scholarly journals Model-checking games for logics of imperfect information

2013 ◽  
Vol 493 ◽  
pp. 2-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich Grädel
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Imperfect Information

scholarly journals Comparing approaches for model-checking strategies under imperfect information and fairness constraints

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-469
Author(s):  
Simon Busard ◽  
Charles Pecheur ◽  
Hongyang Qu ◽  
Franco Raimondi
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Fairness Constraints

scholarly journals Verification of Broadcasting Multi-Agent Systems against an Epistemic Strategy Logic

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Belardinelli ◽  
Alessio Lomuscio ◽  
Aniello Murano ◽  
Sasha Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Secret Sharing ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Perfect Recall ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Strategy Logic

We study a class of synchronous, perfect-recall multi-agent systemswith imperfect information and broadcasting (i.e., fully observableactions). We define an epistemic extension of strategy logic withincomplete information and the assumption of uniform and coherentstrategies. In this setting, we prove that the model checking problem,and thus rational synthesis, is decidable with non-elementarycomplexity. We exemplify the applicability of the framework on arational secret-sharing scenario.

scholarly journals Model checking for coalition announcement logic

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-69
Author(s):  
Н.А. Алешина
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
Polynomial Space ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Knowledge Change ◽  
Public Announcement Logic ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Imperfect Information Games ◽  
Simultaneous Moves

This talk is based on joint work with Rustam Galimullin and Hans van Ditmarsh, published in the German Conference on Artificial Intelligence (KI 2018). First I will introduce background and motivation for the work. I will introduce multi-agent Epistemic Logic (EL) for representing knowledge of (idealised) agents, Public Announcement Logic (PAL) for modelling knowledge change after truthful announcements, Group Announcement Logic (GAL) for modelling what kinds of changes in other agents’ knowledge a group of agents can effect, and Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL) which is the main subject of the talk. CAL studies how a group of agents can enforce a certain outcome by making a joint announcement, regardless of any announcements made simultaneously by the opponents. The logic is useful to model imperfect information games with simultaneous moves. It is also useful for devising protocols of announcements that will increase some knowledge of some agents, but also preserve other agents’ ignorance with respect to some information (in other words, preserve privacy of the announcers). The main new technical result in the talk is a model checking algorithm for CAL, that is, an algorithm for evaluating a CAL formula in a given finite model. The model-checking problem for CAL is PSPACE-complete, and the protocol requires polynomial space (but exponential time). DOI: 10.21146/2074-1472-2018-24-2-59-69

scholarly journals Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bastien Maubert ◽  
Munyque Mittelmann ◽  
Aniello Murano ◽  
Laurent Perrussel
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Polynomial Space ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Auction Mechanisms ◽  
Strategy Logic ◽  
Do So

Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs

2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Monitoring ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Environment Monitoring ◽  
Nature Protection ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Effective System

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

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