Public Policy Instruments for Procurement: An Empirical Analysis

2022 ◽  
Vol 176 ◽  
pp. 121472
Author(s):  
Yelena Kalyuzhnova ◽  
Dina Azhgaliyeva ◽  
Maksim Belitski
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Public Policy Instruments

scholarly journals Public Policy Instruments Selected in Policy Implementation Prostitution Prevention and Revocation in Surabaya City

2020 ◽  
Vol 005 (01) ◽  
pp. 19-22
Author(s):  
Nurul Umi Ati ◽  
Soesilo Zauhar ◽  
Sarwono Sarwono ◽  
Lely Indah Mindarti
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Public Policy Instruments

International trade protectionist policies and in-state preferences: A link

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sawsan Abutabenjeh ◽  
Stephen B. Gordon ◽  
Berhanu Mengistu
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The World ◽  
State Preference ◽  
Public Policy Instruments ◽  
The U.S

By implementing various forms of preference policies, countries around the world intervene in their economies for their own political and economic purposes. Likewise, twenty-five states in the U.S. have implemented in-state preference policies (NASPO, 2012) to protect and support their own vendors from out-of-state competition to achieve similar purposes. The purpose of this paper is to show the connection between protectionist public policy instruments noted in the international trade literature and the in-state preference policies within the United States. This paper argues that the reasons and the rationales for adopting these preference policies in international trade and the states' contexts are similar. Given the similarity in policy outcomes, the paper further argues that the international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help understand what states could expect in applying in-state preference policies.

scholarly journals Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives

1993 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 501
Author(s):  
Kernaghan Webb
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Functional Approach ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Legal Accountability ◽  
Public Policy Instruments

The federal government makes extensive use of its spending powers to establish programs intended to influence private behaviour in furtherance of public policy objectives. Incentives are frequently used where more conventional policy instruments would not be appropriate or available. However, in many situations, such programs lack adequate legal structure. The author concludes that the minimal legal structure allows for tremendous administrative flexibility, but detracts from effective accountability, and can negatively affect operational fairness. Taking a functional approach to analysis, the author argues that since incentives are public policy instruments intended to alter behaviour, they are akin (though not identical) to conventional regulatory approaches, and so should be subject to many of the same legal principles and structures as apply to conventional policy instruments. The effect would be more open and accountable frameworks for the creation and operation of incentives, which should result in better designed and more fair and efficiently functioning incentive regimes.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document