) satisfying his proposed definition of 2-fold topological minimal self-joinings.The second part of the article shows that 2-fold topological minimal self-joinings does not imply 3-fold and that no map has 4-fold topological minimal self-joinings. This latter result follows from a generalization of a theorem of Schwartzman.

The minimal self needs a social update

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 1057-1065 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Kyselo
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Self
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