My History is Not Mine

<p>Globalisation has helped spread Eurocentric modernist architectural principles across most cultures. In a very real sense, many Eastern cultures are having their own unique architectural histories rewritten, even erased, and in danger of becoming lost. Burmese poet Zeyar Lynn’s poem “My History is Not Mine” represents a powerful lament, decrying the loss of unique cultural identities. Global contemporary architecture rarely recognises the rich litany of ideas that may arise from contemporary responses to cultures, and this design research-led thesis investigation seeks possible solutions to this loss. This investigation is framed around Lynn’s poem “My History is Not Mine”. It seeks to reinterpret some of the most ‘traditional’ elements of modern architecture—room, wall, ceiling, floor, threshold, window, etc.—through fictional narrative theory, allegory and experiential constructs. Eastern superstitions are used as provocateurs, starting points that help the project explicitly move away from traditional Eurocentric formalist architectural precepts. The goal is to test an architectural design method that prioritises the experiential and challenges some of the expected ‘norms’ within which Eurocentric modern architecture has been traditionally situated. This investigation is grounded in speculative architectural design. The three principal design stages of the methodology progress iteratively from physical analogue model, to digital animation, and finally to virtual gaming environment. The intention is to challenge traditional notions of architecture and the way architectural design concepts are conceived, and this is carried forward using a methodology that shifts experimental outcomes from the visual to the experiential—a virtual, time-based approach that deviates from conventional architectural design processes—in order to privilege the investigation of shifts in spatial conditions and experiential perceptions over time. The first stage of the investigation was to explore the abstraction of Eastern superstitions into physical models—‘allegorical artefacts’. These initial experiments were set up as a starting point to help propel the project towards a provocative and evocative pathway of discovery. By examining how these superstitions might be interpreted in a virtual gaming environment in the final stages of the investigation, the investigation challenges how these design interpretations can actively enable important architectural elements, such as threshold, spatial enclosure, visual axes, etc., to be redefined—placing the viewer into an experiential realm that is removed from traditional architectural referencing—and engage them as changes in spatial conditions experienced over time, rather than as primarily object-based. The time-based design outcomes are framed, experienced and tested in relation to Jerome Bruner’s theory of “The Narrative Construction of Reality”. Bruner posited ten requisite steps for achieving a meaningful narrative experience for the reader of narrative fiction. Fictional narrative relies on enabling the participant to self-identify within a fictional context as a vital tool that allows the participant to navigate through the story. This design-led research investigation examines how Bruner’s literary theory might be applied to an architectural experience, to help enable the experiential to become a driver for architectural design, where the participant’s own self-positioning in a time-based scheme becomes a vital element in constructing a unique architectural experience. The framework synthesises the design outcomes within a narrative experience that looks to discover unique solutions to the research objectives. The investigation applies Bruner’s ten constructs of narrative fiction to the architectural experience: diachronicity (relationships over time), particularity (unique cultural attributes), intentional state entailment (agency), hermeneutic composability (synecdoche), canonicity and breach (disruption of the expected), referentially (creation of new realities), genericness (changing the way a story is told), normativeness (multiplicity), contextual negotiability (cultural sensitivity and culturally negotiated meanings), and narrative accrual (collective representation). This thesis asks: How can experiential cultural artefacts be engaged as a conceptual framework to generate an allegorical architectural project? How can the digital gaming interface be used to help architectural design methods better explore the experiential as a design generator?</p>

My History is Not Mine

<p>Globalisation has helped spread Eurocentric modernist architectural principles across most cultures. In a very real sense, many Eastern cultures are having their own unique architectural histories rewritten, even erased, and in danger of becoming lost. Burmese poet Zeyar Lynn’s poem “My History is Not Mine” represents a powerful lament, decrying the loss of unique cultural identities. Global contemporary architecture rarely recognises the rich litany of ideas that may arise from contemporary responses to cultures, and this design research-led thesis investigation seeks possible solutions to this loss. This investigation is framed around Lynn’s poem “My History is Not Mine”. It seeks to reinterpret some of the most ‘traditional’ elements of modern architecture—room, wall, ceiling, floor, threshold, window, etc.—through fictional narrative theory, allegory and experiential constructs. Eastern superstitions are used as provocateurs, starting points that help the project explicitly move away from traditional Eurocentric formalist architectural precepts. The goal is to test an architectural design method that prioritises the experiential and challenges some of the expected ‘norms’ within which Eurocentric modern architecture has been traditionally situated. This investigation is grounded in speculative architectural design. The three principal design stages of the methodology progress iteratively from physical analogue model, to digital animation, and finally to virtual gaming environment. The intention is to challenge traditional notions of architecture and the way architectural design concepts are conceived, and this is carried forward using a methodology that shifts experimental outcomes from the visual to the experiential—a virtual, time-based approach that deviates from conventional architectural design processes—in order to privilege the investigation of shifts in spatial conditions and experiential perceptions over time. The first stage of the investigation was to explore the abstraction of Eastern superstitions into physical models—‘allegorical artefacts’. These initial experiments were set up as a starting point to help propel the project towards a provocative and evocative pathway of discovery. By examining how these superstitions might be interpreted in a virtual gaming environment in the final stages of the investigation, the investigation challenges how these design interpretations can actively enable important architectural elements, such as threshold, spatial enclosure, visual axes, etc., to be redefined—placing the viewer into an experiential realm that is removed from traditional architectural referencing—and engage them as changes in spatial conditions experienced over time, rather than as primarily object-based. The time-based design outcomes are framed, experienced and tested in relation to Jerome Bruner’s theory of “The Narrative Construction of Reality”. Bruner posited ten requisite steps for achieving a meaningful narrative experience for the reader of narrative fiction. Fictional narrative relies on enabling the participant to self-identify within a fictional context as a vital tool that allows the participant to navigate through the story. This design-led research investigation examines how Bruner’s literary theory might be applied to an architectural experience, to help enable the experiential to become a driver for architectural design, where the participant’s own self-positioning in a time-based scheme becomes a vital element in constructing a unique architectural experience. The framework synthesises the design outcomes within a narrative experience that looks to discover unique solutions to the research objectives. The investigation applies Bruner’s ten constructs of narrative fiction to the architectural experience: diachronicity (relationships over time), particularity (unique cultural attributes), intentional state entailment (agency), hermeneutic composability (synecdoche), canonicity and breach (disruption of the expected), referentially (creation of new realities), genericness (changing the way a story is told), normativeness (multiplicity), contextual negotiability (cultural sensitivity and culturally negotiated meanings), and narrative accrual (collective representation). This thesis asks: How can experiential cultural artefacts be engaged as a conceptual framework to generate an allegorical architectural project? How can the digital gaming interface be used to help architectural design methods better explore the experiential as a design generator?</p>

ВПЛИВ СИТУАЦІЇ СПІЛЬНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ НА МОВЛЕННЄВУ КОМУНІКАЦІЮ ДІТЕЙ

The article highlights the results of research on the problem of children's speech communication, which occurs in the process of interpersonal interaction: role-playing, sports games, productive and creative activities. It is concluded that the success of practical interaction and communication depends on the child's ability to express their own intentions in speech and understand the intentions of the partner. It was found that the initial and common element is the intentional aspect of the content of speech, the manifestation of the child's positive or negative intentional orientation. It is assumed that the study of the intentional structure of dialogues in the process of performing a common task will help to identify the intentional state of children, their current intentions, will reveal the interdependence of speech and practical actions of participants in joint activities.

Methodological impulses of Ján Horecký

The author of the study develops the ideas of J. Horecký, which relate to the language sign, the language system, language consciousness and its cultivation. Interpretations of J. Horecký’s statements on the systemic and communicative language sign lead to the conclusion that there is really only a communication sign as an ambivalent significant for users of the language who control the rules of its use. Significant are articulation‐acoustic units, which we feel as fictitious equivalents of what we experience when we are in the intentional state. J. Horecký’s reflections on the language system led the author to confront the user of the language as an actor of language practice with the user realizing himself as a reflexive linguistic being. In this confrontation, the language system came into focus in a practical and reflexive modality. On the background of these modalities of the language system, the author approaches linguistic consciousness in the interpretation of J. Horecký, in order to shed light on it in terms of two questions: (1) What is the degree of linguistic awareness of the mother tongue? (2) What is the “true” cultivation of language consciousness? These questions led the author to confront the linguistic realist with the anti‐realist and to discover a situation in which the linguist believes in realism but holds the position of anti‐realist. The author leans towards the realists and emphasizes the thesis that the representation of the language system is true when it corresponds to the language system resulting from the nature of language.

The self and its causal powers between metaphysics and science

According to the thesis of powerism, our world is pervaded by causal powers which are metaphysically basic. The aim of this paper is to defend the existence of the self, defined as a substantial entity, and its mental powers. This claim, which may seem a bold one, should not be deemed as inconsistent with scientific evidence. In fact, this approach does not ignore empirical knowledge, but is not bound only to it in order to understand entities, properties, and the relationship between them. Aristotelian powerism may show that the self, as the subject of one’s mental acts, is a substance that has an essential nature. Firstly, we shall analyze the immediate evidence we have in support of the existence of the self as a substantial entity. We will show that the self is a substance because it possesses an essential character, i.e. an individual essence. We will take into account the Aristotelian perspective of substance, trying to show how the presence of a necessary property that makes every subject identical to itself and the phenomenal features of one’s private experience point to the existence of a substantial entity that corresponds to the self. Secondly, we will try to justify the adoption of a metaphysical theory of causation based on powers, analyzing it in comparison with the main competing theories, namely hypotheticalism and nomism. Then, we shall proceed to show the causal properties of the substance in question, namely the mental powers. In fact, thirdly, we will embrace the thesis of powerism by defending the existence of a set of mental powers that should be attributed to the self. We will describe the main features of mental powers and we will show that they are conceivable as the pure intentional acts we perform by directing an intentional state towards an intentional object. In this way we show how a classic problem of philosophy of mind, relevant to science as well, can be addressed in an original way by a metaphysical approach involving powers.

Reformulating the network theory of mental disorders: Folk psychology as a factor, not a fact

Borsboom et al. (2019) argue that the network theory of mental disorders, if correct, blocks the biological reduction of mental disorders. This is mainly argued through a partial reformulation of network theory which combines multiple realizability of symptoms with a realist interpretation of folk psychological explanations. In this article, I argue that (a) the latter is problematic and that (b) the combination of these arguments voids the previous predictive and explanatory power of network theory. I then present a novel way in which network theory could avoid biological reductionism by considering folk psychology not as a fact, but as a structuring cause of causal connections between intentional state symptoms, together with culture and time period. Drawing from this, a novel principle for network theory is proposed, which allows it to retain force against reductionism while also retaining predictive and explanatory power.

Intentional content in psychopathologies requires an expanded interpretivism

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how. Incorporating this practical approach to intentional state ascription in psychopathological cases expands and improves traditional interpretivism.

Emergence and development of human language

I will introduce the topic of this paper by demarcating the notion of “language”, as a necessary first step in order to know what we mean when dealing with its appearance and development in the human species. In a first approximation, I’ll highlight the fact of being a human capacity with an intermediary function between a physical signal (i.e., sounds) and an intentional state of the individual (i.e., meanings). Such an intermediary function and its associated features (arbitrariness, symbolism, compositionality, productivity, systematicity) require a multidisciplinary treatment with different levels of explanation (linguistic, psychological, neurobiological) that give rise to corresponding models of that human language capacity. I’ll then review those models and make them converge into the appropriate frame of reference –characteristic of the cognitive science– for dealing with the main topic of this paper. It will be pursued along two sections, one devoted to the acquisition of language by the individual and its development from an ontogenetic perspective; and the other just devoted to language appearance in the evolutionary history of the species and, hence, to its phylogenetic development. I’ll conclude by underlining the natural (innate for its most part) and specialized character of the human faculty of language, together with its specificity as a unique property of the human species, which points to its relatively sudden appearance and to the possibility of facing a genuine example of evolutionary discontinuity.

Mutual Understanding Between Partners in Discourse

The current paper shows the results of the study on the intentional structure of everyday common communication, psychological consulting practice, scientific discussions and both interactive radio and TV programs. The main method of the study is Intent-analysis. It is based on the expert estimation that focuses on defining speech intentions related to the interlocutors’ orientations to their partners, current interaction and effects of their speech. The typical elements of an intentional structure of a dialogue and its modifications in the certain communicative context are represented. An intentional structure of a dialogue includes interlocutors’ intentions orientated to themselves, to their partners and environmental reality. Intentional content and frequency of mentioned elements depend on the type of a dialogue. Defined moderation of intentional variables during the dialogue could be considered as verification of the fact that understanding of intentional subtext of an utterance is an important precondition for conversational interactions. We characterized the variables that effect on the comprehension of intentions and cause communication fails. The significant factors of understanding between partners is the way how they realize speech intentions and what are the conditions of exposure to the verbal content. The orientation either to the partner or to the current situation is depend mostly on the intentional state of speaker’s mind. The results of the study prove the statement that both realization and comprehension of speech intentions are vital for mutual understanding, coordination of interactions and achieving the goals of communication.

Belief

We believe that there is coffee over there; we believe the special theory of relativity; we believe the Vice-Chancellor; and some of us believe in God. But plausibly what is fundamental is believing that something is the case – believing a proposition, as it is usually put. To believe a theory is to believe the propositions that make up the theory, to believe a person is to believe some proposition advanced by them; and to believe in God is to believe the proposition that God exists. Thus belief is said to be a propositional attitude or intentional state: to believe is to take the attitude of belief to some proposition. It is about what its propositional object is about (God, coffee, or whatever). We can think of the propositional object of a belief as the way the belief represents things as being – its content, as it is often called. We state what we believe with indicative sentences in ‘that’-clauses, as in ‘Mary believes that the Democrats will win the next election’. But belief in the absence of language is possible. A dog may believe that there is food in the bowl in front of it. Accordingly philosophers have sought accounts of belief that allow a central role to sentences – it cannot be an accident that finding the right sentence is the way to capture what someone believes – while allowing that creatures without a language can have beliefs. One way of doing this is to construe beliefs as relations to inner sentences somehow inscribed in the brain. On this view although dogs do not have a public language, to the extent that they have beliefs they have something sentence-like in their heads. An alternative tradition focuses on the way belief when combined with desire leads to behaviour, and analyses belief in terms of behavioural dispositions or more recently as the internal state that is, in combination with other mental states, responsible for the appropriate behavioural dispositions. An earlier tradition associated with the British Empiricists views belief as a kind of pale imitation of perceptual experience. But recent work on belief largely takes for granted a sharp distinction between belief and the various mental images that may or may not accompany it.